[FRIAM] Abduction

Sun Dec 23 19:09:43 EST 2018

Wouldn't it make more sense to say real things are subjects of true
propositions of the form "x is real".

-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
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Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018, 4:57 PM Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net
wrote:

> Thanks, Eric,
>
>
>
> I think you have everything right here, and it is very well laid out.
> Thank you.
>
>
>
> One point that nobody seems to quite want to help me get a grip on is the
> grammar of the two terms.  True seems to apply only to propositions, while
> real only to nouns.  Now the way we get around that is by saying that the
> real things are the objects of true proposition.  But that leads to what I
> call the unicorn problem.  “Unicorns don’t exist” is a true proposition
> that does not, however, make “unicorns” real.
>
>
>
> This seems like the kind of problem a sophomore might go crazy ab0ut in an
> introductory philosophy course, so I am a bit embarrassed to be raising
> it.  For my philosophical mentors, it is beneath their contempt.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Eric
> Charles
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 23, 2018 4:02 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Abduction
>
>
>
> I think Peirce is getting at something a bit different. When Peirce is on
> good behavior, he is laying out The World According to The Scientist. When
> a Scientist says that some claim is "true" she means that future studies
> will continue to support the claim. Perhaps even a bit more than that, as
> she means all investigations that could be made into the claim would
> support the claim, whether they happen or not. Peirce also tells us that
> "real" is our funny way of talking about the object of a true belief. *If
> *"I believe X" is a statement about a *true *belief, *then *future
> investigations will not reveal anything contradicting X, and... as a simple
> matter of definition... X is real.
>
>
>
> When Peirce is first getting started, he seems to think that you could
> work that logic through with just about any claim (and either find
> confirmation or not). Did my aunt Myrtle screw up the salad dressing recipe
> back on June 1st, 1972? Maybe we could descend upon that question using the
> scientific method and figure it out! Why rule out that future generations
> could find a method to perform the necessary studies?
>
>
>
> However, at some later point, I think Peirce really starts to get deeper
> into his notion of the communal activity of science, as embodied by his
> beloved early chemists. Did the honorable Mr. Durston really succeed in
> isolating oxygen that one winter day, by exposing water to electricity
> under such and such circumstances? Isn't that the thing Scientists argue
> over? Well, it might be the type of thing people argue over, but is has
> little to do with the *doing *of science. Individual events are simply
> not the type of thing that scientists actually converge to agreement about
> using the scientific method; the type of thing they converge upon is an
> agreement over whether or not the described procedures contain some crucial
> aspect that would be necessary to claim the described result. "Water" as an
> abstraction of sorts, under certain abstract circumstances, with an
> abstracted amount of electricity applied, will produce some (abstract)
> result. And by "abstract" I mean "not particular".  Scientists aren't
> arguing over whether some exact flow of electrons, applied in this exact
> way, will turn this exact bit of water into some exact bit of gas. They
> want to know if a flow of electrons with some properties, applied in a
> principled fashion, will turn water-in-general into some predictable amount
> of gas-with-particular-properties. We can tell this when things go wrong:
> Were it found that some bit of water worked in a unique seeming way, the
> scientists would descend upon it with experimental methods until they found
> something about the water that allowed them to make an abstract claim
> regarding water of such-and-such type.
>
>
>
> I suspect most on this list would agree, at least roughly, with what is
> written above.
>
>
>
> Now, however, we must work our way backwards:
>
> *  The types of beliefs about which a community of Scientists coverage
> upon are abstractions,
>
> *  the scientists converge upon those beliefs because the evidence bears
> them out,
>
> *  that the evidence bears out an idea is what we mean when we claim the
> object of an idea is real.
>
> *  Thus, at least for The Scientist, the only things that are "real" are
> abstractions.
>
>
>
> In the very, very long run of intellectual activity, the ideas that are
> stable are ideas about abstractions, which means that the object of those
> ideas, the abstractions themselves, must be "real."
>
>
>
> (I feel like that was starting to get repetitive. I'll stop.)
>
>
>
>
> -----------
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
>
> U.S. Marine Corps
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:38 PM Prof David West <profwest at fastmail.fm>
> wrote:
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> Alas, I was not present to hear the inchoate discussion. Please allow me
> to do some deconstruction and speculation on what you might be asking about.
>
>
>
