<div dir="ltr">"I intend to check the mail in a few minutes. I am not doing it now. Nobody else knows of my plan until you read this. Why can't I validly say that I have that intention?" <br clear="all"><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br><div></div></div><div>You CAN say that you have that intention. The Big Questions are 1) To what are you referring when you say that. 2) Could you be in error regarding the thing being referred to? </div><div><br></div><div>Once we work out the answer to Question 1 we will, Nick and others of his ilk would assert, find that it would be more grammatically clean to not use the word "have", because that implies a thing that can be possessed. I <i>have </i>a bank account; I <i>do </i>my morning exercises. Of course, some other languages don't distinguish those verbs in exactly the way English tends to... and English varies from place to place... so your mileage may vary. For example, under some circumstances "I am going to have tea" could be synonymous with "I am going to do high-tea."</div><div><br></div><div>At any rate, some of us would assert that when you say "I intend to check the mail in a few minutes" you are predicting/asserting things you will do in the future (barring some dramatic change in circumstances) and that you are an imperfect predictor of such things. To reify that pattern-of-future-behavior as a thing you "have" now is, at the least, some sort of category error. </div><div><br></div><div>And, of course, if you aren't trying to do philosophy of psychology or scientific psychology, then your using vernacular phrasing is no worse than similar things that people in other sciences might object to. For example, you can find physicists who will get snippy over whether it is correct to say that you add cold to something (vs. take away heating), but, like, if it's a cooking show or a casual conversation, it really doesn't matter much. </div><div dir="ltr"><a href="mailto:echarles@american.edu" target="_blank"></a></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 4:55 PM Frank Wimberly <<a href="mailto:wimberly3@gmail.com">wimberly3@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto">I intend to check the mail in a few minutes. I am not doing it now. Nobody else knows of my plan until you read this. Why can't I validly say that I have that intention?<br><br><div>---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Oct 20, 2020, 2:27 PM <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com" target="_blank">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div><p class="MsoNormal">Russ, <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">I have not had time to follow this thread, but just want to remind you what my first response to your question would be. Intentions are not the sorts of thing we “have”. They are things that we do. They are of a higher order than knee jerks, or even apple bites, but they are patterns in behavior all the same. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">I have busy because I signed up to do all sorts of things in September because I had nothing to do, and to my horror and surprise, every thing I signed up for, bore fruit and now I am overwhelmed. I have a prejudice against Dennett. I think he worries too much about his standing with the Big Kids at Harvard and trying NOT to violate vernacular ways of thinking so much as to dent his royalties. And I am jealous of him. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">So there. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Hope you are well<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Nick <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Nicholas Thompson<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal">Clark University<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(5,99,193)">https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</span></a><u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div style="border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Russ Abbott<br><b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, October 20, 2020 12:07 PM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <<a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">friam@redfish.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] Dennett on agency<u></u><u></u></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">Not sure what the point is. Larger systems can exploit information and "pick of scars." Cells in that sense are larger systems. I'm confused about what that is supposed to add to the discussion.<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black"><u></u> <u></u></span></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">Computer programs can certainly be described using intentional language. Does that mean that a computer program can have intention? If so, that seems to degrade the notion of intent. <u></u><u></u></span></p></div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal">-- Russ Abbott <br>Professor, Computer Science<br>California State University, Los Angeles<u></u><u></u></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 9:23 AM jon zingale <<a href="mailto:jonzingale@gmail.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">jonzingale@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style="border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><p class="MsoNormal">... and why tornados fail to have it. A key feature appears to be that agents<br>have a history that makes a difference, can exploit information the way a<br>thermostat can. Electrons or molecular motors, for instance, don't pick up<br>scratches or scars. Sean Carroll adds that agents participate in the arrow<br>of time.<br><br>Queued up to the relevant part of the discussion:<br><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yZw4wxvnVQ&ab_channel=SeanCarroll&t=1670s" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8yZw4wxvnVQ&ab_channel=SeanCarroll&t=1670s</a><br><br><br><br>--<br>Sent from: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br><br>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>archives: <a href="http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a> <u></u><u></u></p></blockquote></div></div></div>- .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. .<br>
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