[FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
Curt McNamara
curtmcn at gmail.com
Mon Dec 9 11:20:26 EST 2019
This discussion reminded me of two books:
The Mechanical Mind by Crane
https://books.google.com/books?id=fIzWix4CPxkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
In it the author makes clear that all thinking is tied to (some kind) of
experience. Which is different from AI (at this time).
The Order of Time by Rovelli
https://books.google.com/books?id=YvM3DwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
Rovelli makes it clear there is no single time -- it is different for you
and me, different on the mountain top, and there is "less of it" near large
masses. Time is discrete, and has a lower allowable limit.
Curt
On Mon, Dec 9, 2019 at 7:20 AM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:
> I think we've gotten somewhere.
>
> Frank
>
> -----------------------------------
> Frank Wimberly
>
> My memoir:
> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>
> My scientific publications:
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Mon, Dec 9, 2019, 4:08 AM Prof David West <profwest at fastmail.fm> wrote:
>
>> Nick,
>>
>> No need to be ill at ease — I do not mean illusory in, or with, any
>> sense/degree/intimation of dualism.
>>
>> Ultimately, either: I am more of a monist than thou. Or, you are equally
>> a mystic as I.
>>
>> You cannot speak of Experience without explicitly or implicitly asserting
>> an Experiencer --->> dualism. If there is an Experience "of which you
>> cannot speak," or of which "whatever is spoken is incorrect or incomplete;"
>> then you are as much a mystic as Lao Tzu and the Tao.
>>
>> Because your sensibilities will not allow you to admit your mysticism, I
>> offer an alternative: you are an epistemological monist but not an
>> ontological monist. On the latter point; I have already accused you of
>> believing in an ontological "Thing" other than experience: a human soul or
>> essence or spirit.
>>
>> My monism is both ontological (except for the myth that infinitely long
>> ago, and infinitely in the future, there were two things "intelligence" and
>> "matter") and epistemological (accepting that my epistemology is ineffable).
>>
>>
>> davew
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 8:49 PM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> Hi, David,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for channeling me so accurately. It is a talent to channel what
>> one does not agree with so faithfully that the person channeled is
>> satisfied. Thank you for that.
>>
>>
>>
>> I would have only one ill-ease, about the last part of your version:
>>
>>
>>
>> *both equally illusory.*
>>
>>
>>
>> I think “illusory” is used here, in your way, not in the way I would use
>> it, but to refer to the world that truly is but which we an never truly
>> grasp. I.e., dualistically. For me, an illusion is just an experience
>> that does not prove out. I arrive at my coffee house three days in a row
>> and there is a “day old” old-fashioned plain donut available for purchase
>> at half price. I experience that “donut at 4” is something I can count
>> on. That turns out not to be the case because, another customer starts
>> coming in at 3.59 and commandeering all the donuts. My experience was
>> illusory. Or, think flips of a coin. You flip a coin 7 times heads and
>> you come to the conclusion that the coin is biased. However, you flip it a
>> thousand times more and its behavior over the 1007 flips is consistent with
>> randomness. You come to the conclusion that the bias was probably an
>> illusion.
>>
>>
>>
>> My understanding of illusory is probabilistic and provisional.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> *ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>> <ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>> <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/>*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
>> *Sent:* Friday, December 6, 2019 10:16 AM
>> *To:* friam at redfish.com
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
>>
>>
>>
>> I dare not really speak for Nick, but I think the essence of his position
>> is that there is no "out there" nor is there any "in here." There is only a
>> flow of "experience" that is sometimes "evaluated" (interpreted?) to a
>> false distinction of in or out — both equally illusory.
>>
>>
>>
>> davew
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 6, 2019, at 3:27 PM, John Kennison wrote:
>>
>> Hi Nick, and Eric,
>>
>>
>>
>> I am grappling with Nick's ideas that mental states must be physical
>> things and even are "out there" rather than "in here". What about
>> delusions? If I think I see bear in the woods but I am mistaken, is this
>> false perception "out there" even when the bear is not?
>>
>>
>>
>> --John
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> on behalf of Eric Charles <
>> eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, December 5, 2019 8:41 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam at redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* [EXT] Re: [FRIAM] A pluralistic model of the mind?
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick,
>>
>> Your need to complicate things is fascinating. You are a monist. You are
>> a monist is the sense of not thinking that "mental" things and "physical"
>> things are made of different stuffs. At that point, you can throw a new
>> word in the mix (e.g., 'experience', 'neutral stuff'), or you can throw
>> your hat in with one or the other side of the original division, e.g., "I
>> am a materialist" or "I am an idealist". To that, you add the insight that
>> that later discussion is all a bit weird, because once you have decided to
>> be a monist it weirdly doesn't matter much what you call the stuff.That
>> insight is in need of support, because the old dichotomy is so built in to
>> our language and culture that the claim it doesn't matter which side you
>> choose is very unintuitive. That is solid, and you should develop it
>> further.
