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Glen wrote:<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:cc212a22-225a-8b1f-5420-e8456b70dcd1@gmail.com">I
*think* that works. Ordinarily, I react badly to hyper-formality.
But one reason to formalize is so that we can be agnostic about
the origins of some thing, abstracting it from the world. Whether
an ultra-abstracter like Peirce would support the
historical/scholarly logging of whatever messy process gave rise
to the stable patterns is unclear to me. I tend to think he would
not. It seems to me that Abstracters tend to want crisp boundaries
and forever-trustable conclusions, like EricS' suggested ...
"committed to making true statements". Concretizers, on the other
hand, insufferably insist on adding the burrs back onto the
finished piece, thereby breaking the machine. Somewhere within
biology, the two camps diverge. Concretizers seem to have been
rare in logic and physics, less rare in chemistry. Abstracters
seem to percolate out of the soft sciences, which are described
that way because they resist abstraction. Their burrs are
resistant to machining. (Caveat that there's no shortage of
hucksters that *claim* to have abstracted them, but haven't.)
<br>
<br>
Of course, the art lies in iterating between the two poles.
Concretizing enough to make Platonic objects useful in the world.
Abstracting enough to make concrete objects transmissable across
circumstance. And none of us are fully integrated animals. We do
both, just to a greater or lesser extent.
<br>
</blockquote>
<p>This "oscillation" or "orbit-following" within the dimensionality
including/dominated-by concrete/abstract is fascinating to me, and
I think it *is* the dynamics that make it work. We are so prone
to want to (statically) place an entity as a point in those spaces
(quad-charts 'R Us!) and ignore the implied *phase space* that
can be derived from them (and their dynamics). <br>
</p>
<p>I know this is a typical (for me) abstraction that somewhat
ignores the concrete (and the dynamical) that I speak of ... I am
(naturally) a low-dimensional creature (A. Square ala E A Abbott )
struggling to apprehend (and maybe navigate) a hidden
higher-dimensional space I suppose. <br>
</p>
<img moz-do-not-send="true"
src="https://images.adsttc.com/media/images/5482/08a4/e58e/cef0/ed00/001f/medium_jpg/flatland500.jpg"
alt="" width="400" height="500"><img moz-do-not-send="true"
src="https://d28hgpri8am2if.cloudfront.net/book_images/onix/cvr9781625586995/flatland-9781625586995_hr.jpg"
alt="" width="331" height="499"><img moz-do-not-send="true"
src="https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/51yZaAhMzjL._SL500_.jpg"
alt="" width="500" height="500">
<p><br>
</p>
<p>And again, I can't resist referencing <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://teleodynamics.org/">Deacon's Homeo/Morpho/Teleo
Dynamics</a> <br>
</p>
<p><img moz-do-not-send="true"
src="https://i0.wp.com/teleodynamics.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/pic2.jpg?w=795&ssl=1"
alt="" width="586" height="437"></p>
<p>Surely someone here has a better (formal) understanding of this
or a more inspired (intuitive) apprehension of this than I!? <br>
</p>
<p>Or I am just one hand (set of gums) clapping in the dark...<br>
</p>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:cc212a22-225a-8b1f-5420-e8456b70dcd1@gmail.com">
<br>
On 1/16/23 07:53, Prof David West wrote:
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I do not know and have not read Feferman,
so this may be totally off base, but ...
<br>
<br>
glen stated:
<br>
/Worded one way: Schema are the stable patterns that emerge from
the particulars. And the variation of the particulars is
circumscribed (bounded, defined) by the schema.
<br>
/
<br>
This is a description of "culture." Restated—hopefully without
distorting the meaning:
<br>
<br>
*Culture is the stable patterns of behavior that emerge from
individual human actions which vary (are idiosyncratic) within
bounds defined by the culture.*
<br>
<br>
The second glen statement:
<br>
<br>
/Worded another way: Our perspective on the world emerges from
the world. And our perspective on the world shapes how and what
we see of the world./
<br>
<br>
alludes to the cognitive feedback loop (at least part of it)
that I developed in my doctoral dissertation on cognitive
anthrpology.
<br>
<br>
davew
<br>
<br>
<br>
On Mon, Jan 16, 2023, at 3:32 AM, glen wrote:
<br>
> Well, not "languageless", but "language-independent". Now
that you've
<br>
> forced me to think harder, that phrase
"language-independent" isn't
<br>
> quite right. It's more like "meta-language" ... a family
of languages
<br>
> such that the family might be "language-like" ... a
language of
<br>
> languages ... a higher order language, maybe.
