[FRIAM] Fwd: RE: Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Frank Wimberly wimberly3 at gmail.com
Fri Sep 22 10:58:21 EDT 2017


Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Frank Wimberly" <wimberly3 at gmail.com>
Date: Sep 22, 2017 8:55 AM
Subject: RE: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
To: "Thompson, Nicholas" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
Cc:

OK, more seriously.

If "is" means "=" then it's symmetric and you are correct.  But if it means
subset of then not.  For example a man is a human but a human isn't
necessarily a man.

Beyond that, there are problems with statements that are apparently
analytic.  Every black dog is a dog but is every iron horse a horse?  Even
"black dog" may mean something other than a dog in some context.  Human
language is very ambiguous.  That's why mathematicians use formal logic,
sometimes.  In one of his books, John Baez says a 1x1 matrix is a number I
pointed out that it wasn't and he said that all mathematicians would say it
is except logicians.  He said he would lash himself with a wet noodle.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sep 22, 2017 8:25 AM, "Frank Wimberly" <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:

> It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is.
>
> Seriously, I'll attempt a better answer soon.
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Sep 22, 2017 8:20 AM, "Nick Thompson" <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
>> All right.  I admit it.  I know ABSOLUTELY NOTHING about logic.
>>
>> Frank, can you help me out here?  My concession here was that in Peirce's
>> world, the relation of belief to action is analytical .... i.e. arises
>> directly from the definitions of terms.  I thought this was a big
>> concession, because propositions that arise analystically aren't very
>> interesting, and I was confessing to having said something not very
>> interesting.  Unfortunately, this crowd does not want me to get a way EVEN
>> with that concession.
>>
>> I was TRYING to write a tautology.  So I guess I should have written, "X
>> is Y; therefore, X is Y.  Is THAT a tautology.   I know you have tried to
>> explain this to me before.
>>
>> I have CLEARLY gotten myself WAY in over my head, here.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Nick
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>> Clark University
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of ?glen?
>> Sent: Friday, September 22, 2017 6:17 AM
>> To: friam at redfish.com
>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>>
>>
>> On 09/21/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>> > */[NST==> Is there any logic in which, “Let X be Y; therefore X is Y”
>> > is not entailed.  If a belief is defined as that upon which one is
>> > prepared to act, is there any logic in which acting does not imply
>> > belief?  <==nst] /*
>>
>> Of course.  E.g. modal logics allow different types of "therefore", say
>> ⊨_a and ⊨_b.  Then it might be true that "Let X be Y  ⊨_a  X is Y" but
>> false that "Let X be Y  ⊨_b  X is Y".  Similarly, I can imagine a logic
>> where "be" and "is" mean different things.
>>
>> > On 09/21/2017 05:00 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:
>> > Yes, of course.  E.g. Since most of my actions involve very tight
>> feedback loops, something like tossing a ball to a friend can be launched
>> and then I can make attempts to abort it if, say, I notice the friend has
>> looked away.
>> >
>> > */[NST==>Wouldn’t the best way to analyze this be as a series of
>> > “micro” beliefs?  <==nst] /*
>>
>> What is a "micro" belief?  The whole point of my response was that you
>> are over-simplifying both belief and action in order to tell a "just so
>> story" and force the story to fit your philosophy.  It seems reasonable to
>> me that if actions are decomposable, then so would be beliefs because
>> there's no difference between beliefs and actions.
>>
>> But you are saying something different.  Somehow, to you, beliefs are
>> different from actions.
>>
>>
>> > */[NST==>I think a body can enact conflicting beliefs at the same
>> > time, but that is because I am comfortable with the idea that that the
>> > same body can simultaneously act on two different belief systems.  CF
>> > Freud, slips of the tongue, hysteria, etc.  Frank will correct me. /*
>>
>> You're implying that, although bodies are composite, belief systems are
>> unitary.  If the same body can do 2 conflicting things, why can't the same
>> belief system be composed of 2 conflicting things?  This is why I raised
>> the idea of paraconsistent, defeasible, and higher order logics.
>> Specifically _those_ types.
>>
>> Why do you treat belief systems as fundamentally different from physical
>> systems?
>>
>> --
>> ␦glen?
>>
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>>
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