<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class="">The clarification below is helpful, Dave,<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">I have now spent enough time with a few people who keep laying claim to “the nature of Reality” in terms that make no sense to me, that last night my anxiety dream about looming problems that I can’t see how to solve was of having been kidnapped and taken off to a retreat somewhere, where my food had been laced with LSD (me not told), and I was wondering whether, in that state, I would be able to figure out that my total bewilderment at the disarray of natural events wasn’t because they had changed, but because I had been drugged.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Buy, my anxiety dreams to the side, about the topic:</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Almost-always, if I use the word “real”, I do so with little attention or care, and it probably doesn’t have any more meaning in my hands, in those usages, than the effort I put into it. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">If I have to be careful, then I go back to literals and see how far I can get being orderly.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">It seems that “real” is, like many things, _a word_ that our language has distilled from wherever languages distill such things, and handed down to us along with conventions of use, since long before we were born. So its use is a habit and a convention. It is a placeholder. In literal terms, I would say that is _all_ it is.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">But what, then, is it a placeholder for? Empirically or phenomenologically, there seem to be two answers.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">We mention inter-subjective exchange, and I should broaden that a bit. It is not only exchange between two different human identities, but also between two moments of a single self, if experiences have to be related across those moments. Whatever “continuity” of a self is, it seems to entail elements of prediction, and often, to use a word of glen’s that I have taken up, simulation. The prediction or simulation of the next experience, from outside the sample that contains that experience, may fit better or worse with the experience as it unfolds. One sense of the word “real” seems to be a referent to the consistency of patterns, so the prediction aligns fairly well with the predicted most of the time, and we can account for aberrations as somehow exceptional. Whatever simulation-habits seem to support that consistency take on the predicate of “realities” in our binding to language habits.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">But there is another thing that is quiet different from the former. Some people really like the feeling of “being moved”. Or of being enthusiastic (I know some people who, if they didn’t constantly whip themselves into a state of enthusiasm, I am convinced would die on the spot). Or religiously ecstatic, to use the terms as Wikipedia breaks them down from William James’s taxonomy. Working from that system of priorities, “real” seems to get bound to the intensity with which they feel whatever that state is that they like. This, of course, is my gloss on what those people are doing. They would assert, when they tell me that they have “the real reality”, and everybody else is missing the point, that they are doing something completely other; but that of course is the part of what they say that I can make no sense of, so I can’t speak for it.</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">The two bindings seem, to me, to be quite different in kind. That doesn’t mean they can’t be correlated. After all, if we have been evolved as thinkers, part of that has probably led to attaching emotional tags to having predictions that align with the world, more or less. Therefore if I could do a semantic map, I would not be surprised to find the word “real” polysemous spanning the two fields of meaning, in many languages. But for there to be such a correlation seems to be an evolved feature of us, as complex actors, and does not in itself make the two above ways of binding the word-habit “real” to cues the same. </div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Materialistically,</div><div class=""><br class=""></div><div class="">Eric</div><div class=""><br class=""><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On Mar 25, 2022, at 4:07 AM, Prof David West <<a href="mailto:profwest@fastmail.fm" class="">profwest@fastmail.fm</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><title class=""></title><style type="text/css" class="">p.MsoNormal,p.MsoNoSpacing{margin:0}</style><div class=""><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">a minor (?) point of clarification: what is being asserted by these authors (in various ways and from various perspectives) has to do with what we assert to be Real, i.e., to have ontological (metaphysical) status.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">With regard the mythical apple hitting Newton on the head:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""> - Mass, velocity, inertia, volume, even the Pantone value of the red skin—the description—are <b class="">Real</b>.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""> - "ouch," the grey scale perception of the apple's skin because I am colorblind, even the "Wow, I just realized what gravity is,"—the perceptions—are <b class="">Not Real</b>.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">A different example: the quantized and digitized values from five types of sensor that feed a neural net 'describe' human perception and are <b class="">Real</b>. Any aspect of human perception that cannot be similarly formalized and captured, is therefore <b class="">Not Real</b>.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">Questions about whether or not a description can 'capture' an object are orthogonal. (Of course, no description can ever be complete, or accurate from one moment to the next.)