<div dir="ltr"><font color="#9900ff">I don't know what you mean by "mental stuff", of course.</font><br clear="all"><div><div dir="ltr" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">Well... In this context, I mean whatever the "psyche" part of panpsychism entails. <br><br>Given that I don't believe in disembodied minds, I'm with you 100% on everything you do being "body stuff". Which, presumably, leads to the empirical question of what types of bodies do "psyche", and where those types of bodies can be found. </span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></span></div><div><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">You say further that: </span><font color="#9900ff">No. Neither the dirt nor I do "mental stuff".<br></font><br></div><div>Well, now we have something to actually talk about then! Dave West, unsurprisingly, stepped in strongly on the side of dirt having psyche in at least a rudimentary form, I presume he would assert that you (Glen) do mental stuff too. Dave also asserts that his belief in panpsychism <i>does</i> affect how he lives in the world. Exactly to the extent that his way of living in the world is made different by the belief, panpsychism <i><u>is</u></i> more than just something he says. </div><div><br></div><div>Steve's discussion about what it would feel like to be the bit of dirt trampled beneath a particular foot is a bit of a tangent - potentially interesting in its own right. His discussion of when he, personally, starts to attribute identity - and potentially psyche - to clumps of inanimate stuff seems directly on topic, especially as he too has listed some ways his behaviors change when he becomes engaged in those habits. </div><div dir="ltr"><br><div dir="ltr" style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></div><div></div></div><div dir="ltr"><a href="mailto:echarles@american.edu" target="_blank"></a></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Feb 17, 2023 at 2:36 AM \u26e7 glen <<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank">gepropella@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Doubling down on the incredulity fallacy? OK. Yes. There is something it is like to be trampled dirt. I don't know what you mean by "mental stuff", of course. I don't do any mental stuff as far as I know. Everything I do is inherently "body stuff". Maybe that's because I've experienced chronic pain my whole life. Maybe some of you consistently live in a body free experience? I've only experienced that a few times, e.g. running in a fasted state. And I later suffered for that indulgent delusion.<br>
<br>
No. Neither the dirt nor I do "mental stuff". So you need a more concrete question. <br>
<br>
On February 16, 2023 6:04:17 PM PST, Eric Charles <<a href="mailto:eric.phillip.charles@gmail.com" target="_blank">eric.phillip.charles@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>"an account of the seemingly analogous position of panpsychism"<br>
><br>
>What is that more than something people say?<br>
><br>
>Do *you* experience the dirt at your feet as having a mental life? If so,<br>
>tell me about it: What is the dirt like when it seems to be doing mental<br>
>stuff? What kind of mental stuff is it doing?<br>
><br>
>If not: Have you seen anyone who earnestly thinks the dirt is doing mental<br>
>stuff? If so, what were *they* like? How was that belief pervasive in their<br>
>adjustments to the world? Based on your experiences with that person, how<br>
>do you think your ways of acting in the world would change if you adopted<br>
>such a position?<br>
><br>
><br>
><<a href="mailto:echarles@american.edu" target="_blank">echarles@american.edu</a>><br>
><br>
><br>
>On Thu, Feb 16, 2023 at 1:27 PM glen <<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank">gepropella@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
>> I don't grok the context well enough to equivocate on concepts like "have"<br>
>> and "category of being". But in response to Nick's question: "What is there<br>
>> that animals do that demands us to invent categories to explain their<br>
>> behavior?", my answer is "animals discretize the ambient muck". So if<br>
>> categorization is somehow fundamentally related to discretization, then<br>
>> animals clearly categorize in that sense.<br>
>><br>
>> I mean, all you have to do is consider the frequencies of light the<br>
>> animals' eyeballs do or don't see. That's two categories right there, the<br>
>> light they do see and the light they don't. Unless there's some sophistry<br>
>> hidden behind the question, the answer seems clear. Reflection on what one<br>
>> does and does not categorize isn't necessary. I could even claim my truck<br>
>> discretizes fluids ... those that make it seize up versus lubricate it,<br>
>> those that it burns vs those that stop it cold. Etc. Maybe the question is<br>
>> better formulated as "What makes one impute categories on another?" Clearly<br>
>> my truck doesn't impute categories on squirrels.<br>
>><br>
>> But Nick does follow that question with this "experience" nonsense. So my<br>
>> guess is there *is* some sophistry behind the question, similar to EricC's<br>
>> incredulous response to DaveW's question about phenomenological composition<br>
