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Marcus -<o:p></o:p>
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<p>I think the least plausible of these is the
think-yourself-happy approach. If it always worked, that
would be Free Will. Mind over matter.</p>
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This is quite familiar to my own operational logic. I tend toward
trick-yourself-happy with things like "I can always procrastinate
later" to break a procrastination rut for example. I'm
experimenting (without any controls or even a plan) on my
(struggling) 26 year old nephew by offering him a series of
"trick-yourself-out-of-unhappy-or-inaction" tricks that I have
gathered (by bouncing through a life). So far, his resistance (my
Sister's family's classic I-cant-because) has held firm, but I trust
some of the seeds of my cult-deprogramming are getting through even
if they haven't sprouted yet. I follow what I take to be a
stylization of Glen's (likely?) prescription which is to change my
habits and my internal state will follow (with some exponential
moving average?). A friend used to call this "acting as if".<br>
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<p><o:p></o:p>I don’t see machines all the way down and
panconsciousness at odds. Open source software.</p>
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<p>I suppose the question begged by ORCH-AR (Penrose-Hameroff) and
Poised Realm (Kauffman) or Neuronal Superposition (Pearce
hisself) and others is whether "all the way down is qualitatively
different for sufficiently large values of 'down' ? " at which
point something magical/mystical/mythical happens and "viola!"
Consciousness!<br>
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<p>And you are probably much better able to explain why a "quantum
machine" is qualitatively different (or not) than a classical
machine?</p>
<p>- Steve<br>
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