[FRIAM] The Biden plan - my version three years ago

[Raymond Parks]

Folks,

   Reading the Joseph Biden plan for a government in Iraq (the 
federation of autonomous states idea), I was reminded of something I 
wrote in an email to Sandia's Advanced Concepts Group back August of 
2003.  I've quoted it below for your enjoyment.  The context was as an 
answer to a question about showing the carrot in Iraq.

----------------------- Original Message -----------------------

   We have shown the terrorist community the stick - our military 
actions in Afghanistan and Iraq.  We need to show the supporters of the 
community the carrot.  Afghanistan and Iraq need to become showpieces of 
how enlightened Islamic nations can achieve the glory of the Caliphate 
without the fundamentalism of Wahabbism or Shi'a.  The US must place a 
top national priority on making this happen, devoting funds, personnel, 
and other resources as necessary.  The trick is that the height of 
Islamic civilization was a culture renowned for learning and toleration, 
which we need to support, not for it's religious fundamentalism.
   Historically, we have two models for nation building, the Marshall 
Plan and Post-WWII Japanese Occupation.  Although we can learn from 
both, neither method alone will work in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Cultural 
differences from modern Europe and Imperial Japan are too significant to 
allow many of the methods to work.  Both countries have long histories 
as tribal/clan/family cultures and are not ready for government based on 
modern nation-state principles.  Neither country has a middle class able 
to resume commerce and government as did Europe.  Afghanistan has never 
developed a significant middle class (the country had just enough to 
support the Soviet-backed government of the '70s and '80s but these 
people were effectively removed during the fighting of the '80s and by 
the Taliban since).  Iraq had developed a real middle class but that 
development was co-opted by the Baath Party.  The Iraqi middle class is 
very weak; members of the middle class are either former Baath Party 
members and therefore untrustworthy and ineffective or they were 
dissidents ruthlessly suppressed or driven into exile.  Iraq and 
Afghanistan are different from post-WWII Japan in that their people are 
not accustomed to obedience and hierarchy.
   The US needs to start nation building with government that uses the 
strengths of each country to achieve the goal of regaining former glory 
without Islamic fundamentalism.  More so in Afghanistan than Iraq, 
tribal and ethnic connections are stronger than local, regional, or 
national.  Therefore, any constitution written for either country must 
recognize and capitalize on this fact.  Instead of a system of local, 
regional (state), and national government like the US, Europe and Japan, 
these countries must be organized along ethnic boundaries.  Each tribe 
or ethnic group must have their own elected representative body, 
executive, and judiciary at various levels.  Where a local area is 
exclusively one ethnic group (e.g. Najef), the local government of that 
ethnic group will be the sole local government.  Where a local area is 
mixed (e.g. Baghdad), there would be parallel local governments for each 
ethnic group.  At the same time, there must be a government structure 
that mediates and manages across the ethnic/tribal boundaries.  This is 
necessary for two reasons.  The immediate necessity is to resolve 
disputes and solve problems that involve more than one tribe/ethnic 
group.  In the long run, as more and more disputes and problems cross 
boundaries, this will become the real government and the tribal/ethnic 
governments will decrease in importance.  The meta-government must be 
inclusive of even the smallest minority but must also reflect the 
reality of population.  A dual legislative body is the traditional way 
to accomplish this - one group with equal representation of each 
ethnic/tribal government and another whose representation is based on 
numbers of each group.  Splitting the legislative powers between the two 
in the same way as between the US Senate and House would make sense. One 
other part of the constitution must be an explicit declaration of equal 
rights such as MacArthur forced into the Japanese constitution.
   At the same time as the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan reflect 
the realities of their culture, the commercial and infrastructure 
entities should include ordinary citizens.  Listening to reports on NPR, 
I heard of a Shi'a neighbourhood in Baghdad where the sewage system has 
failed.  Even before the war, the Sunni government had neglected it and 
the looting after the war ruined it.  The report mentioned that men from 
the neighbourhood shovel up the excess effluent and remove it manually. 
  The residents blame the US for failing to keep looters from stealing 
the parts whose absence crippled the sewage processing plant.  They are 
reflecting an attitude derived from the Baath party government that 
public infrastructure is the responsibility of and under the authority 
of the government.  We need to turn that attidude around, both in words 
and actions.  Water, sewer, electic and communications infrastructures 
need to become co-ops owned by the users of those infrastructures.  If 
we tell the people of Iraq and Afghanistan that the customers/users of 
the infrastructures are the real owners we plant two seeds - the idea 
that they must help themselves and the beginnings of real commerce.  At 
the same time as we turn the problems back on the people, we must assure 
them that we will provide advice and help.  If I were the US sewer czar 
of Baghdad (and there is one according to the radio report), I would 
start holding neighbourhood meetings wherein I would tell the locals 
that they own the sewer.  I would present the problems (particularly the 
missing parts problem), suggest solutions, and ask them what they want 
me to do.  The solutions I would present would be carefully chosen to 
require customer/user participation and effort and I would refuse to 
support any proposals that do not.  I would offer shovels, honey-wagons, 
front-end loaders, dump trucks, back-hoes, pipes and valves, but the 
"owners" would have to use them or pay someone else to use them.  I 
would also offer engineering expertise to teach them how to engineer the 
rebuilding, management expertise to teach how to run the projects, and 
heavy equipment expertise to teach how to use the equipment.  The two 
parts of this plan that we must have the discipline to adhere to are, 
first, that nothing is done by the US alone and Iraqis are involved in 
every action, and, second, that everything costs the customers/user 
something (either in money or effort).  Back to the case of the Shi'a 
neighbourhood, I would encourage the customers to find the looted parts, 
organize their shovel brigades, and involve them in the replacement and 
upgrade of the system.  The same methods apply to other infrastructures. 
  When the problems surpass the local level, then the customers/users 
will need to select representatives (directors) to meet and solve the 
problems together.
   Earlier, I said that the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are 
the stick in the effort to reduce support for global terrorism. However, 
I think that we and the world recognize that the arm wielding the stick 
is getting tired.  We just don't have the military resources to wage 
another such campaign while these are still underway.  We need to find a 
way to make our stick credible, again.  As much as I would like to see 
us re-institute universal conscription, I don't think that is a likely 
option, yet.
   One of the major problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan is a 
population of combative, unemployed young men.  Many of them have been 
trained in para-military operations.  All of them have tribal, ethnic, 
and religious loyalties that could lead them to engage in terrorism and 
guerilla warfare against each other and the US.
   Historically, the best solution to this problem has been to recruit 
the men of military age and form units of similiar background for use 
far away from their homes.  The English used this after the Fourty-Five 
to help subdue the Scots, the US used this to some extent in the Indian 
campaigns, the Russians did this under the Czar to coopt the Cossacks as 
well as under the Communist regime to quell uprisings, and the British 
did this in India with the Sikh and the Gurkha.  I suggest that we solve 
this problem and our own lack of military resources at the same time. We 
should recruit units for the United Nations (not for our military) out 
of Afghanistan and Iraq and then send them to replace our own units in 
peacekeeping missions as well as to each other's countries.  This is a 
quick way to provide employment to young men, it would relieve us of 
responsibilities in the Balkans and elsewhere, and it would remove those 
most likely to cause trouble from their own countries.  I would use Army 
Special Forces to perform the training and cadre missions necessary.

-- 
Ray Parks                   rcparks at sandia.gov
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