[FRIAM] Whorfianism and Xibipio

Steven A Smith sasmyth at swcp.com
Wed Mar 28 13:28:38 EDT 2018


I've not participated in this discussion of  Peirciean Pragmatism for
many reasons including a lack of firsthand knowledge of Peirce's work
(to even vaguely approach that of Nick or Eric for example.   The talk
of control loops, habits, belief and coupling with reality vs coupling
with beliefs was all very compelling to me, but it was interesting for
me to try to remain an observer and not attempt to develop any new
beliefs or revise the ones I seem to already seem to hold..

Instead I found myself contrasting this discussion with the more public
discussion of Warfianism.

From the Wikipedia entry:

        The principle of *linguistic relativity* holds that the
    structure of a language <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language>
    affects its speakers' world view
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_view> or cognition
    <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognition>. Popularly known as the
    *Sapir–Whorf hypothesis*, or *Whorfianism*, the principle is often
    defined to include two versions. The /strong/ version says that
    language /determines/ thought and that linguistic categories limit
    and determine cognitive categories, whereas the /weak/ version says
    that linguistic categories and usage only /influence/ thought and
    decisions.

I also have been re-reading some of the work of Edward T. Hall
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_T._Hall>, in particular his early
years working with the Native American version of the CCC as chronicled
in his memoiresque "West of the Thirties
<https://www.amazon.com/WEST-THIRTIES-Edward-T-Hall/dp/0385424213>"
which relates his earlier awarenesses of nonverbal communication
including cultural differences in the use of space and time which became
codified as his "/Proxemics
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proxemics>/".   His descriptions of his
emerging awareness while a very young man working among
desert/depression hardened Anglos as Indian Agents on one hand and
roughnecks working on dam and road building on the other,  a variety of
Navajo and Hopi, and in particular the direct influence of the Traders
and most particular that of the Mexican American Lorenzo Hubbell.

As if that were not enough, I also had been independently reading up on
the Amazonian Piraha' whose language (and therefore world view? seems to
center around direct experience for which they have a very specific word
- /xibipio' /which refers to going IN or OUT of experience.   The most
touching to me is using it for the quality of a candle flame as it
flickers.   Dan Everett, the Anthropologist who has spent the most time
studying these people is often credited with debunking Chomsky's
Universal Grammar.   I think the Piraha language *does* confront aspects
of the Chomskian model as does the Hopi Time Controversy
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopi_time_controversy> started by
Whorf.   I do not know if Hall and Whorf ever met during that time, I
believe Whorf was a

Through all of this I was reminded of the LInguistic notions of /realis/
vs /irrealis/ moods which refer to things being discussed which are or
are not known to have happened which is similar but different to
xibipio' or even the Australian Aboriginal /Dreamtime/ often translated
into western culture as "/everywhen/".

I don't feel capable at the moment of participating in the Peircian
discussion honestly but wanted to offer up these contrasting ideas and
hope I don't derail or interrupt the former, but rather enrichen the
general discourse.

- Steve
/
/
On 3/28/18 10:01 AM, uǝlƃ ☣ wrote:
> To be a little more concise, Peirce's position on "self-control" is irrelevant to this point.  Where the agency lies is irrelevant.  This point is that Peircian belief and Peircian doubt seem well-elaborated by the concept of the looseness and tightness of the feedback loop between reality and the behavior under consideration.
>
> Any behavior (be it belief in the æther or eyeball saccade) can be considered Peircian-doubtful if it's tightly coupled to the environment and Peircian-believed if it is loosely coupled to the environment.
>
> And to go back to "What Pragmatism Is", when Peirce says: "if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result", I think you'll notice that the tightness or looseness of the coupling is a tacit experimental target for pretty much any habit/belief.  E.g. my atheist friends delight in pointing out how our theist friends always fail to check their idea of God against reality (strong evidence of Peircian-belief).  Or e.g. arguing for/against gun control, one can't help but notice how often an arguer (fails to) cite(s) data.  Or e.g. when I run, the first mile or so is painful and horrible (strong evidence of Peircian-doubt), yet the final mile or 2 are wonderfully liberating (strong evidence of Peircian-belief).
>
> Or to go back to the dead horse, it should be clear whether a person believes the floor is there when they get up out of bed or not.  Did they look first (tight coupling) or not (loose coupling).
>
> OK.  I feel like I've done as much as I can to make the point clear.  I'll stop.  Thanks for everyone's patience.
>
> ###

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