[FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches

[thompnickson2 at gmail.com]

Jon – can’t answer now except to say, “Probably better than I do.”

 

N

 

Nick Thompson

ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com <mailto:ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com> 

https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/

 

From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale
Sent: Saturday, November 20, 2021 8:38 PM
To: friam at redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches

 

"As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible
or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a
behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways,
as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible,
or impossible."

I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but
I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as
it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense
of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil
for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes
between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are
true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly
true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as
I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean
Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every
possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are
unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at
all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context?

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