>>
>>
>>
>> Instead, you bring up some sort of discussion about serial vs. parallel
>> processing that has nothing to do with that topic at all, then you muddle
>> the issues up. Whether you think of "consciousness" as "serial" or
>> "parallel" has no bearing on the prior issue. Given that you are talking
>> with a bunch of computationally minded people, and that you brought up
>> Turing Machines, the first problem is that a serial system can simulate a
>> parallel system, so while parallel buys you time savings (sometimes a
>> little, sometimes a lot), it doesn't change what the system is capable of
>> in any more fundamental way (assuming you are still limited to writing
>> zeros and ones). But you don't even need that, because it just doesn't
>> matter. Being a "monist" has nothing to do with the serial vs. parallel
>> issue at all. There is no reason a body can't be doing many things at once.
>> Or, you can change your level of analysis and somehow set up your
>> definition so that there is only one thing the body is doing, but that one
>> thing has parts. It is just a word game at that point. If I have a 5-berry
>> pie, is it 5 different types of pie at once, or is it its own 1 flavor of
>> pie? We can talk about the pros and cons of labeling it different ways, but
>> it is the same thing whichever way we label it.... and... it has nothing to
>> do with monism vs. dualism....
>>
>>
>>
>> Admonishment over.
>>
>>
>>
>> So... Say more about the monism part... That is a solid issue and you are
>> getting somewhere with it...
>>
>>
>>
>> It SEEMS so important a difference if one person claims that all we can
>> never know is ideas ("You don't know 'the chair', just your idea of the
>> chair!") and another person claims that knowing isn't ever a thing and that
>> there is just material ("There is no 'idea' of the chair, there is only
>> your physical body in relation to the physical world!"). It seems that they
>> are making vastly different claims, and that they should disagree about
>> almost everything. How is it that THAT doesn't matter?
>>
>>
>>
>> Eric
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------
>>
>>
>>
>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>>
>> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
>>
>> American University - Adjunct Instructor
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 1:20 AM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi, everybody,
>>
>>
>>
>> I have gotten all the communications off of nabble and concentrated them
>> below. If you read this message in plain text, a lot of useful formatting
>> will go away, so I encourage you to enable HTML. Or perhaps, I can fit it
>> all up as a Word file, tomorrow.
>>
>>
>>
>> . I have not had time to dig into the contents much. I am pleased that
>> everybody took the issue straight on, and I look forward to grappling with
>> your comments.
>>
>>
>>
>> *A recapitulation of the thread:*
>>
>>
>>
>> First, some text from the review which Roger sent:
>>
>>
>>
>> *This is exactly as radical as it sounds. Bishop Berkeley and other
>> idealists argued that objects are dependent on mind; Manzotti argues the
>> reverse of this: Mind exists in objects. In The Spread Mind, Manzotti
>> contends that we are mistaken to believe that objects “do not depend on our
>> presence. . . . Our bodies enable processes that change the ontology of the
>> world. Our bodies bring into existence the physical objects with which our
>> experience is identical. We are our experience. We are not our bodies.” And
>> later: “We are the world and the world is us—everything is physical.” This
>> includes dreams, hallucinations, memories—all are the imagined physical
>> objects themselves, not neural firings or mental representations (we must
>> at one time have perceived an object to hallucinate or dream it, although
>> it can be an unreal combination of other objects, as in the case of flying
>> pink elephants). Manzotti impishly dubs this doctrine no-psychism. It’s
>> idealism turned on its head, a reductio ad absurdum of scientific
>> materialism. (If you’re confused, well, I’m not sure I understand it
>> myself, and I read the book.)*
>>
>> *Manzotti first drew Parks’s attention during a conference at IULM
>> University in Milan, where Parks is a professor, by bellowing “There are no
>> images!” in response to a neuroscientist’s discussion about how the brain
>> transforms visual stimuli into images. On Manzotti’s view, the brain does
>> nothing of the kind. There are no pictures, only objects. “He really
>> couldn’t believe how stupid we were all being, he said, buying into this
>> dumb story of images in our heads.” Parks was besotted.*
>>
>> *He could as easily have said “There are no objects, only pictures!” *
>>
>>
>>
>> *MY COMMENT ON THE REVIEW:*
>>
>>
>>
>> I think this review may be a wonderful example of what happens when a
>> (Romantic) dualist tries to explain monism to dualists.