>> of experience(s). What I find missing in Nick's (and EricC's) distillation<br>
>> of experience monism is an account of the seemingly analogous position of<br>
>> panpsychism. Were I a scholar, I might take such work on myself. But I'm<br>
>> not and, hence, very much appreciate these distillations of dead white<br>
>> men's metaphysics and will take what I can get. 8^D<br>
>><br>
>> On 2/16/23 09:22, Steve Smith wrote:<br>
>> > Might I offer some terminology reframing, or at least ask for some<br>
>> additional explication?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > 1. I think "behaviours" would be all Nick's Martians *could* observe?<br>
>> They would be inferring "experiences" from observed behaviours?<br>
>> > 2. When we talk about "categories" here, are we talking about<br>
>> "categories of being"? Ontologies, as it were?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Regarding ErisS' reflections... I *do* think that animals behave *as<br>
>> if* they "have categories", though I don't know what it even means to say<br>
>> that they "have categories" in the way Aristotle and his legacy-followers<br>
>> (e.g. us) do... I would suggest/suspect that dogs and squirrels are in no<br>
>> way aware of these "categories" and that to say that they do is a<br>
>> projection by (us) humans who have fabricated the (useful in myriad<br>
>> contexts) of a category/Category/ontology. So in that sense they do NOT<br>
>> *have* categories... I think in this conception/thought-experiment we<br>
>> assume that Martians *would* and would be looking to map their own<br>
>> ontologies onto the behaviour (and inferred experiences and judgements?)<br>
>> of Terran animals?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > If I were to invert the subject/object relation, I would suggest that it<br>
>> is "affordances" not "experiences" (or animals' behaviours) we want to<br>
>> categorize into ontologies? It is what things are "good for" that make<br>
>> them interesting/similar/different to living beings. And "good for" is<br>
>> conditionally contextualized. My dog and cat both find squirrels "good<br>
>> for" chasing, but so too for baby rabbits and skunks (once).<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Or am I barking up the wrong set of reserved lexicons?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > To segue (as I am wont to do), it feels like this discussion parallels<br>
>> the one about LLMs where we train the hell out of variations on learning<br>
>> classifier systems until they are as good as (or better than) we (humans)<br>
>> are at predicting the next token in a string of human-generated tokens (or<br>
>> synthesizing a string of tokens which humans cannot distinguish from a<br>
>> string generated by another human, in particular one with the proverbial<br>
>> 10,000 hours of specialized training). The fact that or "ologies" tend to<br>
>> be recorded and organized as knowledge structures and in fact usually<br>
>> *propogated* (taught/learnt) by the same makes us want to believe (some of<br>
>> us) that hidden inside these LLMs are precisely the same "ologies" we<br>
>> encode in our myriad textbooks and professional journal articles?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > I think one of the questions that remains present within this group's<br>
>> continued 'gurgitations is whether the organizations we have conjured are<br>
>> particularly special, or just one of an infinitude of superposed<br>
>> alternative formulations? And whether some of those formulations are<br>
>> acutely occult and/or abstract and whether the existing (accepted)<br>
>> formulations (e.g. Western Philosophy and Science, etc) are uniquely (and<br>
>> exclusively or at least optimally) capable of capturing/describing what is<br>
>> "really real" (nod to George Berkeley).<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Some here (self included) may often suggest that such formulation is at<br>
>> best a coincidence of history and as well as it "covers" a description of<br>
>> "reality", it is by circumstance and probably by abstract conception ("all<br>
>> models are wrong...") incomplete and in error. But nevertheless still<br>
>> useful...<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Maybe another way of reframing Nick's question (on a tangent) is to ask<br>
>> whether the Barsoomians had their own Aristotle to conceive of<br>
>> Categories? Or did they train their telescopes on ancient Greece and<br>
>> learn Latin Lip Reading and adopt one or more the Greek's philosophical<br>
>> traditions? And then, did the gas-balloon creatures floating in the<br>
>> atmosphere-substance of Jupiter observe the Martians' who had observed the<br>
>> Greeks and thereby come up with their own Categories. Maybe it was those<br>
>> creatures who beamed these abstractions straight into the neural tissue of<br>
>> the Aristotelians and Platonists? Do gas-balloon creatures even have<br>
>> solids to be conceived of as Platonic? And are they missing out if they<br>
>> don't? Do they have their own Edwin Abbot Abbot? And what would the<br>
>> Cheela <<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_Egg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon%27s_Egg</a>> say?<br>
