[FRIAM] Any non-biological complex systems?

[┣glen┫]

I think the sophistry around the defn of "model" is important, but a distraction from this conversation.  (I've got a few publications that target it almost directly if anyone cares.)  As Russ and Nick point out, this conversation is about the boundary and its ontological status.  Russ is leaping a bit further ahead and focusing on an _effect_ of the boundary while Nick (and I) are focusing on the prerequisite for symbol machines.

My claim is that Stephen's 3 examples are _not_ systems, much less complex systems at all because they are idealized out of their context.  In order to be systems, they have to have some sort of objectively determined boundary (like a petri dish).  Any bounded gob of goo can be thought of as a system.  An agent, however, must be _closed_ under some operation.  Hence, all agents are systems.  But not all systems are agents.  Whether the agent's boundary is loopy, self-defining, or not is the subject of Rosen's work (from which Kauffman's is derivative).

Whether a symbol machine can be merely a system (with an objectively determined boundary) or must be an agent (with some form of closure) is an important question.


On 05/28/2017 08:40 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> [NST==>Ok, but the question before us is, Does the system itself “get to participate” in determining its own boundaries.  <==nst] 

On 05/28/2017 08:35 AM, Russ Abbott wrote:> 
> Symbolic processing, including computers, is a step beyond switches. Half a
> century ago Newell and Simon defined computers as physical symbol machines.
> We and many biological organisms are  physical symbol machines also. I
> think that's an important way to look at it.
> 
> The thing about physical symbol machines is that the rules of causation
> they follow are more complex than those of physics.


-- 
␦glen?