>>
>>
>>
>> What nobody in this discussion seems to understand is that one can have
>> objects OR images BUT NOT BOTH. The lunacy begins when people imagine
>> that there are things outside of experience. Or experience outside of
>> things… really it doesn’t matter: they are both equally crazy. The fact
>> is, everything we know comes in over one channel – I call it experience –
>> and from that channel every form of experience is derived. So, images and
>> objects are not different sorts of stuff, they are arrangements of the same
>> stuff. And once you have agreed that there is only one kind of stuff, it
>> doesn’t make a damn bit of difference what you call it, “images” or
>> “objects”.
>>
>>
>>
>> Take phantom limb, for instance. I feel like I have a leg but when I put
>> my weight on it I fall down. Now the dualist will artificially divide
>> experience into the feeling that I have a leg (i.e., I start to put my
>> weight on it) and the experience of falling down, and call one the
>> ineffable experience the other the brute reality. But this is an
>> artificial division. Not falling down when you put your weight on your leg
>> is as much part of the experience of having a leg as expecting that you
>> wont fall down.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is where I always imagine that glen and I must ultimately find
>> agreement. He has to concede that he is a monist in that everything we
>> experience is, well, experience. I have to concede that I am a pluralist,
>> in that experience can be be organized in a zillion different forms
>> depending on how, and the degree to which, it proves out Hypothesis
>> testing is as much a part of experience as hypothesis formation.
>>
>>
>>
>> Now, there is a a hidden assumption in my monism which I would think you
>> computer folks would be all over me about. I am thinking of consciousness
>> as serial, rather than parallel. Where do I stand to assert that what ever
>> else can be said about experience, it comes down to a series of single,
>> instantaneous points from which all the varieties and forms of experience –
>> objects and fantasies, etc. – are constructed. This is where ProfDave has
>> me, because there is no more reason to believe on the basis of looking at
>> the brain that it has a single point of convergence, a choke point in its
>> processing, than to believe the same of the kidneys. Kidneys can make urine
>> and clean the blood at the same time. This is why I wish I understood the
>> Turing Model better, because I intuit that the computers we use are based
>> on just this seriel fallacy. Now, I suppose behavior provides something
>> like a choke point. We either walk to the supermarket or we drive. But we
>> may do a dozen different things on our way to the supermarket, whether or
>> not we walk and drive. We can listen to a pod cast, we can plan our summer
>> vacation, we can muse about which tuxedo we will wear for our Nobel
>> Address. And if we don’t, as I suspect Frank and Bruce will want us to,
>> artificially separate these musements from the circumstances that occasion
>> them and the actions they ultimately occasion, we will see that the myth of
>> the choke point (the fallacy of the turing machine model?) is contradicted
>> by the fact that we can do and do do many things at once all the time.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *RESPONSES TO MY COMMENTS*:
>>
>>
>>
>> *Glen’s First*
>>
>>
>>
>> But why is serialization different from any other monist tendency?
>> Serialization is a reduction to the uni-dimensional *sequence*, whereas
>> parallel implies pluralism, anything > 1 dimension. It would be
>> inconsistent of you to allow for parallelism and retain your monism. So, to
>> me, you're better off sticking with a sequential conception.
>>
>>
>>
>> And don't forget, as we've discussed before, any output a parallel
>> machine can produce can be "simulated" by a sequential machine. So, again,
>> monism is moot. Yes, it may well be True in some metaphysical sense. But if
>> it walks like a pluralist and quacks like a pluralist ... well, then it's a
>> pluralist.
>>
>>
>>
>> Unification is only useful in so far as it *facilitates* multiplication,
>> i.e. demonstrates constructively how we get many things from few things. If
>> you can't show your work, then you don't understand the problem (or you
>> haven't read the instructions 8^).
>>
>>
>>
>> *Dave West’s Comment:*
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick, I read your Old New Realist paper, but to get a grip on it I must
>> read some Tolman and Holt - or at least it appears so. However, I have come
>> to one conclusion so far: that in your academic persona you are a committed
>> experience monist, but in your public/political persona you are an
>> irredemptive dualist, believing that humans have a soul/spirit/essence
>> apart from mere experience. (I know, how dare I cast such an aspersion?)
>>
>>
>>
>> Other things. I will not attempt to explain the Turing Model, others
>> have the technical expertise to do so, but I will speak a bit about the
>> Turing Metaphor.
>>
>>
>>
>> Metaphorically, a Turing machine is a device with three elements: a
>> read/write head, a set of instructions "in memory," and an infinite tape
>> divided into cells with each cell containing a 1 or 0.
>>
>>
>>
>> A cell of the tape is available to the read/write head and, depending on
>> the instructions in memory, will read or write (or both in sequence) and
>> advance or retire the tape for 1 to n positions.
