[FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15
Nicholas Thompson
thompnickson2 at gmail.com
Thu Dec 19 23:14:28 EST 2019
Hi, Bruce,
I finally found this. Email grief. Sorry to be so slow in answering.
Nick Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
*From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Bruce Simon
*Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 1:44 PM
*To:* friam at redfish.com
*Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15
Birds and bees see ultraviolet light but I don't.
*[NST===>] Well, your skin sees it, right? If you transduce it down to
wavelengths that your eye can respond to, you will see it with your eyes,
right? So all of this hangs on your definition of “see”. *
Flowers give off UV but I can't have the experience of it. A
spectrophotometer can detect UV and I can see the dial move but that is not
the same as experiencing it. *[NST===>] Again, that hangs on a definition
of “see”. *“ Suppose God gave me the ability to see like a bird. Could I
describe to you what the flower looks like (re. UV?).
*[NST===>] You mean, I can never experience the world as a bird experiences
the world, right? But, on your account, as I understand it, we don’t have
to appeal to the birds and the bees to reach this conclusion: I can never
experience the world as YOU experience it, because each persons experience
is ineffably his own. But isn’t there a strange regress going on here.*
*Bruce: I experience that flower.*
*Nick: I, too, experience that flower.*
*Bruce: But you don’t experience my experience of that flower.*
*Nick: Non-sense. I am experiencing your experience of that flower as we
speak! Otherwise we could not be speaking of it. *
* you y *
On Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 12:23:29 PM MST, friam-request at redfish.com
<friam-request at redfish.com> wrote:
Send Friam mailing list submissions to
friam at redfish.com
To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
friam-request at redfish.com
You can reach the person managing the list at
friam-owner at redfish.com
When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
than "Re: Contents of Friam digest..."
Today's Topics:
1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?)
2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Frank Wimberly)
3. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?)
4. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
(thompnickson2 at gmail.com)
It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's
unclear to me what the question is. If the question is:
Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in
any language will be a false description?
Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting
Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way
that could happen:
von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always one
order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce the
object.
Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly
from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete
description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the
non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete
description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of
course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to
be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of
thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two
complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of
other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture.
By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will
fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types
conception.
[†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing
Automata
On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote:
>
> Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to
all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices,
were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could,
recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's
experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently
experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as
the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my
experience.
>
> God is therefore real and extant?
>
> But wait ...
>
> I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and
the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact,
a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And,
of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of
the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I
was raised.
>
> There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact
continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the
meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the
"Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2)
"I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the
"Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or
even differentiable from each other.
>
> There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns
of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain
before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and
experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of
the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual
experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the
"outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond,
"there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... "
>
> Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
"Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
the prediction of effects.
>
> "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
>
> Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its
totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
false-to-fact.
>
> ????
>
> dave west
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I
want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I
want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some
reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that
I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly
what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not
convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to
express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way
I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
>>
>> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to
exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
>>
>> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is
the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of is,
in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in
principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
>>
>> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The
bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we
may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of
what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but
which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory.
>>
>> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
--
☣ uǝlƃ
I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein:
Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen.
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly
My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
Phone (505) 670-9918
On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But it's
unclear to me what the question is. If the question is:
Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it in
any language will be a false description?
Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy quoting
Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate one way
that could happen:
von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always one
order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce the
object.
Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more clearly
from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the complete
description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the
non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete
description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of
course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to
be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of
thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two
complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of
other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture.
By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description will
fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types
conception.
[†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing
Automata
On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote:
>
> Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to
all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices,
were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could,
recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's
experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently
experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as
the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my
experience.
>
> God is therefore real and extant?
>
> But wait ...
>
> I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and
the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact,
a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And,
of course, the form of all those words and effects is but an artifact of
the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious) within which I
was raised.
>
> There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact
continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the
meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the
"Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2)
"I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the
"Experience." None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or
even differentiable from each other.
>
> There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns
of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain
before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and
experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of
the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual
experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the
"outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond,
"there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... "
>
> Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
"Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
the prediction of effects.
>
> "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
>
> Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its
totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
false-to-fact.
>
> ????
>
> dave west
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I
want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I
want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some
reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that
I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly
what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not
convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to
express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way
I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
>>
>> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to
exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
>>
>> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is
the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of is,
in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in
principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
>>
>> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The
bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we
may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of
what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but
which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory.
