[FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us

[Eric Charles]

Well, gosh, now Nick has me all confused...

Dave, when you say that Peirce can't help with "knowledge", are you
invoking some continental-philosophy notion of "definitively-correct,
fully-justified true belief"? Or are you instead talking about whatever
people are talking about when they *claim* to know things (or *feel* like
they know things)? Peirce can, I think, help with the latter. He can't help
with the former, because he doesn't think it exists. In Peirce-land there
is no denying that we are messy systems engaged in messy activities,
including in regards to our cognitions.

-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
American University - Adjunct Instructor
<echarles at american.edu>


On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 3:08 PM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi, Dave,
>
>
>
> See Larding below:
>
>
>
> Nicholas Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>
> Clark University
>
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 20, 2020 1:55 AM
> *To:* friam at redfish.com
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us
>
>
>
> Nick,
>
>
>
> Thanks for the response. I think you answered my questions but, because
> your answers seem to confirm a conclusion I came to prior to the answers, I
> need to check if I have it correct.
>
>
>
> The key issue, for me is in question 4 and your answer ...
>
>
>
> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our
> "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
>
> *[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think
> that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no
> implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns.*
>
>
>
>  ... which is the reason that I asked the followup question about
> naturalized epistemology (NE).
>
>
>
> NE comes from W.V.O. Quine and advocates replacing traditional approaches
> for understanding knowledge with empirically grounded approaches ala the
> natural sciences — how knowledge actually forms and is used in the World. A
> subset would be about what knowledge must an agent form and hold in order
> to survive; which sounds related to evolutionary epistemology.
>
>
>
> The epistemology of Pierce and traditional philosophers of knowledge is
> deemed, like mathematics, to be divorced from common sense understandings
> of meaning and truth. I.e. Pierce's system (logic?) can tell us whether or
> not we have a truthful conception of an object, but nothing further. It
> cannot tell us that Donald "is," let alone that he is an "x."
>
> *[NST===>] Ok, you’ve got my head spinning here.  I think you have it
> exactly backwards.  Leaving the Donald out of it for a moment, because I
> think he confuses us, I think discriminating the LIKELY truth of an
> assertion of fact is EXACTLY what pragmatism is about.  Mathematical
> statements, by themselves, are neither true nor false but meaningless.
> Just a matter, as Peirce would say, of what language you chose to speak.
> And yes, in a broad sense Peirce is engaged in a vague form of evolutionary
> epistemology since he vaguely attributes the predictive power of habit
> formation to natural selection.  *
>
>
>
> *If you asked me, a purported pragmatist, where knowledge comes from and
> what knowledge is ‘about’, I would say that knowledge comes from past
> experience and it is about future experience.  This includes historical
> knowledge.  If I am told that Indians camp, fished, and hunted on a low
> hill at the bend of the river near the Mosquito Infested Bog (hereafrer,
> MIB), then that information MEANS, among many other things, that I should
> be able to find some nice arrowheads down there.*
>
>
>
> Alas, I seems I must abandon the hope that Pierce can offer assistance in
> my quest to understand what knowledge is, means for obtaining it, and how
> we know if we have it.
>
> *[NST===>] I didn’t see the kidney punch (until Glen pointed it out); all
> I knew, before that, was that my lower back was sore.  I agree with Glen
> that if ever crocodile tears were shed, you shed them when you wrote the
> word “alas”.*
>
>
>
> *N*
>
>
>
> davew
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Feb 20, 2020, at 1:35 AM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>
> David,
>
>
>
> I immediately got snarled up in writing you a long, turgid response, so
> figured I better write you a short one first, lest I never respond at all.
> See larding below.
>
>
>
> n
>
>
>
> Nicholas Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>
> Clark University
>
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/D
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
>
> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Prof David West
>
> Sent: Wednesday, February 19, 2020 8:48 AM
>
> To: friam at redfish.com
>
