<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;">Stephen, <div><br></div><div>Too much good here for me almost-even to be able to read in scarce time, but on your final point 6, about whether various dissipative structures are complex, or not by what measure:</div><div><br></div><div>Do you know Yoshi Oono’s wonderful idiosyncratic book The Nonlinear World?</div><div><div style="display: block;"><div style="-webkit-user-select: all; -webkit-user-drag: element; display: inline-block;" class="apple-rich-link" draggable="true" role="link" data-url="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8"><a style="border-radius:10px;font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;display:block;-webkit-user-select:none;width:228px;user-select:none;-webkit-user-modify:read-only;user-modify:read-only;overflow:hidden;text-decoration:none;" class="lp-rich-link" rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8" dir="ltr" role="button" draggable="false" width="228"><table style="table-layout:fixed;border-collapse:collapse;width:228px;background-color:#E5E6E9;font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;" class="lp-rich-link-emailBaseTable" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0" width="228"><tbody><tr><td vertical-align="center" align="center"><img style="width:228px;filter:brightness(0.97);height:344px;" width="228" height="344" draggable="false" class="lp-rich-link-mediaImage" alt="978-4-431-54029-8.jpg" src="cid:7A19E1AE-3CA1-4D1A-8AAD-B3E0C03DA124"></td></tr><tr><td vertical-align="center"><table bgcolor="#E5E6E9" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="228" style="font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;table-layout:fixed;background-color:rgba(229, 230, 233, 1);" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar"><tbody><tr><td style="padding:8px 0px 8px 0px;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStackItem"><div style="max-width:100%;margin:0px 16px 0px 16px;overflow:hidden;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack"><div style="word-wrap:break-word;font-weight:500;font-size:12px;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;text-align:left;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack-topCaption-leading"><a rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8" style="text-decoration: none" draggable="false"><font color="#272727" style="color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.847059);">The Nonlinear World</font></a></div><div style="word-wrap:break-word;font-weight:400;font-size:11px;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;text-align:left;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack-bottomCaption-leading"><a rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8" style="text-decoration: none" draggable="false"><font color="#808080" style="color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.498039);">link.springer.com</font></a></div></div></td></tr></tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table></a></div></div><div><br></div><div>I believe it’s the final chapter (Toward complexity), which apparently one can just download:</div><div><div style="display: block;"><div style="-webkit-user-select: all; -webkit-user-drag: element; display: inline-block;" class="apple-rich-link" draggable="true" role="link" data-url="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8_5?pdf=chapter%20toc"><a style="border-radius:10px;font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;display:block;-webkit-user-select:none;width:228px;user-select:none;-webkit-user-modify:read-only;user-modify:read-only;overflow:hidden;text-decoration:none;" class="lp-rich-link" rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8_5?pdf=chapter%20toc" dir="ltr" role="button" draggable="false" width="228"><table style="table-layout:fixed;border-collapse:collapse;width:228px;background-color:#E5E6E9;font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;" class="lp-rich-link-emailBaseTable" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" border="0" width="228"><tbody><tr><td vertical-align="center" align="center"><img style="width:228px;filter:brightness(0.97);height:344px;" width="228" height="344" draggable="false" class="lp-rich-link-mediaImage" alt="978-4-431-54029-8.jpg" src="cid:43389D58-C74E-4013-9E9A-1EBFB73A5F4E"></td></tr><tr><td vertical-align="center"><table bgcolor="#E5E6E9" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="228" style="font-family:-apple-system, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif;table-layout:fixed;background-color:rgba(229, 230, 233, 1);" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar"><tbody><tr><td style="padding:8px 0px 8px 0px;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStackItem"><div style="max-width:100%;margin:0px 16px 0px 16px;overflow:hidden;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack"><div style="word-wrap:break-word;font-weight:500;font-size:12px;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;text-align:left;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack-topCaption-leading"><a rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8_5?pdf=chapter%20toc" style="text-decoration: none" draggable="false"><font color="#272727" style="color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.847059);">Toward Complexity</font></a></div><div style="word-wrap:break-word;font-weight:400;font-size:11px;overflow:hidden;text-overflow:ellipsis;text-align:left;" class="lp-rich-link-captionBar-textStack-bottomCaption-leading"><a rel="nofollow" href="https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-4-431-54029-8_5?pdf=chapter%20toc" style="text-decoration: none" draggable="false"><font color="#808080" style="color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.498039);">link.springer.com</font></a></div></div></td></tr></tbody></table></td></tr></tbody></table></a></div><br></div></div><div>in which he argues that the phenomena you mention are only “pseudo-complex”. Yoshi, like David but with less of the predictable “Darwin-was-better; now what subject are we discussing today?” vibe, argues that there is a threshold to “true complexity” that is only crossed in systems that obey what Yoshi calls a “Pasteur principle”; they are of a kind that effectively can’t emerge spontaneously, but can evolve from ancestors once they exist. He says (translating slightly from his words to mine) that such systems split the notion of “boundary conditions” into two sub-kinds that differ qualitatively. There are the “fundamental conditions” (in biology, the contents of genomes with indefinitely deep ancestry), that mine an indefinite past sparsely and selectively, versus ordinary “boundary conditions”, which are the dense here-and-now. The fundamental conditions often provide criteria that allow the complex thing to respond to parts of the here-and-now, and ignore other parts, feeding back onto the update of the fundamental conditions. </div><div><br></div><div>I don’t know when I will get time to listen to David’s appearance with Sean, so with apologies cannot know whether his argument is similar in its logic. But Yoshi’s framing appeals to me a lot, because it is like a kind of spontaneous symmetry breaking or ergodicity breaking in the representations of information and how they modulate the networks of connection to the space-time continuum. That seems to me a very fertile idea. I am still looking for some concrete model that makes it compelling and useful for something I want to solve. (I probably have written this on the list before, in which case apologies for being repetitive. But this mention is framed specifically to your question whether one should be disappointed in the demotion of the complexity in phenomena.)</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Sorry for such a long email. I thought this one would be short. I haven’t tried to answer Russ yet because I expected that one to be long, and cannot yet….</div><div><br></div><div>Eric</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>On Jul 18, 2023, at 4:37 AM, Stephen Guerin <stephenguerin@fas.harvard.edu> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir="ltr">Russ,<div><br>"agent" is an overloaded word in our work. While there's overlap, I don't think there will ever be a single definition to cover them all. I break our use into two classes: software architecture design and discussions around Agency (ie acting on its own or others behalf)</div><div><br></div><div><b>Software Design and Architecture</b><br>I use the term "agent" when in software design less about "agency" and is more about communicating the software architecture pattern of minimal centralized control through actors with simulated or actual concurrency. While we are often interested in issues around agency, I think it's important to preserve this use of "agent" in software without bringing in a second word like agency. Both are <a href="https://alexvermeer.com/unpacking-suitcase-words/">suitcase words</a> ala Minsky. Simulated concurrency might have a scheduler issuing "step" or "go" events to these "agents" but we try to minimize any global centralized coordinator of logic and we expect coordination to emerge from the interaction of the agents (eg flocking, ising or ant foraging model). The term agent is used to distinguish from other approaches like object-oriented, procedural and functional. While agents are certainly implemented with objects, procedural and functional patterns we tend to mean the agents are semi-autonomous in their actions. Pattie Maes in the 90s described agents as objects that can say "no" :-) Relatedly, Uri Wilensky stresses the use of "ask" to request the action of another agent without the ability do directly do so. This use of "ask" was locked into the api in later versions of Netlogo.</div><div><ol><li>agents in agent-based modeling which in Netlogo are turtles, links and patches. Or in other frameworks might be lagrangian particles and eulerian cells and links/edges. I call these lowercase "a" agents. Often we focus on the interaction behaviors between many lightweight agents and less on internal logic. I often say ABM might be better termed Interaction Based Modeling. Interactions are often hybrid between turtles, links and patches.</li><li>agents in multi-agent systems and distributed AI. It's a rough distinction but here the agents tend to be heavier on internal processes and less focused on the interactions. It's less a technical distinction and more about the communities of researchers and developers.</li><li>agent-oriented programming: similar to the 1 and 2 but the agents are deployed sensing and acting in the world (eg Pan-Tilt-Zoom cameras on mountain tops watching for wildfire and coordinating with a network of other cameras and tracked resources). Here, we use agent-oriented programming to distinguish it from </li></ol><div><b>Agency / Telelogic / Teleonomic</b></div></div><div><ol><li>Autonomous Agents - when speaking in this context I often say capital "A" agents with collaborators. Here we're in the realm of emergent Agency ala Stu's Autonomous Agents from 2000 Investigations. <a href="https://redfish.com/papers/Kauffman_autonomous-agents.pdf" target="_blank">Short summary article </a>. Stu's autonomous agents was his stab at defining a living system.</li><li>Personal Software Agents - these are related to agent-oriented programming above but also take on Agency as acting on your behalf. eg, your camera agents and location agents that monitor your private cameras and GPs to coordinate with other agents share information but not the raw data for collective intelligence and collective action.</li><li>Structure-Agency: the bidirectional feedback in sociology and social theory pertains to the degree to which individuals' independent actions (agency) are influenced or constrained by societal patterns and structures and how the structures are created by the Agents.</li><li>Principal-Agent: in economics and contract theory where one party (the agent) is expected to act in the best interest of another party (the principal)
eg divorce lawyers or sports agents negotiating on behalf of their clients where they can expose private preferences to the other agent to find best terms under rules of nondisclosure and professional conduct without revealing private data to either of the clients. This can also relate to the Pricniple-Agent problem where there is the potential or incentive to act in their own self-interest instead. eg real estate representing the buyer but might want to maximize sales price and commission or a corporate executive maximizing salary or stability of employment vs the goals of the shareholders. obvious need here to expand to stakeholders (employees, customers, community) and not just shareholders.