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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Nick wrote;<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=quotation>OK, so what if I believe x, and I believe y and I believe that beliefs x+y<br>entail z? Then I believe z, right? … Entailment …"entails" belief [if] I<br>believe in the laws of logic, right? <span style='font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Frank Wrote: <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=quotation>Not right. As I said, you may believe or not x, y, and/or z independently whether or not you know logic. In the meantime x and y imply z.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Not if I <b><i>believe</i></b> logic, right? If not, please say why. To believe something is to act as if it were the case. To believe logically is to behave as if logic were the case. Or is the problem in our understanding of belief. You hold that belief is an inner state that entails nothing whatsoever in your behavior, past or present? <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Ok, in that case, I see why you said what you said.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Nick<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Nicholas Thompson<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Clark University<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com"><span style='color:#0563C1'>ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/"><span style='color:#0563C1'>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Friam <friam-bounces@redfish.com> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Frank Wimberly<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, July 21, 2020 10:57 AM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal style='margin-bottom:12.0pt'>Not right. As I said, you may believe or not x, y, and/or z independently whether or not you know logic. In the meantime x and y imply z.<o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Tue, Jul 21, 2020, 9:37 AM <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><p class=MsoNormal>OK, so what if I believe x, and I believe y and I believe that beliefs x+y<br>entail z? Then I believe z, right? But do we want to say that I believe z<br>BECAUSE I believed x and y? Entailment never "entails" belief unless I<br>believe in the laws of logic, right? For some reason I want to reserve<br>"cause" for the situation which believing y and believing that x+y entails<br>z, I came to believe z because I came to believe x. <br><br>I am plainly out of my depth, here. I mean, even more than usual. We need<br>a logician, or 4 years at St. Johns, or both. I think that a logician<br>consultant would say -- wearily -- that Nick wants to limit the word cause<br>to "efficient" causes, that experimental psychologists tend to do that, etc.<br>So then the question becomes, is the causality asserted when I say that the<br>snifter broke because I left it on the table when I went to bed AND the cat<br>knocked it off the table while eating the dip from last night's party the<br>same causality as I might assert if I said that the snifter broke BECAUSE it<br>was brittle. And is the causality that we assert when we assert sidewise<br>causality -- a sequence of events -- in any way related to the causality<br>that we assert when we assert upward or downward causality. <br><br>Glen has offered, and EricS has endorsed, a work-around for all this mess<br>which I have yet to understand. Really, I shouldn't speak to this issue any<br>more before I have another go at their messages, which I attach. <br><br>Nick <br><br>Nicholas Thompson<br>Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<br>Clark University<br><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com" target="_blank">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</a><br><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/" target="_blank">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</a><br><br><br><br>-----Original Message-----<br>From: Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> On Behalf Of Jon Zingale<br>Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2020 6:07 AM<br>To: <a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam@redfish.com</a><br>Subject: Re: [FRIAM] better simulating actual FriAM<br><br>What about something being believably prior rather than just temporally<br>prior? Perhaps, we would use a different word than cause?<br><br><br><br>--<br>Sent from: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br><br>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a> un/subscribe<br><a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <br>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <o:p></o:p></p></blockquote></div></div></body></html>