[FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 8

[Bruce Simon]

 With what certainty can you make the statement that "all certainty is illusory"?
    On Sunday, December 8, 2019, 10:00:13 AM MST, friam-request at redfish.com <friam-request at redfish.com> wrote:  
 
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Today's Topics:

  1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
      (HighlandWindsLLC Miller)
  2. Re: Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 7 marked cards and
      convergence, N thompson (HighlandWindsLLC Miller)


Sent from my iPhone

> On Dec 7, 2019, at 1:25 PM, <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Glen, 
> 
> Most streams of experience don't converge.  Random streams predict nothing.  They are of no use to the organism.  Only streams that converge, "are".  I.e, only they exist.  Random streams, aren't.  Most co-occurrences in stream are random, they reveal no existents.  Since you can never know for sure whether you are in a random or a non random stream, you can never know whether the parts of the stream you are responding to exist or not.  But you can sure make educated (i.e., probabilistic)  guesses, and that's what organisms' learning mechanisms do.  So, I don’t have a ==>faith<== in convergence.  I, like all learning creatures, have a lack of interest in non-convergence.  Non being interested in convergence in experience would be like going to a poker game in which some cards are marked and not being interested in the relation between the cards and the marks.  
> 
> Nick 
> 
> Nick Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
> Clark University
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
> 
> 
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of glen?C
> Sent: Saturday, December 7, 2019 9:40 AM
> To: friam at redfish.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
> 
> Excellent! So, your *scalar* is confidence in your estimates of any given distribution. I try to describe it in [†] below. But that's a tangent.
> 
> What I can't yet reconstruct, credibly, in my own words, is the faith in *convergence*. What if sequential calculations of an average do NOT converge?
> 
> Does this mean there are 2 stuffs, some that converge and some that don't? ... some distributions are stationary and some are not? Or would you assert that reality (and/or truth, given Peirce's distinction) is always and everywhere stationary and all (competent/accurate/precise) estimates will always converge?
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [†] You can be a little confident (0.01%) or a lot confident (99.9%). I don't much care if you close the set and allow 0 and 1, confidence ∈ [0,1]. I think I have ways to close the set. But it doesn't matter. If we keep it open and agree that 100% confidence is illusory, then your scalar is confidence ∈ (0,1). Now that we have a scale of some kind, we can *construct* a typology of experiences. E.g. we can categorize things like deja vu or a bear in the woods as accumulations of confidence with different organizations. E.g. a composite experience with ((e1⨂e2⨂e3)⨂e4)⨂e5, where each of ei experiences has some confidence associated with it. Obviously, ⨂ is not multiplication or addition, but some other composer function. The whole composite experience would then have some aggregate confidence.
> 
>> On December 6, 2019 8:22:29 PM PST, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>> Elegant, Glen, and you caused me truly to wonder:  Is the population 
>> mean, mu,  of statistics fame, of a different substance than the 
>> individual measurements, the bar x's that are stabs at it?  But I think 
>> the answer is no.  It is just one among the others, a citizen king 
>> amongst those bar-x's, the one on which the others will converge in a 
>> normally distributed world.  I guess that makes me a frequentist, 
>> right?
>> 
>> And it's not strictly true that Mu is beyond my reach.  I may have 
>> already reached it with the sample I now hold in my hand.  I just will 
>> never be sure that I have reached it.
>> 
>> Could you, Dave, and I perhaps all agree that all ==>certainty<== is 
>> illusory?
>> 
>> I don't think that's going to assuage you.  
>> 
>> I am going to have to think more. 
>> 
>> Ugh!  I hate when that happens. 
> 
> 
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Nick et al:
It seems that the convergence of interest is possibly not just the cards and the marks, but the marker of the cards and whether they are at the table. So, convergence of marker, cards, table, chairs, markee? Markees? Chips? 
Are the chips also marked I must wonder? And the chairs? What about the placement of the table in the room? Are there mirrors? Where are the doors? Definitely convergence. What type of chairs? Who selected the chairs? What type of rug? 
Peggy M Miller

Sent from my iPhone

> On Dec 8, 2019, at 5:38 AM, friam-request at redfish.com wrote:
> 
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> than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..."
> Today's Topics:
> 
>  1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
>      (thompnickson2 at gmail.com)
>  2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Eric Charles)
>  3. Re: Swarms vs. herds (Ron Newman)
>  4. Re: Swarms vs. herds (thompnickson2 at gmail.com)
>  5. Re: [EXT] Re:  A pluralistic model of the mind? (John Kennison)
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