[FRIAM] OK. That's funny.

[jon zingale]

Nick,

Nick,

> One little scrap I can grasp at here, and perhaps make a contribution.
> There  is a subtle point, perhaps a weakness in Peirce, to which the term 
> "believable" points.  Note the mode.  "believable--that which is readily 
> believed."  But Peirce is pointing not to that but to "that which SHALL be 
> believed" or "that which is fated to be believed" in the very long run.
> Not  "credibles" but "credibilenda" .  

Note that the term 'believable' for me is in reference to the idea of a
universal grammar of belief (UGB) and corresponds to what giving enough
time one *will* believe. This idea is a riff on Chomsky's notion of
language competence, where the universal grammar is *there* and through
*performance* one becomes *competent* wrt their universal grammar[Æ].
That said, I assert that there is a kind of identification between my
model and the Peircean model. I assert that for an individual given
enough time to discover their beliefs, that which is *believable* is
that which is fated to be believed.

Now here is where Carter's paper comes in. In the paper, the author
defines the notion of apt-belief as a belief that is discovered to be
accurate because competent. I posit that scientific beliefs could be in a
class of this type. Further, we note that the collection of one's possible
apt-beliefs is a sub-collection of their total possible beliefs, UGB. In
this way, the UGB can be thought of as a classifying object for belief.

The version of Peirce's assertion I am working with here is the one that
you sometimes claim, namely, *that which in the long-run we will _all_
come to agree upon*. This stronger Peircean assertion gives rise to a
sub-collection as well, the collection of those apt-beliefs that we
collectively find to be necessary. That is, granted a Kripke-like
semantics, a belief is Peircean-true iff every person will come to believe
it in the long-run. Dually[⇆], we can consider all of those apt-beliefs
that each of us comes to discover but is not part of the belief-commons.
That at least one of us finds the belief apt means, again via Kripke,
that these beliefs are to be considered possible apt-beliefs wrt the
whole of us. These beliefs are interesting to me exactly because we can
profit from them as knowledge while they _can never_ be Peircean-true.
Again, the reason they cannot, like the grounding for universal grammar,
would follow from a historical accident of biology. I hope to have not
muddied my own waters too much here, and I hope that what I am writing
now is still mostly consistent with what I wrote before.

[Æ] I am speaking loosely here. For one thing, language competence in
Chomsky's model refers to one's *knowledge* of their universal grammar
and not just to what one performs. For the sake of simplicity, I am
blending these ideas.

[⇆] The alethic operators come in monad-comonad adjoint pairs and
so are linked by a duality.




--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/