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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/23/20 9:15 AM, Gary Schiltz wrote:<br>
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<div dir="auto">The observer problem. Does it require a human to
do the observation? What about a parrot? A chimpanzee? An
amoeba? A Turing machine?</div>
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God, Gawdess, Gaia, Collective Intelligence?<br>
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<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 9:47
AM Prof David West <<a href="mailto:profwest@fastmail.fm"
moz-do-not-send="true">profwest@fastmail.fm</a>> wrote:<br>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Peirce:<br>
<br>
"To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a
method should be found by which our beliefs may be
determined by nothing human, but by some external
permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no
effect. ... Such is the method of science. Its fundamental
hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is this:
There are Real things, whose characters are entirely
independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect
our senses according to regular laws, and, though our
sensations are as different as our relations to the objects,
yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can
ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are; and
any man, if he have sufficient experience and he reason
enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion."<br>
<br>
The above quote is a context from which I am about to take
words and ask questions. Those more familiar with the Peirce
corpus in toto must admonish me if I am being unfair, i.e.
this quote is an outlier or an exception to Peirce in
general.<br>
<br>
1- If "There are Real things, upon which our thinking has no
effect," and there are"beliefs"" and "doubts" and
"reasoning" that are, arguably, affected by our thoughts:<br>
a. Is Peirce a dualist? A Cartesian dualist that
distinguishes between an external permanency and internal
thought?<br>
b. Are beliefs, doubts, reasoning 'Real things'?<br>
<br>
2- Quantum physics has an "observer problem" that seems to
imply that the the "characters of Real things" are, in fact,
affected by human thinking, or, at least, human attention."<br>
a. Are there 'Real things'?<br>
<br>
3- Weak postmodern objection: all beliefs and all methods
are determined by the human, technically the social, and
there is no objective criteria by which to give privilege
over one human determined method/belief over another..<br>
a. Does Peirce have grounds to privilege Reason over other
methods/beliefs, e.g. 'meditation', 'faith'?<br>
<br>
4- Stronger postmodern objection: "the laws of perception,"
[the rules of] reasoning," "sufficient experience," and
"reason enough," taken together, constrain the possible
'solution space' too severely; the 'one [provisionally] True
conclusion" is foregone — a product of the process, not
congruence with any "external permanency."<br>
a. What are the "laws" that govern how the Real affects
our senses?<br>
b. What are the "laws of perception?"<br>
c. Does "sufficient experience" and "reason enough"
mandate a narrow, and intolerant, orthodoxy?<br>
<br>
davew<br>
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