<div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000">One obvious quibble is to ask whether "<span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)">A determines the probability density over ..." isn't just a way of substituting the word <i>determines </i>for <i>causes</i>.</span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)">On the other hand, I like this approach. Another way to think about is that changing A results in a change in B (or a change in the probability of B). It's like A is something like a remote control for B.</span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;color:#000000"><span style="font-family:Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(34,34,34)">What's especially interesting about this approach is that one is not obligated to show how that change happens -- just that it does. </span></div><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><font><u style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:20px"><br></u></font></div><div dir="ltr"><font><u style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:20px"> </u></font><span style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:24.75px"> </span>-- Russ Abbott <br>Professor, Computer Science<br>California State University, Los Angeles<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Oct 4, 2020 at 9:06 PM Frank Wimberly <<a href="mailto:wimberly3@gmail.com">wimberly3@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">No, but Clark Glymour might.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Seriously though, our working definition of "A causes B" is that the occurrence of A determines the probability density over the set of possible values of the occurrence of B. There are many ways to quibble with this definition but we were able to construct a set of algorithms for learning causal models (in the form of digraphs) from observational data notwithstanding the quibbles. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As I posted recently, Tetrad, the software implementation of those algorithms, won a SAIL award at the World Artificial Intelligence Conference.<br><br><div dir="auto">---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM</div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:42 PM <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com" target="_blank">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div><p class="MsoNormal">Frank,<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Causality is one of the great cesspools of philosophy, and I am in no position to pump it. For one thing, it seems to me that causality statements are classic instances of category errors. We speak of event A causing event B, but, whenever we do, we are adverting to evidence that shows that Events of Class A have been necessary or sufficient conditions for event of Class B. So, like any things, causality lives at a higher level of organization than that to which we normally attribute it. We can say that a single event of B following A is consistent with causality, but we probably should be careful never to say that event A caused event B. After all, this instance of B following A, could always, conceivably, be a coincidence. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">I would love to know what your collaborators think of that assertion. Is this the kind of thing that George Duncan could dope-slap me about?<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Nick<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Nicholas Thompson<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Clark University<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div style="border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Frank Wimberly<br><b>Sent:</b> Sunday, October 4, 2020 9:21 PM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <<a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">friam@redfish.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] Shorthands for Brain-stuff<u></u><u></u></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12pt">Having worked in the field of causal reasoning for many years I am inclined to say that every event is both a cause and an effect. But perhaps you're using the words differently.<u></u><u></u></p><div><p class="MsoNormal">---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">On Sun, Oct 4, 2020, 9:11 PM Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style="border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">MGD> In your model intents come from the <i>l.teleonomicus</i>, machinery that follows the same rules of physics as everything else.<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><b><i>[NST===>Yes, but not just those laws. <===nst] </i></b><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">What other rules? There are rules that override physics? How is that lump of goo different from any other lump of goo?<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Marcus<u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><p class="MsoNormal">- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <u></u><u></u></p></blockquote></div></div></div>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>
un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>
archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>
FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <br>
</blockquote></div>
- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>
Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>
un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>
archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>
FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <br>
</blockquote></div>