<br>
>
<br>
> Feferman introduced me to the concept of "schematic
axiomatic systems",
<br>
> which seems (correct me if I'm wrong) to talk about formal
systems
<br>
> where one reasons over sentences with substitutable
elements. I.e. the
<br>
> *particulars* of any given situation may vary, but the
"scheme" into
<br>
> which those particulars fit is stable/invariant. [⛧]
<br>
>
<br>
> EricS seemed to be proposing that not only do the
particulars vary
<br>
> within the schema, but the schema also vary. The schema
are ways to
<br>
> "parse" the world, the Play-Doh extruder(s) we use to form
the Play-Doh
<br>
> into something.
<br>
>
<br>
> Your "random yet not random" rendering of Peirce sounds to
me similar
<br>
> to the duality between the particulars and the schema they
populate.
<br>
>
<br>
> Worded one way: Schema are the stable patterns that emerge
from the
<br>
> particulars. And the variation of the particulars is
circumscribed
<br>
> (bounded, defined) by the schema.
<br>
>
<br>
> Worded another way: Our perspective on the world emerges
from the
<br>
> world. And our perspective on the world shapes how and
what we see of
<br>
> the world.
<br>
>
<br>
> And, finally, paraphrasing: The apparition of schema we
experience is
<br>
> due to the fact that such schema are useful to organisms.
Events in the
<br>
> world that don't fit the schema are beyond experience.
<br>
>
<br>
>
<br>
> [⛧] I'm doing my best to avoid talking about jargonal
things like type
<br>
> theory, things that should have come very natural to
Peirce, but would
<br>
> be difficult to express in natural language.
<br>
>
<br>
> On 1/15/23 19:49, Nicholas Thompson wrote:
<br>
>> EricS and Glen,
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Sorry, again. Here is the short version. I
apologize, again, for appending that great wadge of gunk.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> I found the second Feferman even harder to understand
than the first. Glen, can you give me a little help on what you
meant by a languageless language.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Thanks, all
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>> On Sun, Jan 15, 2023 at 4:09 PM Nicholas Thompson
<<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>>> wrote:
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Aw crap! The shortish answer that I meant to
send had all sorts of junk appended! Sorry. Will resend soon.
[blush]
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Sent from my Dumb Phone
<br>
>>
<br>
>> On Jan 12, 2023, at 8:54 PM, Nicholas Thompson
<<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>>> wrote:
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Dear EricS, Glen, and anybody else who is
following.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Thank you so much for pitching in. As I have
often said, I am incapable of thinking alone, so your comments
are wonderfully welcome. And thank you also for confirming that
what I wrote was readable. I am having to work in gmail at the
moment, which is , to me, an unfamiliar medium.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> First, Eric: I am trying to talk math-talk in
this passage, so poetry is not an excuse if I fail to be
understood by you.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> /*FWIW: as I have heard these discussions over the
years, to the extent that there is a productive analogy, I would
say (unapologetically using my words, and not trying to quote
his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between states of knowledge
and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful representation of “what
is the case”) is analogous to the relation of sample estimators
in statistics to the quantity they are constructed to estimate.
We don’t have any ontological problems understanding sample
estimators and the quantities estimated, as both have status in
the ordinary world of empirical things. In our ontology, they
are peers in some sense, but they clearly play different roles
and stand for different concepts.*/
<br>
>> /*
<br>
>> */
<br>
>> I like very muchwhat you have written here and
think it states, perhaps more precisely than I managed, exactly
what I was trying to say. I do want to further stress the fact
that if a measurement system is tracking a variate that is going
to stabilize in the very long run, then it will on average
approximate that value with greater precision the more measures
are taken. Thus, not only does the vector of the convergence
constitute evidence for the location of the truth, the fact that
there is convergence is evidence that there is a truth to be
located. Thus I agree with you that the idea behind Peirce's
notion of truth is the central limit theorem.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Where we might disagree is whether there is any
meaning to truth beyond that central limit. This is where I
found you use of "ontology" so helpful. When talking about
statistics, we are always talking about mathematical structures
in experience and nothing beyond that. We are assuredly talking
about only one kind of thing. However, I see you wondering, are
there things to talk about beyond the statistical structures of
experience? I hear you wanting to say "yes" and I see me
wanting to say "no".
<br>
>>
<br>
>> God knows ... and I use the term advisedly ... my
hankering would seem to be arrogant to the point of absurdity.
