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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Thanks, frank, for that affirmation. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>I am sitting here, on this hot day, looking at the tree across the street, and saying to myself (The Behaviorist) am I REALLY going to get away with telling Glen he cannot say, “That tree is causing the yard to be shaded.” Something not right about that. Modulo obsessive thinking. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Nicholas Thompson<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Clark University<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com"><span style='color:#0563C1'>ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/"><span style='color:#0563C1'>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Friam <friam-bounces@redfish.com> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Frank Wimberly<br><b>Sent:</b> Monday, July 20, 2020 1:59 PM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>Nick, you are correct in saying that causation is a relation between events. The most useful definition of causation that we found in our statistical causal reasoning research (viz Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines) was event A is a cause of event B if the occurrence of A is followed by a change in the probability density over the possible values of B. Modulo obsessional tweaking.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Frank<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Mon, Jul 20, 2020, 1:39 PM <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=MsoNormal><br>Nick (to Jon)<br>Re Gen Phen: That's the Whole Point, here. There are two different<br>distinctions, here, one apparently arising form computation (?) and one<br>arising from biology. Glen originally mentioned a GENerator/ PHENomenon<br>distinction which seems to be the broader of the two and does not forbid<br>downward causation. More recently we have been talking about the<br>GENotype/PHENotype distinction which is narrower and does -<br>historically-forbid downward causation. So, I think we need to spell the<br>words out completely from now on, so we know which game we are playing. <br><br>Your reference to language games raises the question of what sort of "game"<br>are we playing when we talk about causation. One rule of that game, I<br>think, which I may have violated myself in this discussion, is that things<br>cannot cause things. Only events can cause events. The reason is that the<br>notion of cause involves temporal order and things (as opposed to the<br>arrival of things or the placement of things or the removal things) cannot<br>be in a temporal order. I am wondering if adherence to this discipline<br>might make the whole problem of downward causation disappear? So, the<br>addition of the 5th stick (an event) to previous four sticks CAUSES the<br>other 4 sticks not to rotate (an event) and CAUSES the structure to be<br>strong (another event). Notice that this formulation appears to forbid us<br>to say that the constraints on the rotation of the other four sticks<br>provided by the fifth stick CAUSES the strengthening of the structure<br>because those two events are temporally inextricable. What IS the relation<br>between those two facts if not a causal one? I think I would argue that<br>it's a constitutive relation; ie, the rotational constraints constitute the<br>greater strength of the square with the fifth stick. <br><br>Nick<br><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com" target="_blank">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</a><br><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/" target="_blank">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</a><br><br>Jon to Nick <br><br><br>-----Original Message-----<br>From: Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale<br>Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 11:07 AM<br>To: <a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam@redfish.com</a><br>Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM<br><br>Maybe I am misremembering (which clearly happens), but didn't the discussion<br>of gen-phen-like maps arise in the context of goal-function distinctions? In<br>this latter class, we included the thermostat system where constraining<br>systems to Weismann's doctrine would not be meaningful. Clearly, in the<br>goal-function system, an individual that changes the thermostat dial because<br>they prefer the house to be at 60 degrees rather than 80 degrees (a<br>variation on function) performs downwardly to affect the tolerance of the<br>piece of metal or mercury switch (a variation on goal). Are we breaking the<br>semantic game by now demanding that our admissable gen-phen-like maps<br>preserve Weismann's doctrine? I understood Glen's evocation to not be so<br>constrained.<br><br><br><br>--<br>Sent from: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br><br>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a> un/subscribe<br><a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <br><br><br>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <o:p></o:p></p></blockquote></div></div></body></html>