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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/5/20 4:38 PM, Frank Wimberly
      wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAA5dAfq2Df27vcHFAVE9C_iU+mOeMf8Wo0YBzDNw_+07kbQLsQ@mail.gmail.com">
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        <div>"We record/observe *all* your behavior down to the minutest
          level... " is impossible.<br>
        </div>
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    </blockquote>
    <p>Some of my work (not so much these days) has been in light-field
      capture as well as holography... so my metaphorical target domain
      comes from a fairly specific technical perspective.<br>
    </p>
    <p>Of course "recording/observing *all* of your behaviour" is as
      impossible as it is impossible to "record all impinging
      interfering light waves as silver halide crystals on a
      photographic plate", so even a high-quality hologram is just  a
      "fuzzy facsimile"... the point isn't fidelity as much as it is
      that a lot more *qualities* of information are available to BE
      recorded than we normally record (e.g. focusing nominally parallel
      light rays reflected off an object through a lens onto a similar
      photographic plate).   The hologram doesn't necessarily contain
      more data (limited by the grain size of the silver-halide film and
      the quality of the optical elements moving the light around as
      well as the wavelength of the light) than a conventional
      photograph, it is just *qualitatively* more interesting/complex
      than the impingement of a planar wave onto a plane (or the
      integrated fusing of hundreds of such captures from hundreds of
      lenses or pinholes) (think phased array radar in the optical
      spectra).  <br>
    </p>
    <p>I defer to your broader/deeper experience and awareness of
      conventional psychology, but I suppose what I was alluding to is
      the difference between a "gestalt" and a "diagnosis"?   A good
      intuitive therapist, NLP practitioner, car-salesman, "psychic",
      etc.   (I contend) can "read" a LOT more than a bureaucrat
      screening for a particular purpose.   I'm simply borrowing Glen's
      reference to "holographically" to elaborate the nature of that.</p>
    <p>Meanwhile, I agree strongly with you that a great deal of your
      internal state (second by second) is operationally opaque to me
      and everyone else who might try to observe, including Marcus when
      he wires you up with Neuralink hardware or locks you into an fMRI
      while you fantasize about your next car or reminisce about a
      favorite meal/libation you enjoyed 37 years ago while apprehending
      the Aurora Borealis at winter solstice in a northern Finland
      resort that overlooks the Russian Landscape across the border.  I
      also know from my own musings and reminiscings that *my* memories
      can vary from time to time (and from an objective observation like
      a microphone or camera capturing those aspects of a situation).</p>
    <p><br>
    </p>
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    <blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAA5dAfq2Df27vcHFAVE9C_iU+mOeMf8Wo0YBzDNw_+07kbQLsQ@mail.gmail.com">
      <div dir="auto">
        <div><br>
          <div data-smartmail="gmail_signature">---<br>
            Frank C. Wimberly<br>
            140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>
            Santa Fe, NM 87505<br>
            <br>
            505 670-9918<br>
            Santa Fe, NM</div>
          <br>
          <div class="gmail_quote">
            <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 5, 2020, 4:13
              PM Steven A Smith <<a href="mailto:sasmyth@swcp.com"
                moz-do-not-send="true">sasmyth@swcp.com</a>> wrote:<br>
            </div>
            <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
              .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
              <div>
                <p><br>
                </p>
                <div>On 5/5/20 3:04 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:<br>
                </div>
                <blockquote type="cite">
                  <div dir="ltr">
                    <div>Dammit, Nick.  I can and frequently do spend
                      hours planning, remembering, composing emails,
                      fantasizing about my next car, etc  without
                      exhibiting any remarkable behavior beyond
                      eyeblinking, touching my face (don't!), crossing
                      and uncrossing my legs.  We've been through this
                      before but  what is my latest plan about what to
                      do when my auto lease is up?  No one knows but me
                      despite your claim that I don't have private
                      access to these kinds of things.</div>
                  </div>
                </blockquote>
                <p>And following (weakly I am sure) Glen's reference to
                  "holographically", I believe that if we record/observe
                  *all* of your behaviour down to the minutest detail,
                  we can learn a LOT about that inner state.    If we
                  had that data from the *last* time you approached
                  buying a new car (maybe years out) we might recognize
                  the specific patterns of leg-crossing and eye-blinking
                  and chair-leaning that go with fantasizing about that
                  muscle-car inspired anti-proton powered 6 wheel-drive
                  hub-motor flying car you have been jonesing on!     <br>
                </p>
                <p>I'm somewhat with Glen (as I understand him in this
                  conversation) on the ideation that inner and outer is
                  somewhat mutable.    Sometimes the 6-rotor flying
                  drone-car I fantasize (and blame on Frank) flitting
                  around in is *part of* *me* and other times it is what
                  I interface *to* and *it* interfaces (mostly) to the
                  air (and sometimes to the water, the ground, and
                  unfortunately a tall tree here and there).    When I
                  am composing a message *to* this august body named
                  FriAM, I often think of youse alls as "external" to
                  me, but if I'm talking to one of the philistines in my
                  life who do NOT spend all their time talking/thinking
                  about these kinds of things (whatever these kinds
                  are), I sometimes think of myself as being *of* "the
                  FriAM" rather than "in the FriAM" (or is that FriAM
                  pan?).</p>
                <p><br>
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                <blockquote type="cite">
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                  <div class="gmail_quote">
                    <div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, May 5,
                      2020 at 1:36 PM <<a
                        href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"
                        target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>>
                      wrote:<br>
                    </div>
                    <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
                      0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
                      rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Hi,Glen,<br>
                      <br>
                      Careful.  Isn't the formulation "inner world"
                      entirely contradictory?  <br>
                      <br>
                      N<br>
                      <br>
                      Nicholas Thompson<br>
                      Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<br>
                      Clark University<br>
                      <a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com"
                        target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</a><br>
                      <a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/"
                        rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</a><br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      -----Original Message-----<br>
                      From: Friam <<a
                        href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com"
                        target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>>
                      On Behalf Of u?l? ?<br>
                      Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 12:50 PM<br>
                      To: FriAM <<a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com"
                        target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"
                        moz-do-not-send="true">friam@redfish.com</a>><br>
                      Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Warring Darwinians for Glen,
                      Steve<br>
                      <br>
                      However, I think we can come up with a (maybe
                      someday) testable hypothesis based on hidden
                      states. In principle, if EricC's principle is
                      taken seriously, the inner world of a black box
                      device will be *completely* represented on its
                      surface (ala the holographic principle). Any
                      information not exhibited by a black box's
                      *behavior* will be lost/random. <br>
                      <br>
                      This implies something about the compressibility
                      and information content of the black box's
                      behavior, right? <br>
                      <br>
                      On 5/5/20 10:38 AM, Prof David West wrote:<br>
                      > This does not advance an argument against the
                      possibility of a computer thinking — merely an
                      assertion that "behavior" is not a valid basis
                      upon which to argue that they do.<br>
                      <br>
                      <br>
                      --<br>
                      ☣ uǝlƃ<br>
                      <br>
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                  <br>
                  -- <br>
                  <div dir="ltr">Frank Wimberly<br>
                    140 Calle Ojo Feliz<br>
                    Santa Fe, NM 87505<br>
                    505 670-9918</div>
                  <br>
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