>>
>>
>>
>> The Turing machine "computes" the tape and, simultaneously, the tape
>> "instructs" (programs) the computer (read/write head plus tape
>> advance-retire mechanism).
>>
>>
>>
>> The "instructions in memory" are just sequences of the same "stuff" —
>> ones and zeros — as the "stuff" on the tape.
>>
>>
>>
>> Subsequent to some "bootstrap" set of instructions (you have no interest
>> in "end cases" so I will not pursue), the "instructions in memory" can
>> originate on the tape, i.e. the tape contains both "program" and "data." As
>> the "instructions on tape" "move" to "instructions in memory," the
>> "instructions in memory" can become arbitrarily complicated.
>>
>>
>>
>> So far, nothing that contradicts your "experience monism."
>>
>>
>>
>> A favorite science fiction meme: once enough ones and zeros have moved
>> from the tape into "memory" the Turing Machine "wakes up" becomes
>> conscious. Instant dualism, but without much reason as mere "location"
>> changes nothing about the "stuff" which is still ones and zeros. (one
>> "stuff," two values)
>>
>>
>>
>> Because the tape is infinite in length, it matters not that it is
>> "serial" because any parallel computational experience can be replicated
>> serially just takes longer.
>>
>>
>>
>> Still nothing to interfere with your experience monism. The interesting
>> questions might be:
>>
>>
>>
>> 1- Is each individual human being a separate (but equal) instantiation of
>> a Turing Machine consuming a separate (but equal) infinite tape. If yes,
>> then the door seems to be opened for "private" experience/consciousness.
>>
>>
>>
>> 2- each human is a separate Turing Machine, but all consume the "same"
>> infinite tape. "Same" meaning mostly identical, but with some allowance for
>> perspective (slight variation in which portions of the tape are consumed
>> when??). I believe that this would be your preferred interpretation as it
>> might allow some kind of dialog among Turing machines as each one "wrote"
>> to the infinite tape that all were consuming and, perhaps, somehow, thereby
>> lead to some kind of "consensus computation."
>>
>>
>>
>> 3- there is but One Turing Machine, co-extensive with the Universe and
>> One infinite tape, also co-extensive with the Universe and therefore the
>> Universe is constantly "computing" itself. (Writing to the tape equals
>> popping quantum quiffs, i.e. collapsing wave functions by observing.)
>>
>>
>>
>> I am pretty certain that option three is the only one possible for one
>> committed to both ontological and epistemological monism. Ouroboros Rules!!
>>
>>
>>
>> *Glen’s Second:*
>>
>>
>>
>> Well, I did reply, as did Dave. If you're ever wondering whether someone
>> replied, you might check the archive at:
>>
>> http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>> <https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Ffriam.471366.n2.nabble.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cjkennison%40clarku.edu%7Cd797357f28854a68954e08d779ed8593%7Cb5b2263d68aa453eb972aa1421410f80%7C1%7C0%7C637111933386669699&sdata=I3i4o%2FUwNgskuqC9FZm%2FJ7ih8ktHpk7XmBUVU2wsO8M%3D&reserved=0>
>>
>>
>>
>> Dave's was rather interesting w.r.t. Turing machines. Mine was more
>> flippant. But to continue mine, your discussion of serial attention or
>> behavior hearkens back to our prior discussions of quantum computing.
>> Parallelism vs. serial(ism? ... sequentialism?) can be monified/unified by
>> considering a 2 dimentional space of "space" vs time. In the ideal, even
>> things at, say, space = 1 billion can operate that the same *time* as
>> things at space = 1. Similarly, space at time = 1 billion can be at the
>> same position as time = 1. But reality doesn't work that way. And quantum
>> computing demonstrates this kinda-sorta painfully. But traditional
>> distributed computing demonstrates it, too. Parallel computations across
>> large spaces run into inter-process communication bottlenecks. I.e. sure,
>> we can have 10 computers compute the same thing with different inputs and
>> fuse the outputs. But we can't do the same thing with 1k computers without
>> having "bus" or "backbone" bandwidth problems.
>>
>>
>>
>> This sort of thing seems pragmatically clear when you talk about your
>> issues handling "serial consciousness". And, at risk of conflating 2
>> unrelated weird things (quantum with consciousness) for no good reason,
>> there's a *coherence* to the parallel processing that goes on in quantum
>> computing that kinda-sorta feels like your reduction to a serial
>> attention/behavior in parsing consciousness. A loss of that coherence
>> results in separate things, whereas a retention of the coherence maintains
>> your "monism". But, in the end, it's all about the orthogonality between
>> space and time and the *scales* of space and time wherein such
>> orthogonality breaks down.
>>
>>
>>
>> I hope that's clear. I'm a bit occupied with debugging an uncooperative
>> simulation at the moment.
>>
>>
>>
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