[FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 173, Issue 17
HighlandWindsLLC Miller
highlandwinds at gmail.com
Sun Nov 26 13:16:43 EST 2017
further on correlation and causation -- re below quote, so also, if
observation shows that every time a jar fills with hot smoke it cracks, a
correlation, also either and/or the smoke particles movement and/or heat
from smoke is causing the cracking.... or is it the sunlight coming in
through the window, striking the glass? -- if occurs every time, then
evidence would suggest the smoke which can be replicated, where as sunlight
shifts.
a great Sunday argument.
Peggy
Nick,
Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register. Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes,
et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation. This
involves learning causal models from observational rather that experimental
data, including data from the past. Also remember the distinction between
"actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and
statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
Frank
On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 5:44 AM, <friam-request at redfish.com> wrote:
> Send Friam mailing list submissions to
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>
> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Re: Downward causation (Frank Wimberly)
> 2. Re: Downward causation (Nick Thompson)
> 3. Re: Downward causation (Eric Charles)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
> Cc:
> Bcc:
> Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 22:13:21 -0700
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
> Nick,
>
> They are not beyond your ability to understand. I am happy to explain as
> much as you like.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Frank,
>>
>>
>>
>> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive. I have looked at
>> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
>> understand. So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
>> those models work. Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the
>> threshold of our old argument about whether mathematics needs explanation …
>> it just is, You like it or you don’t. Sounds like a good discussion to
>> have on Friday
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
>> Wimberly
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register. Pearl, Glymour,
>> Spirtes, et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.
>> This involves learning causal models from observational rather that
>> experimental data, including data from the past. Also remember the
>> distinction between "actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer
>> causes it to break) and statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
>>
>>
>>
>> There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank Wimberly
>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>>
>>
>>
>> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
>> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>>
>>
>>
>> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
>> whatsoever. The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
>> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
>> That would seem to be overkill. There is, of course, the comparative
>> method and, of course, “thought experiments.” Nothing in the maxim, I
>> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
>> conceptualize it. Seems like mushy ground.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
>> Tollander
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> One of the recurring conundrums of teaching. Finger pointing at the
>> moon....
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" <eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> "Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
>> and the misattribution thing? "
>>
>>
>> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one
>> does the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large
>> part, the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
>> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
>> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>>
>>
>>
>> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
>> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
>> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
>> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
>> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
>> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
>> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
>> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
>> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
>> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
>> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is *causing
>> *the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that
>> some other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.
>>
>>
>>
>> Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
>> sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
>> perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
>> of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
>> Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
>> domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
>> justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
>> (the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).
>>
>>
>>
>> Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
>> would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
>> information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
>> the crucial bit of information brought into focus.
>>
>>
>>
>> With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind.... Hercule Poirot would
>> narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
>> clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
>> the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
>> clue itself were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it
>> was a trivial thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution
>> by virtue of not being self-aware of the abduction taking place.
>>
>>
>>
>> Did that get anywhere?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------
>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>>
>> U.S. Marine Corps
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson <
>> nickthompson at earthlink.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you, Eric. OF COURSE, that is what I should have said. Thank you
>> for saying it so excellently. Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as
>> a form of abduction. I would hope I would have thought to say it myself,
>> if I wasn’t so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang. But that way of
>> speaking makes me CRAAAAAY-ZEEE. How can something defined in terms of
>> something that didn’t happen
>>
>>
>>
>> Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse. A
>> mystery, you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is
>> applied to a situation where it doesn’t really work. Causal attributions
>> are often falsely singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if the
>> motion of a billiard ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.
>> But what we really have to back those attributions up is a pattern of
>> relations between impacts of cue balls and motions of object balls. When
>> we step up to the next level of organization, the confusion disappears,
>> doesn’t it? Events of Type A are said to cause events of type B when
>> experiments with proper controls show that an increase in the occurrence of
>> type B events is dependent upon the previous occurrence of Type A events.
>> But to say that any particular Type A event causes a Type B event is an
>> abuse of language, a mystery.
>>
>>
>>
>> Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
>> and the misattribution thing?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
>> Charles
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward Hicausation
>>
>>
>>
>> What great timing! One of the best philosophy comics on the web right now
>> is "Existential Comics." This very week they took a swipe at "causation."
