[FRIAM] Few of you ...

[glen]

OK. But the conception you're using requires a notion of function/purpose/telos, where the original context was 'what it's for' and the new context is a reuse. And as long as you allow that sort of dualism, then fine. But if you admit that the equivalence classes assumed by reusability are fragile to the memoried historicity and fine-grained structure of the reused thing, then the illusion shatters. Things always reduce to dynamically stable pockets of foam, artificially promoted to objects.

FWIW, I have this argument on a regular basis professionally. We just call it "replacability". A good enough simulation or analog is judged good enough by cross-model validation. And the validation criteria MUST be externally sourced.

I think the strongest argument you (or Nick) might have comes from neutral networks and the gen-phen duality.  In such we have not only robustness but also polyphenism. Although that conception (with which all complexity fans are familiar), I would claim it doesn't actually work. The map is never perfectly robust nor perfectly polyphenic. Different generators always show different phenomena if you look closely enough. The equivalence class we think we've identified is a fiction, albeit useful.

And, yes, my accusation of premature registration is intimately related to the psychological induction of illusory equivalence classes. You know me too well, now. 8^)


On January 18, 2019 11:56:17 AM PST, Steven A Smith <sasmyth at swcp.com> wrote:
>
>I haven't stayed on top of the thread(s) closely of late to know
>precisely what you refer regarding logical abstraction layers, but in
>this context, I'll bite quite happily.  
>
>I don't know if "Automism" is a reserved term in Nick's Lexicon, it
>seems to be.   I'm also wondering Nick, if you might have meant
>"Automatism" (/Psychology: //the ////performance //of an //act //or
>//actions ////without ////the ////performer's ////awareness //or
>//conscious ////volition./)
>
>That said, I think the point of your (Glen) abstraction layers is the
>kind of abstraction scaffolding that happens with every bit of
>exaptation?   A structure (or autonomic process/behavior) emerges as a
>response (adaptation) to some particular evolutionary
>pressure/condition
>which in turn becomes highly useful in solving a challenge unrelated to
>the original?   The *robustness* of the structure/process that made it
>useful/useable in the first place is a key to it's fitness in the
>second
>(exapted) case.
>
>Two (possibly disproven/lame) examples: A proto-sea-mammal develops a
>thick layer of blubber to  obtain neutral bouyancy, but ends up being
>able to expand territory to more northerly seas due to the insulative
>effects.    A proto-herd-dog develops an obsessive behaviour of
>trailing
>it's human closely to avoid missing any opportunity to scavenge
>foodscraps but then  is much more prepared to be imprinted on keeping
>close track a herd of livestock. 
>
>The classic example in biology might be the self-organization of 
>phospholipids into bilayer sheets, vesicles, micelles and supermicelle
>structures.   If protolife researchers (e.g. Packard and Rasmussen) use
>some more directed technique for building a vesicle for drug-delivery,
>will it not nevertheless function enough like an "empty" vesicle
>created
>by statistical self-organization?
>
>I *think* this is roughly what Nick is referring to about with "it is
>what it is"... this qualitative chunking, this level of abstraction
>being robust enough to be useful, not "just" a trick of semantics? 
>I'll
>try to respond to your "Premature Ontologizing" separately, but they
>are
>entertwined?
>
>I know I'm flailing a bit here... but I'm trying to find some traction
>on at least your (Glen) and Nick's terminology to either connect it or
>co-align it or reject it as appropriate.

-- 
glen