[FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic

[jon zingale]

"Or do we assert, as the Free Will contingent do, that Will is above the
fray?"

Ok, so I continue to struggle with what it is that concerns me about the
assumption of determinism. Marcus's point about the loci of *will*
requires serious consideration. From where I stand, arguments opposing
free will to determinism are instances of dialectical argument, where
the former is posed as the pure negative to the latter[!]. The particular
choice here then is seen to be part of a class of such opposites: chaos
and order, irrationality and rationality, randomness and computability,
non-representation and representation, absence and substance,...
Each negative object then is presented as either failing to have scrutable
qualities or have qualities explicitly defined relative to their positive
counterpart. What follows is an asymmetry that is baked into the form of
the argument, regardless of its content.

Now, as far as I can tell, an argumentative *mode* arises when we relate
positive objects to positive objects via metaphor, for instance, when we
say that determinism is computation or determinism is pure order, etc...
An effect of such metaphor making is the attribution of an object as a
quality of another (comprehension), i.e., ascribing determination to a
computation or tracing out a determination by a computation. Meanwhile,
in the opposite category, free will comes to be identified with randomness.

My concern, then, is that positive theories are objectifying whereas
negative theories are reflective[!], and since *will* here is presented
in its negative form, we are denied access to speak directly about its
qualities. Instead, we come to know *will* in terms of randomness via
coming to know determination in terms of computation. Ultimately, it
leaves me feeling like I am looking for my keys (will) under some nearby
streetlight (determination).

[!] Evoking Raymond Guess in his analytic exposition "The Idea of a
Critical Theory".



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