>> Here is an adventure of Sherlock Hume: http://existentialcomics.com/c
>> omic/212
>>
>> I suspect that the best I can do to contribute beyond that is to try fall
>> back on my role of scolding Nick.
>>
>> Nick *should *be asserting that "causation" is a metaphor. The billiard
>> ball are the understood scenario. Billiard balls sitting on a still table,
>> unmolested don't move. But if you knock one ball into another ball, the
>> other ball move so. When I say something like "The approaching lion *caused
>> *the gazelle to move", I am invoking the metaphor that the lion-gazelle
>> relationship is like that of the billiard balls. Had the lion not been
>> doing what it was doing, the gazelle would not have moved away. It isn't
>> simply a "counterfactual." It is an assertion (an *abduction*) regarding
>> broad patterns of gazelle behavior that can be readily observed under many
>> other situations.** Some of those, I have presumably already seen. Those
>> constitute the "basic implication" of the metaphor. Others I have not
>> observed, and those constitute potential investigatory events - not
>> ethereal thought experiments. As in true of any metaphor, there are also
>> aspects of the billiard-ball scenario I do not intend to map perfectly onto
>> the lion-gazelle scenario (e.g., the lion and gazelle are not spheres).
>>
>> So that is where Hume and those like him go wrong. They want to beat the
>> billiard balls scenario itself to death. But that's not how metaphors work.
>> There is something understood about the billiard balls, and it is
>> that-understood-thing that is being generalized to another scenario. Any
>> attempt to explain the billiard balls will involve evoking *different *metaphors,
>> which would entail different assertions (abductions). There is no
>> foundation (Peirce tells us, amongst others), Descartes was on a fool's
>> errand: In the land of inference, it is turtles all the way down.
>>
>>
>>
>> ** The breadth of the patterns being referenced is, I believe, where
>> Frank's point about probability slips in. One could certainly simplify the
>> complexity of the assertion by making lumping similar scenarios together
>> and speaking about the probability of a certain gazelle behavior within the
>> cluster of similar situations.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------
>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>>
>> U.S. Marine Corps
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 5:08 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Also Known As: Beware equating experience with existence.
>>
>> On 11/21/2017 02:00 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> > Beware the tendency to think that if you can't immediately measure
>> something then it doesn't exist.
>>
>>
>> --
>> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> To: "'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group'" <
> friam at redfish.com>
> Cc:
> Bcc:
> Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2017 23:29:17 -0700
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
> Frank,
>
>
>
> I suspect that “actual” causation is just the hypostization of statistical
> causation. But we’ll see.
>
>
>
> I look forward to talking about the models.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 10:13 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> They are not beyond your ability to understand. I am happy to explain as
> much as you like.
>
>
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Frank,
>
>
>
> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive. I have looked at
> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
> understand. So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
> those models work. Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the
> threshold of our old argument about whether mathematics needs explanation …
> it just is, You like it or you don’t. Sounds like a good discussion to
> have on Friday
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register. Pearl, Glymour, Spirtes,
> et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation. This
> involves learning causal models from observational rather that experimental
> data, including data from the past. Also remember the distinction between
> "actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer causes it to break) and
> statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
>
>
>
> There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
>
>
>
> Frank
>
>
>
>
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>
>
>
> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>
>
>
> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
> whatsoever. The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
> That would seem to be overkill. There is, of course, the comparative
> method and, of course, “thought experiments.” Nothing in the maxim, I
> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
> conceptualize it. Seems like mushy ground.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
> Tollander
> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>
>
>
> One of the recurring conundrums of teaching. Finger pointing at the
> moon....
>
>
>
>
>
> On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" <eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> "Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing? "
>
>
> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one does
> the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large part,
> the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>
>
>
> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is *causing
> *the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that
> some other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.
>
>
>
> Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
> sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
> perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
> of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
> Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
> domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
> justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
> (the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).
>
>
>
> Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
> would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
> information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
> the crucial bit of information brought into focus.
>
>
>
> With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind.... Hercule Poirot would
> narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
> clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
> the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
> clue itself were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it
> was a trivial thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution
> by virtue of not being self-aware of the abduction taking place.
>
>
>
> Did that get anywhere?
