[FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism

Sun May 24 13:39:16 EDT 2020

*That which is the case, whether or not you, me, or any other finite
cognitive system believes it.*

Did Peirce write that?    Shouldn't it be "whether you, I, or any other..."

Nick, don't take Ecstasy.

Frank

---
Frank C. Wimberly
140 Calle Ojo Feliz,
Santa Fe, NM 87505

505 670-9918
Santa Fe, NM

On Sun, May 24, 2020, 11:21 AM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi, dave.  See Larding, below.
>
>
>
> Nicholas Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>
> Clark University
>
> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>
> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David West
> *Sent:* Sunday, May 24, 2020 8:58 AM
> *To:* friam at redfish.com
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Peirce & Postmordernism
>
>
>
> Eric,
>
>
>
> Thank you for the response, it is useful.
>
>
>
> The quantum question, poorly stated, challenges Peirce's definition of an
> external reality "upon which our thinking has no effect."
>
>
>
> *[NST=**è** His formulation was more like “That which is the case,
> whether or not you, me, or any other finite cognitive system believes it.“
> I am not sure there is an important difference there.  More important to
> remember that Peirce’s is an assertion concerning the meaning of the
> conception “truth”, not an assertion that there is a truth of any matter.
> It is the definition of truth that makes coherent our behavior with respect
> to the word.  *
>
> *<===nst] *
>
> I assume that Peirce would put things like molecules, atoms, and
> elementary particles in that category - based upon what was known about
> them when he was writing.
>
> *[NST===>Yes, he would say that they are candidate “reals”.  <===nst] *
>
> But, if the character of the most fundamental of those things — particle
> or wave, velocity, spin, location, etc. — is determined by human
> observation/measurement, then they cannot be Real according to Peirce's
> definition. This looks like an easy conclusion, but I suspect I am missing
> a nuance somewhere.
>
> *[NST===>Well, here is where I think he would get off the bus.  If I can
> make a true statement of the form, “if I do this procedure, then I will
> probably get that result, then the elements in that statement are probably
> real.”  Probably true and probably real are all you ever get in Peirce.
> <===nst] *
>
>
>
> My fourth question, also poorly stated, actually claims that any Truths
> discovered via use of the method are not Truths about any external reality,
> but merely Truths about application of the rules (reason, sufficient
> experience, laws of perception, etc.) of the method. A kind of tautology
> claim: you (Peirce) define what the Truth must be in the definition of the
> rules of method.
>
> *[NST===>Just keep remembering that the pragmatic maxim is a claim about
> MEANING, to a metaphysical claim.*
>
> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practicIal bearings, we
> conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
> these effects is the whole of our conception of the object..
>
>
>
> *<===nst] *
>
>
>
> If I am wrong about the "tautology" aspect of my question (high
> probability), then my position would become: "you (Peirce) have, with your
> rules of method, so constrained the problem and solution space that your
> method applies only to a narrowly defined domain. It is not even close to a
> general method of problem solving or Truth finding; but you (Peirce) seem
> to be claiming such generality. My counter claim to Peirce: although "the
> method" might be useful for math, physics, chemistry, etc. it is useless
> for questions of psychology, cultural anthropology, politics,
> consciousness, etc.
>
> *[NST===>I have a long history in my writing of being allergic to other
> people’s tautologies, so you have me by the short hair, here.  The
> PragmatiCIst Maxim does place upon you the burden of stating what
> differences in knowledge-gathering practice your conception of truth
> makes.  If those differences are not practicially obsure, then you have a
> definition in good standing with Peirce, and science can go on.  The
> opposite of truth in Peirce not falsity (for falsity is a kind of truth)
> but doubt.  If there is nothing upon which we are “fated to agree”, then
> there is no truth.  <===nst] *
>
>
>
> Ready to be set straight.
>
> *[NST===>I am not sure I am in a condition to set anybody straight about
> anything.  You seem to be able to read, during this crisis.  I can no more
> read anything right now than I could during a bad hurricane in a rickety
> New England farm house. Congratulations.  If your MDMA will help me get
> back to reading, I am for it. <===nst] *
>
>
>
> davew
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 23, 2020, at 7:20 PM, Eric Charles wrote:
>
> Dave,
>
> These are very good questions. The Fixation of Belief is one of Peirce's
> writings that I really like. It is a non-technical piece written very early
> in his career. If we had serious Peirce scholars amongst us, they would go
> on for years about how that paper relates to Peirce's later and more
> precise works. It is a deep rabbit hole. Luckily, we don't have that
> problem.
>
>
>
> 1. Is Peirce a dualist? - I think he is trying hard not to be, but he
> still has some lingering bits that make me wonder if he's fully cut the
> cord. I suspect that at this stage of his career he would say that beliefs
> and thoughts are real. Later, in his career, he comes to believe that only
> "generals" are "real", and that's a whole different can of worms. His work
> on what we might broadly call "psychology" is probably the weakest part of
> his work.
>
>
>