>>
>> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
--
☣ uǝlƃ
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
I'm not. Wittgenstein was very cool. But he wasn't a *builder*. (... as far
as I know. I'd be happy to be wrong.) The thing that (in my ignorant
opinion) distinguishes people like Wittgenstein from people like Gödel, von
Neumann, Feynman, etc. ... even Penrose with the tilings and such, is that
they *build* things. Until the hoity-toity results from the unification
theorem come percolating down to morons like me, I'll continue treating
constructive proofs as better and more real/existing than classical proofs.
On 12/11/19 10:44 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein:
>
> Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen.
--
☣ uǝlƃ
Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank. See Larding Below:
Nick Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
Clark University
ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
*From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
*Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM
*To:* friam at redfish.com
*Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to all.
Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices, were
quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could, recognizing
that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's experience
of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently experience me, not
as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as the pious jackass
that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my experience.
*[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer. *
God is therefore real and extant?
*[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we would
have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”. I say
that God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz. An old guy who hides in a closet
and manipulates our experience with giant levers. That conception is
probably “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out. Or, ringed
around with sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and
therefore not “prove-out-able”. So, *
But wait ...
I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and the
framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact, a
post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And,
of course, the form of all those words and effects is but
*[NST===>] Why “but”, Dave? It’s an artifact of culture. It’s an
experience that proves out only with in the framework of a culture. As
long as you stay within the culture, it proves out pretty good. When you
moved away from home, it didn’t prove out. *
an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious)
within which I was raised.
There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
false-to-fact.
*[NST===>] Stipulated*
What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and
predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an
experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an
ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the
"Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience." None of these
implied relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from
each other.
There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns of
brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain before
and after "It" are measurable and comparable.
*[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing. What experiences
does brain talk represent. Were you looking at an MRI while all of this
was happening? *
Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in
the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations
of individual experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others
on the "outside" — is altered as well, although often not expressible
beyond, "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it,
but ... "
*[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are
themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways. *
Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
"Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
the prediction of effects.
"Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
Despite being, in every way ineffable — in that no words capture its
totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
false-to-fact.
*[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is
effable. Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we
can use as a model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can
agree, “Nick and Dave really effed that sucker!” In the meantime, please
have a look at the attached text, pp 4-8. *
*Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”*
Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to conclude
that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are inevitably
explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet, you cannot
explain something until you have something to explain – so all explanations
must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable conclusion, if you
take both of these claims at face value, is that all explanations are based
on prior explanations! The distinction between description and explanation
concerns their position in an argument, not their objectivity or
subjectivity in some enduring sense. Whether a statement is explanatory or
descriptive depends upon the understandings that exist between the speaker
and his or her audience at the time the statement is made. *Descriptions
are explanations that the speaker and the audience take to be true for the
purpose of seeking further explanations*.[1] <#m_-6995609592522041570__ftn1>
????
dave west
On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I
want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I
want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some
reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that
I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly
what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not
convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to
express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way
I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to
exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive the
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is
the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of is,
in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in
principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The
bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we
may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits of
what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but
which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory.
Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor
On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in
convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in
the meantime, ...
"Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald Trump
isn't funny
https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/
There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread:
1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous
juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument,
you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument."
I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole
purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually
*saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke.
And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is
illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is
salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..."
I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state of
play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of
times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening",
and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think
monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than
pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At
least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to
*commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various
types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or
17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing
competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate.
As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's the
failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should work
toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is we
think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally
ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything.
On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote:
> Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and lots of
experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not "expressible"
nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with words nor
communicated using words.
>
> Words fail! Indeed!
>
> Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail.
>
> You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT
render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about
an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally
ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make
a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of
Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find
my own experience of like kind.
>
> A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters
thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein
you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken
in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades
and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never
expressing, in words or language, the experience itself.
>
> At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a
language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or
mathematical symbols or such-based languages.
>
> The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate voids in
ontology?
>
> I love your etymological daffiness, I share it.
>
> The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in the
notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I believe to
be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL that does not
follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in words.
>
> And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because you
are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the
"N-Word" or the "C-Word."
--
☣ uǝlƃ
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
============================================================
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
------------------------------
[1] <#m_-6995609592522041570__ftnref1> Conversely, explanations are
descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be unverified under the
present circumstances.
_______________________________________________
Friam mailing list
Friam at redfish.com
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20191219/480b80d0/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the Friam
mailing list