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----------
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>
> U.S. Marine Corps
>
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
> Hi, Eric,
>
>
>
> Thank you, Eric. OF COURSE, that is what I should have said. Thank you
> for saying it so excellently. Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as
> a form of abduction. I would hope I would have thought to say it myself,
> if I wasn’t so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang. But that way of
> speaking makes me CRAAAAAY-ZEEE. How can something defined in terms of
> something that didn’t happen
>
>
>
> Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse. A
> mystery, you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is
> applied to a situation where it doesn’t really work. Causal attributions
> are often falsely singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if the
> motion of a billiard ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.
> But what we really have to back those attributions up is a pattern of
> relations between impacts of cue balls and motions of object balls. When
> we step up to the next level of organization, the confusion disappears,
> doesn’t it? Events of Type A are said to cause events of type B when
> experiments with proper controls show that an increase in the occurrence of
> type B events is dependent upon the previous occurrence of Type A events.
> But to say that any particular Type A event causes a Type B event is an
> abuse of language, a mystery.
>
>
>
> Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
> and the misattribution thing?
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
> Charles
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward Hicausation
>
>
>
> What great timing! One of the best philosophy comics on the web right now
> is "Existential Comics." This very week they took a swipe at "causation."
> Here is an adventure of Sherlock Hume: http://existentialcomics.com/
> comic/212
>
> I suspect that the best I can do to contribute beyond that is to try fall
> back on my role of scolding Nick.
>
> Nick *should *be asserting that "causation" is a metaphor. The billiard
> ball are the understood scenario. Billiard balls sitting on a still table,
> unmolested don't move. But if you knock one ball into another ball, the
> other ball move so. When I say something like "The approaching lion *caused
> *the gazelle to move", I am invoking the metaphor that the lion-gazelle
> relationship is like that of the billiard balls. Had the lion not been
> doing what it was doing, the gazelle would not have moved away. It isn't
> simply a "counterfactual." It is an assertion (an *abduction*) regarding
> broad patterns of gazelle behavior that can be readily observed under many
> other situations.** Some of those, I have presumably already seen. Those
> constitute the "basic implication" of the metaphor. Others I have not
> observed, and those constitute potential investigatory events - not
> ethereal thought experiments. As in true of any metaphor, there are also
> aspects of the billiard-ball scenario I do not intend to map perfectly onto
> the lion-gazelle scenario (e.g., the lion and gazelle are not spheres).
>
> So that is where Hume and those like him go wrong. They want to beat the
> billiard balls scenario itself to death. But that's not how metaphors work.
> There is something understood about the billiard balls, and it is
> that-understood-thing that is being generalized to another scenario. Any
> attempt to explain the billiard balls will involve evoking *different *metaphors,
> which would entail different assertions (abductions). There is no
> foundation (Peirce tells us, amongst others), Descartes was on a fool's
> errand: In the land of inference, it is turtles all the way down.
>
>
>
> ** The breadth of the patterns being referenced is, I believe, where
> Frank's point about probability slips in. One could certainly simplify the
> complexity of the assertion by making lumping similar scenarios together
> and speaking about the probability of a certain gazelle behavior within the
> cluster of similar situations.
>
>
>
>
>
> -----------
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>
> U.S. Marine Corps
>
>
>
> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 5:08 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Also Known As: Beware equating experience with existence.
>
> On 11/21/2017 02:00 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> > Beware the tendency to think that if you can't immediately measure
> something then it doesn't exist.
>
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
>
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>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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>
>
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> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Eric Charles <eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
> Cc:
> Bcc:
> Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2017 07:44:30 -0500
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
> Frank, Nick,
> I highly recommend that the book "Beyond Versus
> <http://fixingpsychology.blogspot.com/2015/08/does-nature-versus-nurture-makes-sense.html>".
> Though it limits itself to the context of the nature vs. nurture debates
> (over a century's worth of them), it fits this context because it is a
> book-length study of the differences in mindset and result between trying
> to predict variation and trying to elucidate causal mechanisms. To set the
> task of determining whether variation in smoking habits relate to variation
> in cancer rates is quite a different task from trying to determine
> biological pathways that lead from smoking to cancer. Statistics plays a
> role in both, to be sure, but the roles are very different and should not
> be confused.
>
>
> -----------
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
> U.S. Marine Corps
> <echarles at american.edu>
>
> On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 1:29 AM, Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net
> > wrote:
>
>> Frank,
>>
>>
>>
>> I suspect that “actual” causation is just the hypostization of
>> statistical causation. But we’ll see.
