[FRIAM] A/R theory

[thompnickson2 at gmail.com]

Russ, 

 

This is exactly the mind-body problem, isn’t it?  Could we be computational monists and resolved the mind body problem by saying that behavior is the implementation of mind?  

 

Nicholas Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology

Clark University

 <mailto:ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com

 <https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

 

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Russ Abbott
Sent: Saturday, November 7, 2020 12:44 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] A/R theory

 

You may be interested in my Minds and Machines <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dKv7Dt_2pO1OlUL7BesB31FyjpCsO_2E/view?usp=sharing>  (also Springer) paper on the same subject.

 

The Bit (and Three Other Abstractions) Defne the Borderline Between Hardware and Software 

 

Abstract Modern computing is generally taken to consist primarily of symbol manipulation. But symbols are abstract, and computers are physical. How can a physical device manipulate abstract symbols? Neither Church nor Turing considered this question. My answer is that the bit, as a hardware-implemented abstract data type, serves as a bridge between materiality and abstraction. Computing also relies on three other primitive—but more straightforward—abstractions: Sequentiality, State, and Transition. These physically-implemented abstractions define the borderline between hardware and software and between physicality and abstraction. At a deeper level, asking how a physical device can interact with abstract symbols is the wrong question. The relationship between symbols and physical devices begins with the realization that human beings already know what it means to manipulate symbols. We build and program computers to do what we understand to be symbol manipulation. To understand what that means, consider a light switch. A light switch doesn’t turn a light on or off. Those are abstractions. Light switches don’t operate with abstractions. We build light switches (and their associated circuitry) so that when flipped, the world is changed in such a way that we understand the light to be on or of. Similarly, we build computers to perform operations that we understand as manipulating symbols.  

 

In other words, it's all in our minds.

 

-- Russ Abbott                                       
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles

 

 

On Sat, Nov 7, 2020 at 9:35 AM jon zingale <jonzingale at gmail.com <mailto:jonzingale at gmail.com> > wrote:

This work does seem to be relevant, up to 𝜀-equivalence, to many of the
fibers in recent threads :) As the authors point out, the question of
deciding which diagrams 𝜀-commute is the business of experimental science à
la EricC's commentary on the history of chemistry. Also, the ideas expressed
in this paper appear to point in a similar direction to the
(model-theoretic) ideas I was attempting to land in the *downward-causation*
discussion from last week. Lastly, the thesis is related to questions of how
extensional (or purely-functional) computation arises from the intentional
(maximally-stateful) variations of a substrate. So, thanks.

𝜀-equivalence itself is interesting because it comes with a *competence
constraint* that prevents it from being a transitive relation, that in
general a =𝜀 b ^ b =𝜀 c ⊬ a =𝜀 c is crucial to the theory. In other
words, while there may be a wide range of arm shapes that can be used as
bludgeons, one can evolve themselves out of the sweet spot. Dually, the
𝜀-equivalence condition provides a route to modeling *exaptation*, via
modal possibility. As p's belonging to the Physical domain vary, images in
the abstract theory vary into or out of 𝜀-equivalence with values belonging
to other problem domains. In particular, if we imagine that the R-map in the
paper is *actually* a structural functor as it seems to imply, we can
imagine another functor R' which specifies yet another problem space.
Natural transformations then, up to 𝜀-equivalence, provide a model of
exaptation. Because of the experimental nature of 𝜀-equivalence, I suspect
we would slowly discover an underlying Heyting algebra which would extend to
a topos via studying relations on sieves of 𝜀-equivalent structures. This
approach would formalize *how far from competent* a structure is wrt
*proving* a particular computation.



--
Sent from: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6  bit.ly/virtualfriam <http://bit.ly/virtualfriam> 
un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/ <http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/FRIAM-COMIC> 
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20201108/68956487/attachment.html>