> Subject: [FRIAM] question for pragmatists and Piercians among us
>
>
>
> Politically charged question to follow. Unlike my usual wont, I am not
> trying to be provocative. I pick a difficult example for my question in the
> hope that it will generate enough heat to produce light with the hope that
> the light will illuminate clarity.
>
>
>
> Pierce said:
>
>
>
> "Consider what effects, *that might* conceivably have practical bearings,
> we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
> these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."
>
>
>
> The Donald is our object
>
> *[NST===>] It might be argued that the whole project is ill-founded
> because “the Donald” is an individual, and therefore, by definition, not a
> general.  Abduction is to generals.  I think this is a cheap response,
> because, while The Donald is not a general in the same way “cat” is a
> general, it is still a lower level general.  “Is it true that The Donald is
> over 6’ tall” is a reasonable question to ask in the same way that “how
> many angels….pin?” is not a reasonable question to ask. So, then, by
> definition, The Donald is a real  *
>
>
>
>
>
> 1- Can we enumerate the "effects with conceivably practical bearings" we
> expect our object to have?*[NST===>] * *Eric might help us here, but
> basically, I have to agree with you the Maxim is faulty at this point.  It
> seems to me a monstrous category error.  Objects are just not the sorts of
> things that have effects.  Events have effects.  Actions have effects.
> Thanks reminding me of this problem.  I always supply words when I read the
> maxim, such as effects… of conceiving of the object in the way we do, as
> opposed to some other way. The effects under consideration are the
> expectations that would arise from conceiving of the object way.  So, if we
> conceive of DT as  a liar, then many effects follow from that conception,
> and those effects are the meaning of the conception, and it has no other
> meaning. *
>
> 2- Must the enumeration include both "positive" and "negative" effects?
>
>   2a- does the answer to #2 depend on the definition of "our?" If 'our' is
> defined inclusively the answer to #2 would seem to be yes, but if 'our' is
> exclusive or restricted to only those with pro or anti
> perspectives/convictions, maybe not.*[NST===>] *
>
> *[NST===>] well, we have to remember that the Maxim is a thesis about
> meaning, and so I think the maxim can be applied relatively—i.e., If [to
> me] a unicorn is a white horse with a narwhale horn in the middle of his
> forehead, then that is [to me] the meaning of unicorn.  *
>
> 3- Must the effects we conceive have some threshold measure of a quality
> we might call 'truthiness', 'likelihood', 'believe-ability', reality'? [T
> becoming a dictator.]*[NST===>] * *The question is not about the meaning
> of “trump”; as a proper name, “Trump” has no meaning in that sense.  The
> question is about the assignment of trump to the general, “dictator”, and
> so concerns the meaning of that general.  If we were to test by observation
> the proposition that Trump is a dictator,  what tests would we employ.
> These tests, according to the maxim, are the meaning of the attribution. *
>
>  is a conceivable effect, but, I for one, see no possibility of that
> effectuating* [NST===>] I don’t think so.  What “unicorn” means to me has
> no implications for the existence of unicorns.  *
>
> 4- If we had a "consensus" enumeration of plausible effects does our
> "conception of the object" have any relation to the ontology of the object?
>
> *[NST===>] I don’t think so.  Increasing the number of people who think
> that “unicorn” means “a horse with a narwhale horn on his forehead” has no
> implications for the existence or non existence of unicorns. *
>
>
>
> 5- If we have myriad enumerations does that mean "we" cannot possess a
> conception of the object, merely multiple conceptions of caricatures of the
> object?
>
>
>
> I'm working on a paper with an epistemological focus and that brought me
> to Pierce and prompted the above questions.
>
> Another question for the evolutionists who are also pragmatists: why
> pragmatism over "naturalized epistemology?"
>
> *[NST===>] I am not sure what a naturalized epistemology is.  Evolutionary
> epistemology is the known that all knowledge arises through selection
> mechanisms.  People will say, for instance, that both a bird’s wing and a
> jumbo jet’s constitute knowledge about flight.  Well, I suppose.  *
>
>
>
> davew
>
>
>
> ============================================================
>
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
> http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
> ============================================================
>
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
>
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20200221/a62d1171/attachment.html>