>> ><br>
>> > My dog and the rock squirrels he chases want to know... so do the cholla<br>
>> cactus fruits/segments they hoard in their nests!<br>
>> ><br>
>> > Mumble,<br>
>> ><br>
>> > - Steve<br>
>> ><br>
>> > On 2/16/23 5:37 AM, Santafe wrote:<br>
>> >> It\u2019s the tiniest and most idiosyncratic take on this question, but<br>
>> FWIW, here:<br>
>> >> <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520752113" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520752113</a><br>
>> >><br>
>> >> I actually think that all of what Nick says below is a perfectly good<br>
>> draft of a POV.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> As to whether animals \u201chave\u201d categories: Spend time with a dog.<br>
>> Doesn\u2019t take very much time. Their interest in conspecifics is (ahem)<br>
>> categorically different from their interest in people, different than to<br>
>> squirrels, different than to cats, different than to snakes.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> For me to even say that seems like cueing a narcissism of small<br>
>> differences, when overwhelmingly, their behavior is structured around<br>
>> categories, as is everyone else\u2019s. Squirrels don\u2019t mistake acorns for<br>
>> birds of prey. Or for the tree limbs and house roofs one can jump onto.<br>
>> Or for other squirrels. It\u2019s all categories. Behavior is an operation on<br>
>> categories.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> I found it interesting that you invoked \u201cnouns\u201d as a framework that is<br>
>> helpful but sometimes obstructive. One might just have said \u201cwords\u201d. This<br>
>> is interesting to me already, because my syntactician friends will tell you<br>
>> that a noun is not, as we were taught as children, a \u201cword for a person,<br>
>> place, or thing\u201d, but rather a \u201cword in a language that transforms as nouns<br>
>> transform in that language\u201d, which is a bit of an obfuscation, since they<br>
>> do have in common that they are in some way \u201cobject-words\u201d. But from the<br>
>> polysemy and synonymy perspective, we see that \u201cmeanings\u201d cross the<br>
>> noun-verb syntactic distinction quite frequently for some categories.<br>
>> Eye/see, ear/hear, moon/shine, and stuff like that. My typologist friends<br>
>> tell me that is common but particular to some meanings much more than<br>
>> others.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Another fun thing I was told by Ted Chiang a few months ago, which I<br>
>> was amazed I had not heard from linguists, and still want to hold in<br>
>> reserve until I can check it further. He says that languages without<br>
>> written forms do not have a word for \u201cword\u201d. If true, that seems very<br>
>> interesting and important. If Chiang believes it to be true, it is<br>
>> probably already a strong enough regularity to be more-or-less true, and<br>
>> thus still interesting and important.<br>
>> >><br>
>> >> Eric<br>
>> >><br>
>> >>> On Feb 15, 2023, at 1:19 PM,<<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com" target="_blank">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> <<br>
>> <a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com" target="_blank">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> FWiW, I willmake every effort to arrive fed to Thuam by 10.30<br>
>> Mountain. I want to hear the experts among you hold forth on WTF a<br>
>> cateogory actually IS. I am thinking (duh) that a category is a more or<br>
>> less diffuse node in a network of associations (signs, if you must). Hence<br>
>> they constitute a vast table of what goes with what, what is predictable<br>
>> from what, etc. This accommodates \u201cfamily resemblance\u201d quite nicely. Do<br>
>> I think animals have categories, in this sense, ABSOLUTELY EFFING YES. Does<br>
>> this make me a (shudder) nominalist? I hope not.<br>
>> >>> Words\u2026nouns in particular\u2026 confuse this category business. Words<br>
>> place constraints on how vague these nodes can be. They impose on the<br>
>> network constraints to which it is ill suited. True, the more my<br>
>> associations with \u201chorse\u201d line up with your associations with \u201chorse\u201d, the<br>
>> more true the horse seems. Following Peirce, I would say that where our<br>
>> nodes increasingly correspond with increasing shared experience, we have<br>
>> evidence ot the (ultimate) truth of the nodes, their \u201creality\u201d in Peirce\u2019s<br>
>> terms. Here is where I am striving to hang on to Peirce\u2019s realism.<br>
>> >>> The reason I want the geeks to participate tomorrow is that I keep<br>
>> thinking of a semantic webby thing that Steve devised for the Institute<br>
>> about a decade ago. Now a semantic web would be a kind of metaphor for an<br>
>> associative web; don\u2019t associate with other words in exactly the same<br>
>> manner in which experiences associate with other experiences. Still, I<br>
>> think the metaphor is interesting. Also, I am kind of re-interested in my<br>
>> \u201cauthorial voice\u201d, how much it operates like cbt.<br>
>> >>><br>
>> >>> <br>
-- <br>
glen \u26e7<br>
<br>
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