> 2. What about quantum physics and the "observer" problem? I'm not sure
> this intersects with Peirce's work. I suspect Peirce wouldn't like quantum
> indeterminacy, but he might be fine with it so long as we held the emphasis
> on how that doesn't really affect interaction with macro objects.
>
>
>
> 3. Why does Peirce privileged Reason? (weak post-modernism) In the
> Fixation of Belief, Peirce is pretty honest that the only thing the
> scientific method has going for it is that it leads to stable beliefs. If
> you don't care whether or not your beliefs pan out when tested, there are
> some good reasons to prefer other methods of fixating beliefs. One of my
> favorite things about that paper is Peirce's honestly that the other
> methods for fixating beliefs have things in their favor.
>
>
>
> 4. Why constrain the 'solution space'? (strong post-modernism) Well,
> Peirce actually thinks there will not be a solution to almost all questions
> we might think to ask. The question isn't really how to constrain the
> solution space though, the question is what gets to count as a solution.
> You can't solve problems that don't exist, so if we are asking questions
> about things that are not real, we will never find an answer. There might
> be perfectly good reasons to pretend there are answers to poorly formed
> questions - to facilitate social cohesion in various ways, to avoid getting
> killed by fanatics, etc., etc. - but that's a totally different problem.
> The assertion that some belief is "true" is an assertion about what *would
> *happen *if *we systematically started examining the consequences of that
> belief. If you want to talk about some other properties a belief might
> have, that's fine, just don't pretend you are talking about whether or not
> it is true. And we may "examine the consequences" of a belief using the
> full scope of examination methods. There are no preconceived restrictions.
> "Our senses" is meant in the most generous sense, not a narrow one, and
> merely acknowledges that we cannot examine anything except via the methods
> by which humans are capable of examining things.
>
>
>
> Does that help?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----------
>
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>
> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
>
> American University - Adjunct Instructor
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 10:47 AM Prof David West <profwest at fastmail.fm>
> wrote:
>
> Peirce:
>
>
>
> "To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be
> found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some
> external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. ...
> Such is  the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in
> more familiar language, is this: There are Real things, whose characters
> are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our
> senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as
> different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the
> laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and
> truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason
> enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."
>
>
>
> The above quote is a context from which I am about to take words and ask
> questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce corpus in toto must admonish
> me if I am being unfair, i.e. this quote is an outlier or an exception to
> Peirce in general.
>
>
>
> 1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no effect," and
> there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and "reasoning" that are, arguably,
> affected by our thoughts:
>
>   a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that distinguishes between
> an external permanency and internal thought?
>
>   b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?
>
>
>
> 2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to imply that the
> the "characters of Real things" are, in fact, affected by human thinking,
> or, at least, human attention."
>
>   a. Are there 'Real things'?
>
>
>
> 3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods are determined
> by the human, technically the social, and there is no objective criteria by
> which to give privilege over one human determined method/belief over
> another..
>
>   a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other
> methods/beliefs, e.g.  'meditation', 'faith'?
>
>
>
> 4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception," [the rules of]
> reasoning," "sufficient experience," and "reason enough," taken together,
> constrain the possible 'solution space' too severely; the 'one
> [provisionally] True conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process,
> not congruence with any "external permanency."
>
>   a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects our senses?
>
>   b. What are the "laws of perception?"
>
>   c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough" mandate a narrow,
> and intolerant, orthodoxy?
>
>
>
> davew
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. .
> ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
>
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
>
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>
> -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. .
> ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
>
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
>
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>
>
>
>
> -- --- .-. . .-.. --- -.-. -.- ... -..-. .- .-. . -..-. - .... . -..-. .
> ... ... . -. - .. .- .-.. -..-. .-- --- .-. -.- . .-. ...
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam
> un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20200524/9709443f/attachment.html>