>>
>>
>>
>> I look forward to talking about the models.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
>> Wimberly
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 10:13 PM
>>
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> They are not beyond your ability to understand. I am happy to explain as
>> much as you like.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank
>>
>> Frank Wimberly
>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 10:10 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Frank,
>>
>>
>>
>> Please forgive me for not being adequately responsive. I have looked at
>> some of the sources you have mentioned and they are beyond my ability to
>> understand. So, I am dependent on you (or others) to explain to me how
>> those models work. Now, I realize that this perhaps brings us to the
>> threshold of our old argument about whether mathematics needs explanation …
>> it just is, You like it or you don’t. Sounds like a good discussion to
>> have on Friday
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
>> Wimberly
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 9:55 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>>
>>
>> Whenever I say this it doesn't seem to register. Pearl, Glymour,
>> Spirtes, et al have put statistical causal reasoning on a firm foundation.
>> This involves learning causal models from observational rather that
>> experimental data, including data from the past. Also remember the
>> distinction between "actual" causation (hitting this jar with a hammer
>> causes it to break) and statistical causation (smoking causes cancer).
>>
>>
>>
>> There is an extensive and growing literature on these topics.
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Frank Wimberly
>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 9:43 PM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> Well, I would like to say that my personal version of the Pragmatic Maxim:
>>
>>
>>
>> *Consider what possible experimental effects the invocation of your
>> conception has; those effects are the entire meaning of your conception.*
>>
>>
>>
>> … means that the causality makes reference to experiments or to nothing
>> whatsoever. The problem is, of course, that strictly speaking that means
>> we cannot apply causality to past events, including evolutionary ones.
>> That would seem to be overkill. There is, of course, the comparative
>> method and, of course, “thought experiments.” Nothing in the maxim, I
>> suppose, requires me to actually perform the experiment; only to
>> conceptualize it. Seems like mushy ground.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Carl
>> Tollander
>> *Sent:* Wednesday, November 22, 2017 7:10 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward causation
>>
>>
>>
>> One of the recurring conundrums of teaching. Finger pointing at the
>> moon....
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Nov 22, 2017 14:32, "Eric Charles" <eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> "Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
>> and the misattribution thing? "
>>
>>
>> I would head in a different direction. The question is about, how one
>> does the attribution; the answer is, most people do it poorly. In a large
>> part, the history of scientific *method *is a history of determining the
>> conditions under which we allow causal attributions. When I used to teach,
>> I illustrated this most directly in my intro-to-behaviorism class.
>>
>>
>>
>> That class included a lot of discussion of applied behavior analysis
>> (altering the environment of a person in an effort to improve their
>> behavioral functioning within that environment). The central challenge is
>> that the ABA practitioner typically only has access to the (usually a)
>> child for a very limited time, and you don't want to jump to the conclusion
>> that your efforts are working when external factors might equally explain
>> the change in the child's behavior. We work up from very basic methods of
>> increasing confidence. We eventually build up to an ABAB design, in which
>> the prospective solution is applied, then removed, then applied, then
>> removed. Every time the problem behavior goes away, comes back, goes away,
>> and comes back, etc., our confidence increases that our intervention is *causing
>> *the improvement in behavior, because it is increasingly unlikely that
>> some other factor just so happens to be varying at exactly the same times.
>>
>>
>>
>> Part of the process of "becoming" "a scientist" is increasingly the
>> sophistication of research needed before you draw such conclusions... or,
>> perhaps more accurately, how well you match the tentativeness-vs-solidity
>> of your beliefs to the type of empirical evidence in favor of them.
>> Eventually one is drawing on a wealth of difficult-to-specify
>> domain-specific knowledge in support of any conclusion, but likely
>> justifies the conclusion on the basis of the latest bit of crucial evidence
>> (the one which, for them, solidifies the pattern).
>>
>>
>>
>> Though... suddenly I might have a legitimate response to your inquiry: I
>> would hypothesize that people often mistakenly point at the bit of
>> information that was crucial to them, rather than the larger pattern that
>> the crucial bit of information brought into focus.
