<div dir="auto">Glen did not invent the word predicative.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">See <a href="https://iep.utm.edu/predicat/">https://iep.utm.edu/predicat/</a></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br><br><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature" dir="auto">---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Jul 28, 2020, 1:03 PM <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">You are pushing me hard, here, but I think the up/down thang is orthogonal to the predicativist position. (You invented that word, right?) We Predicativists need only assert that there is a before and after: i.e., BEFORE we can say whether a thing is, we have to have said, up front, what it would be for that thing to be. We can take it back soon as we see where it leads. <br>
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Nick <br>
Nicholas Thompson<br>
Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<br>
Clark University<br>
<a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</a><br>
<a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</a><br>
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-----Original Message-----<br>
From: Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> On Behalf Of u?l? ???<br>
Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 12:47 PM<br>
To: FriAM <<a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">friam@redfish.com</a>><br>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Dogs, Computers, Joy<br>
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Hm. I appreciate an attempt to cleanly separate the predicative parts from the impredicative parts. But you don't seem to be allowing *any* impredicative parts. Your push to the universal foundation *smells* like predicativism to me, especially when you go off into monism la-la land.<br>
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My claim would be that Doug is correct that the words (or concepts even) are never *defined* because they cannot be defined in the way the predicativists want. This perspective is anti-foundationalism. It's not turtles all the way down. It IS that there is no such thing as *down*.<br>
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On 7/28/20 11:33 AM, <a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a> wrote:<br>
> I saw you coming! My bottom line is not predication but the explicitness of whatever predications one makes. What could, of course define consciousness as "whatever humans do that seems to me conscious" or "Whatever is produced by a human brain". But, after trying to do science with such definitions, I think most would realize that these definitions are incapacitating. At that point, a scientist relinquishes those definitions and begins to seek others, definitions that actually direct one toward the possibility of finding answers. Thus, I stipulate that definitions are part of the dialectic of discovery. Neither I, nor Frank, is allowed to say M is the meaning of P for all time; we are only allowed to say that for some set of purposes, in some context, M is the meaning of P. Are we constantly pressing a head toward the most universally applicable definitions? You bet! Do we ever get there? Not yet!<br>
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\u2199\u2199\u2199 u\u01ddl\u0183<br>
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