Given all the forms of discourse in which the words "truth" and
"real" are used, all the myriad language games in which these
words appear as tokens, how, on earth, could I (or Peirce)
claim that there exists one and only one standard by which the
truth of any proposition or the reality of any abject can be
demonstrated? I think I have to claim (and I think Peirce
claims it) that whatever people may say about how they evaluate
truth or reality claims, their evaluation always boils down to
an appeal to the long run of experience.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Our difference of opinion, if we have one, is
perhaps related to the difference of opinion between James and
Peirce concerning the relation between truth as a believed thing
and truth as a thing beyond the belief of any finite group of
people. James was a physician, and presumably knew a lot about
the power of placebos. He also was a ditherer, who famously
took years to decide whom to marry and agonized about it
piteously to his siblings. James was fascinated by the power of
belief to make things true and the power of doubt to make them
impossible. Who could jump a chasm who did not believe that he
could jump a chasm! For Peirce, this sort of thinking was just
empty psychologizing. Truth was indeed a kind of opinion, but
it was the final opinion, that opinion upon which the operation
of scientific practices and logical inquiry would inevitably
converge.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> EricC, the Jamesian, will no doubt have a lot to
say about this, including that it is total garbage.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> As for Fefferman, my brief attempt to learn
enough about Fefferman to appear intelligent led me to the
website, <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html">http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html"><http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html">http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html"><http://www.vipfaq.com/Charles%20Fefferman.html></a>>,
which might be the weirdest website I have ever gone to. I
don't THINK that a language-free language is my unicorn, but
Glen NEVER says something for nothing, so I am withholding
judgement until he boxes my ears again. I think my unicorn may
be that all truth is statistical and, therefore, provisional.
Literally: a seeing into the future.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Thanks again for helping out, you guys!
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Nick
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Consider, for a moment, the role of placebos in
medicine.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Consider the ritual of transubstantiation. At the
moment that you sip it, is the contents of the chalice Really
"blood."
<br>
>>
<br>
>> /*Peirce writes, "Consider what effects, which may
have practical bearing, the object of your conception to have.
Then our **conception of those effects is our whole of our
conception of the object.*/
<br>
>>
<br>
>> "The Whole"?! Really? Now somebody of Peircean
Pursuasion would point out that, if a parishionner were to burst
a blood vessel, and a doctor with a transfusion kit were
present, NObody would conceive that the patient should b
transfused with communion wine. Since causing instant death
upon tranfusion is not one of the conceivable consequences of
the chalice containing blood (leave aside immunity issues ), and
is a conceivable consequence of transfusing communion wine, we
are warranted to say that, despite what the practice of
communion implies, the stuff in the challice is wine not blood.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> But it's entirely conceivable that some
parissioners, at theinstant of communion, do conceive of the
wine as blood, and experience changes of themselves and teh
world around them as a consequence of receiving communion.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Fork 1 here "The Whole"?! Really? Consider the
phenomenon of a _________________ effects.
<br>
>> /*
<br>
>> */
<br>
>> The juice here is what we think we are
estimating. Are we estimating the true state of affairs in some
world we cannot more directly access or are we estimating the
final resting place of the statistic we are measuring. My
point, here, is that the latter is all we have. To the extent
that anything in experience is non-random (ie, some events are
predictive of other events), any mechanism that homes on these
contingencies will be selected if the consequences are of
importance to reproduction of the organism. we live in a mostly
random world and to the extent that our methods of inquiry are
useful, further inquiry will probably narrow our estimate of
some property within finer and finer limits. This is a process
I would call inductive.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> Now I think, in your latter comments, you are
getting at the fact that this is only one kind of
convergence,and is dependent on a prior convergence concerning
what identifies a substance as lithium. Before we can determine
the boiling point of lithium we have first to agree upon which
substances are lithium and which operations constitute
"boiling". These are decisions that are abductive in nature,
and, to that extent are less straight-forward. Lets say we
are interested in determining the boiling point of Li and we are
sent looking for some li to biol. We come accross a lump of
grey metal witha dark finish in our lab drawer and we want ot
know if this is lithium. The logic here (light grey substance
with dark finish =? lithiumisthe logic ofabduction. That this
first test is positive will lead you toperform yet another
abductive lest: is it noticeably light when youbalance it in
yourhadn, can you cut it withthe plasticknife you brought home
with your take-out
<br>
>> lunch , etc. These tests are similarly abductive
(Li is light, theis substance is light, this sjumbstance isli;Li
is soft, this substance is soft, this substanve is Li. When
enough of these tests have come up positive you will declare the
substance to be Li an procede to measure its boiling point. (A
similar series of abductions willbe require to agree upon what
constitutes "boiling".
<br>
>>
<br>
>> *Lithium* (from Greek
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language></a>>: λίθος,
romanized
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romanization_of_Greek></a>>:
/lithos/, lit.
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Literal_translation></a>> 'stone')
is a chemical element
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_element></a>> with
the symbol <<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbol_(chemistry)></a>>
*Li* and atomic number
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_number></a>> 3. It is
a soft, silvery-white alkali metal
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alkali_metal></a>>. Under
standard conditions
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_temperature_and_pressure></a>>,
it is the least dense metal and the least dense solid element.