<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">davew<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class=""><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">On Thu, Mar 24, 2022, at 10:21 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> Obviously, there can be flaws in observing a system from within the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> system. If a hardware platform is in some weird state, the software <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> running on it may not be computing or observing in an accurate way. <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> But I'd be first to claim there is no such thing as independent <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> measurement. <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> -----Original Message-----<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> From: Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" class="">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> On Behalf Of glen<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2022 9:57 AM<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> To: <a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" class="">friam@redfish.com</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Analytic Idealism<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> I don't think the point is that the description(s) *cannot* capture the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> object, only that there *can be* flaws in the description(s). Saying <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> that descriptions *do not* is not the same thing as saying they *can <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> not*. But I haven't read the book(s). So maybe I'm giving it too much <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> benefit.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> On 3/24/22 09:47, Marcus Daniels wrote:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> There wouldn't be, say, a LIGO experiment if people were confusing the referent with the descriptor.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> It is absurd by construction: Communicate using description given the belief that description can't capture the essence of a quality.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> Just stay stoned and enjoy, no?<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> -----Original Message-----<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> From: Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" class="">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> On Behalf Of glen<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2022 9:30 AM<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> To: <a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" class="">friam@redfish.com</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Analytic Idealism<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> I think EricS' digestion puts too much gloss on the (lack of) crispness between the qualities. There's a (possibly preemptive) registration of the ontology where (e.g.) mass, length, and time are disjoint, albeit I can infer that might not be the case if we can replace (ground, foundationally) any quality with a collection of substitutable acts/behaviors. While Dave mentions LSD and the (quantitative) greater or less than of brain activity, he doesn't mention things like synesthesia, the pollution of one quality with another [⛧]. So, while I don't quite buy the Analytic Idealism concept that scientists have replaced the object with the sign (referent with the descriptor), I do buy that the scientific-ish crisp distinction between things like mass and length can be artificial.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> Such a gooey context is amenable to such (artificial) distinction - analytic -. But that slicing is lossy ... information is lost in the distinction between qualities [⛤]. The same would be true of the/whatever recipe of action that replaces the quality. Recipes for length could be (more strongly "already are") mixed with recipes for mass (or time). But it's our Scientismist/Objectivist bias that allows us to impute any artificial crispness into the world.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> [⛧] In arguing that the qualities/dimensions may not be distinct, I'm relying on the data fusion activities of animals with a CNS and a relatively large brain. While it may seem like swinging a bucket of water around is not substitutable with a yard stick, composing such high-order activities out of smaller activities (like moving one's opposable thumb or realtime monitoring of a moving object with saccadic binary vision) relies fundamentally on the goo inside our heads. Mess with the goo and you mess with the composability of the actions. LSD messes with the goo.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> [⛤] If we try to speak more jargonally, I'm challenging the idea that a "space" of qualities can ever have an orthogonal basis. Orthogonality isn't necessarily a feature of the way our CNS/brains work. And worse yet, it may not be a feature of the world.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>> On 3/22/22 18:15, David Eric Smith wrote:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> Dave —<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> I’m not sure I understand qualitative and quantitative as a <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> partition, or as a pair of alternative predicates, though of course I <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> recognize the usage of setting one against the other. This is <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> probably because I don’t understand “qualitative” as a category. <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> (Given that I don’t understand Brouwer’s intuitionism beyond the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> small feature of its requirement for constructions, I probably don’t <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> understand “quantitative” as a category either.)<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> A place this comes up for me is when I try to teach dimensional analysis to beginning physics students (or sometimes to liberal arts students).<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> Very little of what we do involves “pure numbers” (and even those often include more; but I’ll come back to that). In all of dimensional analysis, a number has to be paired with a dimension. So I have to explain to my students what “a dimension” is. Since I have told them that we are going to require operational definitions, I have to tell them somehow operationally, and not just say “you know it when you see it”.