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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>Or as Peirce would say, “Simply a matter of the arrangement of words.”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>N<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Nick Thompson<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="mailto:ThompNickSon2@gmail.com"><span style='color:#0563C1'>ThompNickSon2@gmail.com</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><a href="https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/"><span style='color:#0563C1'>https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/</span></a><o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b>From:</b> Friam <friam-bounces@redfish.com> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Eric Charles<br><b>Sent:</b> Saturday, November 20, 2021 9:49 PM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam@redfish.com><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] WAS: P Zombie Couches<o:p></o:p></p></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal>I would say that Peirce is concerned with determining what is true in this actual world. That water decomposes into hydrogen and oxygen in a certain ratio under certain experimental conditions, is the type of thing we will (presumably) continue to agree about until the end times, i.e., it is "true". (That ratio isn't exactly 2 hydrogen for every 1 oxygen, but it is reasonably close.) <o:p></o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Can we imagine a world in which water decomposes in some other fashion? I'm not sure exactly what that discussion is. Would we say something like: Sure, but then it wouldn't be "water"<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Or would we say something like: Yes, that could definitely be a possible world, but their "water" wouldn't be exactly the same as our water. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>At any rate....<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>The Philosophical Zombie Problem is the type of thing that is faux deep, and I thought it deserved to be ridiculed, and I think it makes as much sense when talking about couches as when talking about people. So... I was mostly just trying to make that point. (Ditto with the "Stomach in Jar" entry mocking the "Brian in a Vat" thought experiment.) There might be a conversation something like it that would have a bit of depth, but instead it is almost entirely linguistic trickery masquerading as deep thoughts. <o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><div><div><div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal><br clear=all>-----------<o:p></o:p></p></div></div></div></div></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 9:39 PM Jon Zingale <<a href="mailto:jonzingale@gmail.com">jonzingale@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Verdana",sans-serif;color:#333333'>"As an experience-monist, I believe either that all worlds are possible<br>or no worlds are possible. Also, as an experience-monist (but not as a<br>behaviorist) I am allowed to experience the world in a variety of ways,<br>as present, as past, as future, as fantasy, as dreams, and, as possible,<br>or impossible."<br><br>I gather that you mean something like, "Any experience is possible", but<br>I am not sure that this coincides with the usage of "possible worlds" as<br>it occurs in EricC's Wikipedia reference, *possible worlds* in the sense<br>of Kripke. In Kripke, "possible worlds" logic is used as a kind of foil<br>for speaking about a priori and a posteriori truths. Kripke distinguishes<br>between those propositions which are necessarily true (in that they are<br>true for every possible world) and those propositions which are possibly<br>true (in that they are true for at least one possible world). As far as<br>I can reason at present, your ontological commitments are to "Peircean<br>Truth" wherein propositions are only "true" if they are true for every<br>possible world, i.e., necessary truth. Those propositions which are<br>unstable, or vary across "worlds", I imagine for Peirce, are nothing at<br>all. How poorly do I understand your position relative to this context?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><br>.-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - .<br>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 <a href="http://bit.ly/virtualfriam" target="_blank">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>un/subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br>archives:<br> 5/2017 thru present <a href="https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/" target="_blank">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/" target="_blank">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><o:p></o:p></p></blockquote></div></div></body></html>