<div dir="ltr">Then there's <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/sep/09/the-big-idea-how-the-protege-effect-can-help-you-learn-almost-anything" target="_blank">https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/sep/09/the-big-idea-how-the-protege-effect-can-help-you-learn-almost-anything</a> which is about the benefits of teaching anyone, but the author chose to teach a chatbot. Irene countered with <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber_duck_debugging">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber_duck_debugging</a> in which benefit accrues when teaching a rubber duck. Perhaps it all falls under the aegis of acting as if. As if you understood something well enough to explain it, as if the receiver of your explanation were able to benefit from the instruction. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Philosophy_of_%27As_if%27">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Philosophy_of_%27As_if%27</a>, a kind of self-willed placebo effect.<div><br></div><div>-- rec --</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Sep 13, 2024 at 12:12 AM glen <<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank">gepropella@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">We've talked about how some of us really enjoy simulated conversation with chatbots ... "really" is an understatement ... it looks more like a fetish or a kink to me ... too intense to be well-described as "enjoyment". Anyway, this article lands in that space, I think:<br>
<br>
Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI<br>
<a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adq1814" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adq1814</a><br>
<br>
It seems to me that some arbitrary thought can play at least a few roles to a person. It may provide: 1) a kernel of identity to establish us vs. them, 2) fodder for feigning engagement at cocktail parties and such, and 3) a foil for world-construction (collaboratively or individually).<br>
<br>
(1) and (2) wouldn't necessarily mechanize refinement of the thought, including testing, falsification, etc. But (3) would. For me, (2) does sometimes provide an externalized medium by which I can change my mind. Hence my affinity for argument, especially with randos at the pub. But it seems like coping and defense mechanisms like mansplaining allow others to avoid changing their minds with (2).<br>
<br>
Another concept I've defended on this list is the vocal grooming hypothesis. If a lonely person engages a chatbot as a simple analogy to picking lice from others' fur, then their engagement with the bot probably lands squarely in (1) and (2). But if the person is simply an introverted hermit who has trouble co-constructing the world with others (i.e. *not* merely vocal grooming), then the chatbot does real work, allowing the antisocial misfit to do real work that could later be expressed in a form harvestable by others. I wonder what humanity could have harvested if Kaczynski or Grothendieck in his later years had had access to appropriately tuned chatbots.<br>
<br>
-- <br>
glen<br>
<br>
<br>
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