[FRIAM] Nick's Categories

[Steve Smith]

> Excellent! I appreciate your clarification as to why it might be 
> useful to explore. I will do so. I'm still a bit confused as to why 
> you mentioned it in the context of me claiming that "the bot" (e.g. 
> ChatGPT) has a body. 
I think I was ignoring that bit of context entirely...   however "all 
computation is embodied" feels like a tautology to me?  Even though many 
with a bio-centric view might not think of computational substrate as 
"body"?  I think the inlined Rączaszek‑Leonardi quote I included might 
speak to the larger? question about (dis/pan)embodiment?
> Or the context of claiming some forms of panpsychism are monist. Maybe 
> I'll figure out why Deacon's relevant to one or both of those comments 
> as I read through Rączaszek‑Leonardi's essay.

I think Deacon's molecule->sign argument might be monist as well as 
panpsychist.   I find Deacon's recursive bootstrap-scaffold from 
homeodynamic to morphodynamic to teleodynamic to *gesture at* how 
energy-stuff yields matter-stuff yields body-stuff yields mind-stuff 
yields mind++-stuff (or more generally 
life-like/intelligence-like/consiousness-like/ends-in-mind/teleo)-stuff. 
I can't say I'm smart enough, or have applied myself enough (or both) to 
his constructions and reflections to say with confidence that he's being 
successful in this project...   the homeo/morpho/teleo prefixes suggest 
3 qualitative groupings of "differences that make a difference" in a 
chain of supervenient/emergent properties.