[FRIAM] health care logistics

[Marcus Daniels]

Glen writes:

< I don't see how we can prune the combinatorial explosion of [im]possible outcomes without deciding some kind of objective at the start, even if it's super vague like a Gaia-ish homeostatic health of the biosphere. >

One could imagine a sort of Mad Max scenario out in the streets where the Whole Foods deliveries are intercepted by the street dwelling climate refugees?   Or large compounds where food, water, temperature-controlled clean air were ensured for a price?   Take all the rusting metal sitting around from Trump's wall and build bigger fences around estates?   Green Zones, like in the Iraq sense?

Marcus
________________________________
From: Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> on behalf of glen <gepropella at gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 25, 2022 11:50 AM
To: friam at redfish.com <friam at redfish.com>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] health care logistics

Well, OK. But the question still stands: Necessary for what objective?

The Siebert & Rees paper talks about shared values like "socially just ecological sustainability", "salvage civilization", "one-earth living", etc. And each one of their criticisms in section 3 also assume some values. So, I'm guessing it's something like their objective that we're assuming as our objective. And anything that does not target that objective isn't put into the kitty of things we'll evaluate as possible or impossible. (E.g. the second-earth idea where we abandon this earth as a husk is not part of the conversation.)

I don't see how we can prune the combinatorial explosion of [im]possible outcomes without deciding some kind of objective at the start, even if it's super vague like a Gaia-ish homeostatic health of the biosphere.


On 1/25/22 06:39, David Eric Smith wrote:
> To say this is a value question is fair, glen, given my shorthands of language.
>
> However, I would like to split apart questions of “who wants what” from questions of “what can or cannot happen under what conditions, irrespective of what anybody wants”.  In principle we have ways to get at the latter question; we often do worse in getting any resolution out of the former.  Maybe there is something basic in this?  Our notion of truth is that on any properly-posed question, there should only be one durable answer.  Whereas in the area of desires, we think it is either inescapable, or for many also desirable (a self-referential value judgment) that different answers coexist indefinitely.
>
> Eric
>
>
>
>> On Jan 25, 2022, at 8:02 AM, glen <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Necessary for what, though? We need the shared value(s) before we can ask what response we'd get from the convergence on something that might be necessary to adhere to that value. Is the shared value that biology on this planet should be preserved and the thing we need to do is impossible? Or perhaps the shared value that all "lower forms of life" were simply stepping stones to the human organism, but to preserve the human organism is impossible? Etc.
>>
>> As Jon likes to ask: What are we optimizing? If we can't agree on that, then the responses to impossibilities will be as diverse as the values that underlie those impossibilities. And, if that's the case, then we're back to the clustering/homogenizing we see in any aspect of pop culture.
>>
>> On 1/24/22 17:21, David Eric Smith wrote:
>>> In a real situation where we decided something was necessary that we believed there was no way to do, somehow I feel like the same movie doesn’t become the response.  Something else does.  What is that?
>>
>> On 1/24/22 17:34, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>>> Before I launch into a diatribe about why the hell we can't agree to basic, never mind interesting things:


--
glen
Theorem 3. There exists a double master function.


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