[FRIAM] At the limits of thought

[uǝlƃ ☣]

Well said! While I don't think I understand the Gröbner basis analogy, I would argue that the motivations will also be derived from the world, though perhaps more deeply with long memories. [†] Add to that the loopiness where the agents co-construct the world that constructs them and it's not clear to me that any basis could be well-formed.

Folding this into Jochen's suggestion to Nick, when comparing inheritance from path-dependence to inheritance from generators, we'd have to do something to handle state. If we went with path-dependence, we'd have to define where the saved state accumulates (and presumably rates of decay). And like my statement about non-loopy/well-formedness of a potential basis, some of the saved state will be stored in the environment and some in the gametes. E.g. cities (buildings, roads, utility lines, cell phones, etc.) are state saved in the environment (Renee's grandkids don't even know what a rotary phone is/does) and things like eye color are state saved in gametes. Are the two types of data/state different in kind? Or is there a smooth transition between gametes state and environmental state.

I feel confident the functional programming people have had all these discussions. 8^) Marcus and Chris once insisted that I'd understand much better if I simply read section 3.5 of SICP ... they underestimated just how stupid I am, however. 

[†] I have argued, even on this list, that perhaps the motivation can be unified into something I call Twitch, which someone (on this list) pointed out to me was discussed in Warren's All the King's Men, arguably my favorite novel. It's not quite clear to me what my conception of Twitch is or would be if I took it seriously ... some kind of heat maybe, a pressure to explore every crevice of the universe ... a pressure strong enough maybe to *create* the universe ... like virtual particles at an event horizon.

On 4/27/20 10:14 AM, Jon Zingale wrote:
> I like that Sims approaches the problem of AI from the perspective that
> life is a consequence of the world, that life is the world discovering itself.
> He specifies a learning semantics (genetic algorithms) and a learning
> syntax (motivation functions and virtual embodiment in time) for his creations.
> His specifications are functor-like in that they determine a structure on the
> world that when probed gives information about the world, more or less finely.
> Through process come functions like crawling, reaching, or defending.
> Some how these functions follow from motivation, learning and the world.
> Is it reasonable to interpret them as dependent functions of the underlying
> motivation functions, the motivations acting as a generalized grobner basis?
> 
> To Glen's point, or perhaps the point of the Bengiopaper, if we watch long
> enough and the virtual world has sufficient analog to our own, we can begin
> to experience a transparency of understanding. Still perhaps, the understanding
> is not of the agent but of the world.


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☣ uǝlƃ