Like all alkali metals, lithium is highly reactive
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reactivity_(chemistry)></a>>
and flammable, and must be stored in vacuum, inert atmosphere,
or inert liquid such as purified kerosene or mineral oil. When
cut, it exhibits a metallic luster
<br>
>>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luster_(mineralogy)></a>>,
but moist air corrodes
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corrosion></a>> it quickly
to a dull silvery gray, then black tarnish. It never occurs
freely in nature, but only in (usually ionic) compounds
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_compound></a>>,
such as pegmatitic <<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegmatite></a>> minerals,
which were once the main source of lithium. Due to its
solubility as an ion, it is present in ocean water and is
commonly obtained from brines
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brine></a>>. Lithium metal
is isolated electrolytically
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrolysis></a>> from a
mixture of lithium chloride
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_chloride></a>> and
potassium chloride
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potassium_chloride></a>>.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> On Sun, Jan 8, 2023 at 3:21 AM glen
<<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com">gepropella@gmail.com</a> <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com"><mailto:gepropella@gmail.com></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com">mailto:gepropella@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com"><mailto:gepropella@gmail.com></a>>> wrote:
<br>
>>
<br>
>> This smacks of Feferman's claim that "implicit
in the acceptance of given schemata is the acceptance of any
meaningful substitution instances that one may come to meet, but
which those instances are is not determined by restriction to a
specific language fixed in advance." ... or in the language of
my youth, you reap what you sow.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> To Nick's credit (without any presumption that
I know anything about Peirce), he seems to be hunting the same
unicorn Feferman's hunting, something like a
language-independent language. Or maybe something analogous to a
moment (cf <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)"><https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment_(mathematics)></a>>)?
<br>
>>
<br>
>> While we're on the subject, Martin Davis died
recently:
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/">https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/"><https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/">https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/"><https://logicprogramming.org/2023/01/in-memoriam-martin-davis/></a>>
As terse as he was with me when I complained about him leaving
Tarski out of "Engines of Logic", his loss will be felt,
especially to us randos on the internet.
<br>
>>
<br>
>> On 1/7/23 15:20, David Eric Smith wrote:
<br>
>> > Nick, the text renders.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > You use words in ways that I cannot
parse. Some of them seem very poetic, suggesting that your
intended meaning is different in its whole cast from one I could
try for.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > FWIW: as I have heard these discussions
over the years, to the extent that there is a productive
analogy, I would say (unapologetically using my words, and not
trying to quote his) that Peirce’s claimed relation between
states of knowledge and truth (meaning, some fully-faithful
representation of “what is the case”) is analogous to the
relation of sample estimators in statistics to the quantity they
are constructed to estimate.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > We don’t have any ontological problems
understanding sample estimators and the quantities estimated, as
both have status in the ordinary world of empirical things. In
our ontology, they are peers in some sense, but they clearly
play different roles and stand for different concepts.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > When we come, however, to “states of
knowledge” and “truth” as “what will bear out in the long run”,
in addition to the fact that we must study the roles of these
tokens in our thought and discourse, if we want to get at the
concepts expressive of their nature, we also have a hideously
more complicated structure to categorize, than mere sample
estimators and the corresponding “actual” values they are
constructed to estimate. For sample estimation, in some sense,
we know that the representation for the estimator and the
estimated is the same, and that they are both numbers in some
number system. If we wish to discuss states of knowledge and
truth, everything is up for grabs: every convention for a word’s
denotation and all the rules for its use in a language that
confer parts of its meaning. All the conventions for procedures
of observation and guided experience. All the formal or
informal modes of discourse in which we organize our
intersubjective experience
<br>
>> pools and
<br>
>> > build something from them. All of that
is allowed to “fluctuate”, as we would say in statistics of
sample estimators. The representation scheme itself, and our
capacities to perceive through it, are all things we seek to
bring into some convergence toward a “faithful representation”
of “what is the case”.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > Speaking or thinking in an orderly way
about that seems to have many technical as well as modal
aspects.
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > Best,
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> > Eric
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> >
<br>
>> >> On Jan 7, 2023, at 5:05 PM, Nicholas
Thompson <<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>
<<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"><mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com></a>>>> wrote:
<br>
>> >>
<br>
>> >> */The relation between the believed
in and the True is the relation between a limited function and
its limit. {a vector, and the thing toward which the vector
points?] Ultimately the observations that the function models
determine/**/the limit, but the limit is not determined by any
particular observation or group of observations. Peirce
believes that The World -- if, in fact, it makes any sense to
speak of a World independent of the human experience -- is
essentially random and, therefore, that contingencies among
experiences that lead to valid expectations are rare. The
apparition of order that we experience is due to the fact that
such predictive contingencies--rare as they may be-- are
extraordinarily useful to organisms and so organisms are
conditioned to attend to them. Random events are beyond
experience. Order is what can be experienced. /*
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
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