</li><li>Agents as ecological emergents with relation to extremum principles like Principle of Stationary Action I will often talk about the emergent cognition of the ant foraging system as a whole as an uppercase "A" Agent. As mentioned on the list before, when we look at multiple interacting fields with derivatives of action with concentrations in one field driving symmetry breaking and structure formation in a second field we can use teleonomic language like the purpose of Benard convection cell is to dissipate the temperature gradient through mass structure faster than unorganized flow. Here, the full system is an Agent not the individual oil molecules. Note the stationary action principle still needs to be extended to non-equilibrium symmetry breaking of coupled fields but if you take the full system into account, stationary action still governs across the full system. I hope for a revised Noether's theorem where broken symmetries with respect to dual lagrangians of action will imply non-conserved quantities(dissipation).</li><li>Teleonomic Material: the latest use by <a href="https://www.preposterousuniverse.com/podcast/2023/07/10/242-david-krakauer-on-complexity-agency-and-information/">David Krakauer on Sean Carroll's recent podcast</a> in summarizing Complexity. Hurricanes, flocks and Benard Cells according to David are not Complex, BTW. I find the move a little frustrating and disappointing but I always respect his perspective.</li></ol></div><div><br></div><div>-Stephen</div><div><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div><font color="#888888"><br></font></div></div></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 1:01 PM Russ Abbott <<a href="mailto:russ.abbott@gmail.com" target="_blank">russ.abbott@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">I was recently wondering about the informal distinction we make between things that are agents and things that aren't.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">For example, I would consider most living things to be agents. I would also consider many computer programs when in operation as agents. The most obvious examples (for me) are programs that play games like chess. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">I would not consider a rock an agent -- mainly because it doesn't do anything, especially on its own. But a boulder crashnng down a hill and destroying something at the bottom is reasonably called "an agent of destruction." Perhaps this is just playing with words: "agent" can have multiple meanings. A writer's agent represents the writer in negotiations with publishers. Perhaps that's just another meaning. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">My tentative definition is that an agent must have access to energy, and it must use that energy to interact with the world. It must also have some internal logic that determines how it interacts with the world. This final condition rules out boulders rolling down a hill. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">But I doubt that I would call a flashlight (with an on-off switch) an agent even though it satisfies my definition. Does this suggest that an agent must manifest a certain minimal level of complexity in its interactions? If so, I don't have a suggestion about what that minimal level of complexity might be. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">I'm writing all this because in my search for a characterization of agents I looked at the article on <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/agency/" target="_blank">Agency</a> in the <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.</i> I found that article almost a parody of the "armchair philosopher." Here are the first few sentences from the article overview.</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><br></div></div><blockquote style="margin:0px 0px 0px 40px;border:none;padding:0px"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;"><span style="color:rgb(26,26,26);font-family:serif;font-size:16.5px">In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events.</span></div></div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><font><u style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:20px"><br></u></font></div><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">That seems to me to raise more questions than it answers. At the same time, it seems to limit the notion of <i>agent</i> to things that can have intentions and mental models. (To be fair, the article does consider the possibility that there can be agents without these properties. But those discussions seem relatively tangential.) </div><br></div><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: small;">Apologies for going on so long. Thanks, Frank, for opening this can of worms. And thanks to the others who replied so far.</div></div><div dir="ltr"><br></div><div dir="ltr"><font><u style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:20px"> </u></font><span style="color:rgb(33,33,33);font-family:"Helvetica Neue",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;font-size:16.5px;line-height:24.75px"> </span>-- Russ Abbott <br>Professor Emeritus, Computer Science<br>California State University, Los Angeles<br><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Jul 14, 2023 at 8:33 AM Frank Wimberly <<a href="mailto:wimberly3@gmail.com" target="_blank">wimberly3@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto">Joe Ramsey, who took over my <a href="http://job.in/" target="_blank">job.in</a> the Philosophy Department at Carnegie Mellon, posted the following on Facebook:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div>I like Neil DeGrasse Tyson a lot, but I saw him give a spirited defense of science in which he oddly gave no credit to philosophers at all. His straw man philosopher is a dedicated *armchair* philosopher who spins theories without paying attention to scientific practice and contributes nothing to scientific understanding. He misses that scientists themselves are constantly raising obviously philosophical questions and are often ill-equipped to think about them clearly. What is the correct interpretation of quantum mechanics? What is the right way to think about reductionism? Is reductionism the right way to think about science? What is the nature of consciousness? Can you explain consciousness in terms of neuroscience? Are biological kinds real? What does it even mean to be real? Or is realism a red herring; should we be pragmatists instead? Scientists raise all kinds of philosophical questions and have ill-informed opinions about them. But *philosophers* try to answer them, and scientists do pay attention to the controversies. At least the smart ones do.<br><br><div>---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM</div></div>
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