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> What I come up with is that each dimension corresponds to a recipe <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> for a set of _acts_ one can carry out, and the concept of a dimension <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> refers to certain substitutabilities in those acts. So if I say a <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> ruler has length, by that I mean that I can put two objects on a <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> tabletop abutting the two ends of the ruler. Saying that length “is <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> a dimension” is saying that I can take away the rule and put bananas, <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> or king’s feet, end to end and perform the same operation of holding <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> two things apart. A different recipe goes with swinging objects <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> around in a bucket to measure mass, or dunking them in water to <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> measure volume, etc. (Anecdote from Lucy Jacobs, squirrel-woman <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> supreme: During the harvest season, when squirrels pick up acorns, <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> they shake them vigorously a time or two in their teeth, before <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> choosing to keep or to toss. We are pretty sure they want to know <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> which ones have a lot of nut-meat and moisture. Even squirrels <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> understand what mass is, and that it is not identical to<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> weight.)<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> One has to go a little further than just the recipe for substitution to say that something “is a dimension”; the operation also has to admit subdivision. So in place of one meterstick, I must be allowed to substitute three and 1/3rd kings’ feet, so I am saying that stringing the feet end to end, and so separating them, is an operation _of the same kind_ as using the string of feet or the meterstick to separate to objects on the table. It is in subdivisibility without changing the nature of the operation that I bring in quantity.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> To the extent that one program of activity can’t be substituted for another, the dimensions have distinctness. Swinging buckets can’t be used as a surrogate for lining up kings’ feet, or dunking objects in water.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> It is conventional, in physics, to see three dimensions (mass, length, time) as “the” dimensions upon which dimensional analysis is built, and to call other things counted “pure numbers”. However, there are many places where I have reason not to leave it at that. Counts of atoms need to be partitioned, sometimes, among which elements they are, and I can use those partition labels as dimensions. Often, in economics, I want to treat goods-types, and also monies, credit denominations, or near-monies, as having dimensions. If I do so, I can do many of the same things done with dimensional analysis in physics with them. The question of what “a dimension” “is” therefore seems to me not to be closed with a memorization of three cases.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> So are dimensions “qualities”? To the extent that we perceive them as somehow different in kind, I would assume it is because our nature has become shaped around the different kinds of things one can do, or can witness happening in the world, but I can’t defend that belief with a validated origin story.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> The above, for me, are not meant to be exemplars of all notions of “qualitative”, but only some entry-point to whether there is a category, from places where I know how to speak carefully.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> My above question, about what relation the “qualitative” aspects of some experience or program have to the quantitative, is about testing whether you can say what you mean. A quite different invocation of the quantitative has always been about being able to hold people to account for whether what they are claiming could ever be said to have “truth-value”, and of what kind? To say “I checked that the rod is 1m long, and you can check it too” has a kind of intersubjective easy fungibility that “I know that God loves me” does not (at least to me) have.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> I am _sure_ that wherever the discussion is, it wasn’t meant to be where I cast it above. But I don’t know how one would check whether my certainty is right.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>> Eric<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> On Mar 23, 2022, at 6:31 AM, Prof David West <<a href="mailto:profwest@fastmail.fm" class="">profwest@fastmail.fm</a> <mailto:<a href="mailto:profwest@fastmail.fm" class="">profwest@fastmail.fm</a>>> wrote:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> "Back in the seventeenth century, when science as we know it today <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> took its first steps, scientists based their entire work on—what <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> else?—/*/perceptual experience/*/: the things and phenomena they <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> could see, touch, smell, taste or hear around them. That starting <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> point, is course,/*_/qualitative/_*/in nature./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /Soon, however, scientists realized that it is very convenient to <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> describe the eminently*qualitative*world by means of*_quantities_*./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /But then something bizarre happened: many scientists seemingly <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> forgot where it all started and began attributing fundamental <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> reality only to the*_quantities_*./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /This, in a nutshell, is the beginning of/metaphysical materialism/, <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> a philosophy that—absurdly—grants fundamental reality to <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> mere*descriptions*, while denying the reality of that which is <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> described. ... we