>>
>>
>>
>> With Murder on the Orient Express on my mind.... Hercule Poirot would
>> narrate such a thing explicitly, would he not? He would say "The crucial
>> clue in helping me unravel my confusion was X" and then he would explain
>> the larger pattern thus illuminated. A lesser detective would act as if the
>> clue itself were crucial in its own right - "This is the key!" - even if it
>> was a trivial thing on its own, thus committing a dramatic misattribution
>> by virtue of not being self-aware of the abduction taking place.
>>
>>
>>
>> Did that get anywhere?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------
>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>>
>> U.S. Marine Corps
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 22, 2017 at 1:07 AM, Nick Thompson <
>> nickthompson at earthlink.net> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you, Eric. OF COURSE, that is what I should have said. Thank you
>> for saying it so excellently. Peirce did in fact see causal attribution as
>> a form of abduction. I would hope I would have thought to say it myself,
>> if I wasn’t so distracted by the “counter-factual” thang. But that way of
>> speaking makes me CRAAAAAY-ZEEE. How can something defined in terms of
>> something that didn’t happen
>>
>>
>>
>> Before you wrote, I was about to get on my “mystery” high horse. A
>> mystery, you remember, is a confusion arrived at when a bit of language is
>> applied to a situation where it doesn’t really work. Causal attributions
>> are often falsely singular, in the sense that , we often speak as if the
>> motion of a billiard ball was caused by the motion of the cue ball, say.
>> But what we really have to back those attributions up is a pattern of
>> relations between impacts of cue balls and motions of object balls. When
>> we step up to the next level of organization, the confusion disappears,
>> doesn’t it? Events of Type A are said to cause events of type B when
>> experiments with proper controls show that an increase in the occurrence of
>> type B events is dependent upon the previous occurrence of Type A events.
>> But to say that any particular Type A event causes a Type B event is an
>> abuse of language, a mystery.
>>
>>
>>
>> Is there any way to put those two things together: the abduction thing
>> and the misattribution thing?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
>> Charles
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 21, 2017 6:43 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Downward Hicausation
>>
>>
>>
>> What great timing! One of the best philosophy comics on the web right now
>> is "Existential Comics." This very week they took a swipe at "causation."
>> Here is an adventure of Sherlock Hume: http://existentialcomics.com/c
>> omic/212
>>
>> I suspect that the best I can do to contribute beyond that is to try fall
>> back on my role of scolding Nick.
>>
>> Nick *should *be asserting that "causation" is a metaphor. The billiard
>> ball are the understood scenario. Billiard balls sitting on a still table,
>> unmolested don't move. But if you knock one ball into another ball, the
>> other ball move so. When I say something like "The approaching lion *caused
>> *the gazelle to move", I am invoking the metaphor that the lion-gazelle
>> relationship is like that of the billiard balls. Had the lion not been
>> doing what it was doing, the gazelle would not have moved away. It isn't
>> simply a "counterfactual." It is an assertion (an *abduction*) regarding
>> broad patterns of gazelle behavior that can be readily observed under many
>> other situations.** Some of those, I have presumably already seen. Those
>> constitute the "basic implication" of the metaphor. Others I have not
>> observed, and those constitute potential investigatory events - not
>> ethereal thought experiments. As in true of any metaphor, there are also
>> aspects of the billiard-ball scenario I do not intend to map perfectly onto
>> the lion-gazelle scenario (e.g., the lion and gazelle are not spheres).
>>
>> So that is where Hume and those like him go wrong. They want to beat the
>> billiard balls scenario itself to death. But that's not how metaphors work.
>> There is something understood about the billiard balls, and it is
>> that-understood-thing that is being generalized to another scenario. Any
>> attempt to explain the billiard balls will involve evoking *different *metaphors,
>> which would entail different assertions (abductions). There is no
>> foundation (Peirce tells us, amongst others), Descartes was on a fool's
>> errand: In the land of inference, it is turtles all the way down.
>>
>>
>>
>> ** The breadth of the patterns being referenced is, I believe, where
>> Frank's point about probability slips in. One could certainly simplify the
>> complexity of the assertion by making lumping similar scenarios together
>> and speaking about the probability of a certain gazelle behavior within the
>> cluster of similar situations.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------
>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>>
>> U.S. Marine Corps
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 5:08 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Also Known As: Beware equating experience with existence.
>>
>> On 11/21/2017 02:00 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>> > Beware the tendency to think that if you can't immediately measure
>> something then it doesn't exist.
>>
>>
>> --
>> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>>
>> ============================================================
>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>
>
>
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