[FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM

Frank Wimberly wimberly3 at gmail.com
Tue Jul 21 11:43:25 EDT 2020


I believe that one can believe a, b, and c independently even if a and b
entail (or cause) c.

Also, in the definition of causation I reported earlier I carefully said "a
cause" rather than "the cause".

I taught resolution theorem proving in the AI course that I taught.  That's
a lot of logic.

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Tue, Jul 21, 2020, 9:37 AM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:

> OK, so what if I believe x, and I believe y and I believe that beliefs x+y
> entail z? Then I believe z, right?  But do we want to say that I believe z
> BECAUSE I believed x and y?  Entailment never "entails" belief unless I
> believe in the laws of logic, right?  For some reason I want to reserve
> "cause" for the situation which believing y and believing that x+y entails
> z, I came to believe z because I came to believe x.
>
> I am plainly out of my depth, here.   I mean, even more than usual.  We
> need
> a logician, or 4 years at St. Johns, or both.  I think that a logician
> consultant would say -- wearily -- that Nick wants to limit the word cause
> to "efficient" causes, that experimental psychologists tend to do that,
> etc.
> So then the question becomes, is the causality asserted when I say that the
> snifter broke because I left it on the table when I went to bed AND the cat
> knocked it off the table while  eating the dip from last night's party the
> same causality as I might assert if I said that the snifter broke BECAUSE
> it
> was brittle.  And is the causality that we assert when we assert sidewise
> causality -- a sequence of events -- in any way related to the causality
> that we assert when we assert upward or downward causality.
>
> Glen has offered, and EricS has endorsed, a work-around for all this mess
> which I have yet to understand.  Really, I shouldn't speak to this issue
> any
> more before I have another go at their messages, which I attach.
>
> Nick
>
> Nicholas Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
> Clark University
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale
> Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 6:07 AM
> To: friam at redfish.com
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM
>
> What about something being believably prior rather than just temporally
> prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause?
>
>
>
> --
> Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>
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