began cluelessly replacing reality with its <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> description, the territory with the map./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /And so now we face the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness':<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> the impossibility of explaining qualities in terms of quantities./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /In the space of a couple of centuries, we tied ourselves up in <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> hopelessly abstract conceptual knots and managed to lose touch with <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> reality altogether./<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /Laboratory results in quantum mechanics, for instance, strongly <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> indicate that there is no autonomous material world of tables and <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> chairs out there. Coupled with the inability of materialist <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> neuroscience to explain experience, this is forcing us to reexamine <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> our earlier assumptions and contemplate alternatives.*_Analytic <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> idealism_*—the notion that reality, while equally amenable to <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> scientific inquiry, is fundamentally qualitiative–is a leading <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> contender to replace metaphysical materialism."/<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> The preceding was from/Science Ideated/by Bernado Klastrup.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> Factoid: when "perceiving alternate realities," e.g., while on LSD, brain activity decreases when material neuroscience predicts an increase.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /"Attention is not just receptive, but actively creative of the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> world we inhabit. How we attend makes all the difference to the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> world we experience. ///<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /Forget everything you thought you knew about the difference between <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> the hemispheres, because it will be largely wrong. It is not what <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> each hemisphere does – they are both involved in everything – but <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> how it does it, that matters. And the prime difference between the <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> brain hemispheres is the manner in which they attend. For reasons of <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> survival we need one hemisphere (in humans and many animals, the<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> left) to pay narrow attention to detail, to grab hold of things we <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> need, while the other, the right, keeps an eye out for everything <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> else. The result is that one hemisphere is good <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> at/*_/utilising/_*/the world, the other better <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> at/*_/understanding/_*/it.///<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> /Absent, present, detached, engaged, alienated, empathic, broad or <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> narrow, sustained or piecemeal, attention has the power to alter <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> whatever it meets. The play of attention can both create and <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> destroy, but it never leaves its object unchanged. How you attend to <br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> something – or don’t attend to it – matters a very great deal."/<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> Preceding from Iain McGilchrist's/Ways of Attending/. I am a big fan of McGilchrist and his book The Master and his Emissary and, I expect, the just ordered two volume,/The Matter with Things/.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> Just throwing some things to see if they stick against anyone's walls and prompts some conversation.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">>>>> Also, big fan of/The Dawn of Everything/mentioned on the list in the last couple of days. I think it has some valuable information and insights that would inform a lot of conversations on this list with regard sociopolitical organization and means of effecting change.<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> --<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - .<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 <a href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fbit.ly%2fvirtualfriam&c=E,1,Os5M86zwCjmcQUPe31ZPGS1aYsXe9razJzVsLXuzsRNeAvL4Ds-Jay9xgkCMd3Rs_CkTd7Lsm3GORUtKzMCD8PNr91zBuih1zzk0UfTXV1UksSajroY,&typo=1" class="">bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> un/subscribe <a href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fmailman%2flistinfo%2ffriam_redfish.com&c=E,1,wS_O4xOkP3LCu00xG0w3rs8XWw1T1obqw4Guv7AXn8mCp01IzQKnl-Xh_2bPTSJl-cdYlUbOcbP2mJUi-CB78nKx0uEE_nBw2yt0U-g3AibxyMvjgRk,&typo=1" class="">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> FRIAM-COMIC <a href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=http%3a%2f%2ffriam-comic.blogspot.com%2f&c=E,1,BxYIjaO5TQnj3VBX_de3CpTmt_WrUtuEGEHBrSTdk9usmiYd4zkrQjKaiAW-wzdiJKBIE4akLfOau9AjxMq9SeetGgLL_6Jy4tjxCvVt&typo=1" class="">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> archives:<br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> 5/2017 thru present <a href="https://linkprotect.cudasvc.com/url?a=https%3a%2f%2fredfish.com%2fpipermail%2ffriam_redfish.com%2f&c=E,1,ZQ6o2ECYEtudbnPRlFr_A4GLmAgv8lf4ZEn2_GvG-LDtUNNdwoaYwBFIO-9iL8dbMylT2WWNH6Z9pCFSyIM6VXXVhgD0Md6KvxopxuXNG-n_Jw2PG6Y,&typo=1" class="">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> 1/2003 thru 6/2021 <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/" class="">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">><br class=""></div><div style="font-family:Arial;" class="">> .-- .- -. - 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