> Imagine a vertical line and assume, metaphorically, that this is a
> 'membrane' consisting of tiny devices that emit signals (electrical
> impulses) into that which we presume to be 'inside that membrane'. I am
> trying to abstract the common sense notion of an individual's 5 senses
> generating signals that go to the brain — without making too many
> assumptions about the signal generators and or the recipient of same.
>
>
>
> We tend to assume that the signal generators are not just randomly sending
> off signals. Instead we assume that somewhere on the left side of the line
> is a source of stimuli, each of which triggers a discrete signal generator
> which we rename as a sensor.
>
>
>
> First question: do you assume / assert / argue that the "source" of each
> stimulus (e.g. the Sun) and the means of conveying the stimulus (e.g. a
> Photon) are "Real?"
>
>
>
> Signals are generated at the membrane and sent off somewhere towards the
> right.
>
>
>
> Second question: do you assume a receiver of those signals, e.g. a
> 'brain-body', and do you assume / argue / assert that the receiving entity
> is "Real."
>
>
>
> If a signal is received by a brain-body and it reacts, e.g. a muscle
> contraction; there are least two possible assumptions you can make:
>
>
>
>    -  some sort of 'hard wiring' exists that routes the signal to a set of
> muscle cells which contract; and nothing has happened except the completion
> of a circuit. Or,
>
>    -  the signal is "interpreted" in some fashion and the response to it
> is at least quasi-voluntary. (Yogis and fakirs have demonstrated that very
> little of what most of us would assume to be involuntary reactions, are, in
> fact, beyond conscious control.)
>
>
>
> Third question: are both the 'interpretation' and the 'response' Real
> things?
>
>
>
> Depending on your answers, we might have a model of interacting "Real"
> things: Source, Stimulus, Membrane, Signal, Interpretation, and Response.
> Or, you might still wish to assert that all of these are "abstractions,"
> but if so, I really do not understand at all what you would mean by the
> term.
>
>
>
> But, you are an amenable chap and might assent to considering these things
> "Real" in some sense, so we can proceed.
>
>
>
> The next step would be to question the existence of some entity receiving
> the signals, effecting the interpretation, and instigating the response.
> Let's call it a Mind or Consciousness. [Please keep the frustrated
> screaming to a minimum.]
>
>
>
> It seems to me that this step is necessary, as it is only "inside" the
> mind that we encounter abstractions. The abstractions might be unvoiced
> behaviors — interpretations of an aggregate of stimuli as a "pattern" with
> a reflexive response, both of which were non-consciously learned, e.g.
> 'flight or fight'.  Or, they might be basic naming; simple assertions using
> the verb to-be; or complicated and convoluted constructs resulting from
> judicious, or egregious, application of induction, deduction, and abduction.
>
>
>
> Fourth question: are these in-the-mind abstractions "Real?"
>
>
>
> At the core, your question seems to be an ontological / metaphysical one.
> Are there two kinds of Thing: Real and Abstract? If so what criteria is
> used to define membership in the two sets? It seems like your anti-dualism
> is leading you to assert that there are not two sets, but one and that
> membership in that set is defined by some criteria/characteristic of
> 'abstract-ness'.
>
>
>
> Please correct my failings at discerning the true nature of your question.
>
>
>
> dave west
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018, at 10:00 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>
> Hi, Everybody,
>
>
>
> Yes.  St. Johns Coffee Shop WILL be open this Friday.  And then, not again
> until the 3rd of January.  I am hoping Frank will have some ideas for
> what we do on the Friday between the two holidays.
>
>
>
> Attached please find the copy of an article you helped me write.  Thanks
> to all of you who listened patiently and probed insistently as I worked
> though the issues of this piece.
>
>
>
> I need help with another article I am working with.  Last week I found
> myself making, and defending against your uproarious laughter, the
> proposition that all real things are abstract.  Some of you were prepared
> to declare the opposite, No real things are abstract.  However, it was late
> in the morning and the argument never developed.
>
>
>
> I would argue the point in the following way:  Let us say that we go along
> with your objections and agree that “you can never step in the same river
> twice.”  This is to say, that what we call “The River” changes every time
> we step in it.  Wouldn’t it follow that any conversation we might have
> about The River is precluded?  We could not argue, for instance, about
> whether the river is so deep that we cannot cross o’er because there is no
> abstract fact, “The River” that connects my crossing with yours.
>
>
>
> Let’s say, then, that you agree with me that implicit in our discussions
> of the river is the abstract conception of The River.  But, you object,
> that we assume it, does not make it true.  Fair enough.  But why then, do
> we engage in the measurement of anything?
>
>
>
> I realize this is not everybody’s cup of tea for a conversation, but I
> wanted to put it on the table.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
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