<div dir="auto"><div>The real issue is consciousness. </div><div><br></div><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature">---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, 7:20 PM Pieter Steenekamp <<a href="mailto:pieters@randcontrols.co.za">pieters@randcontrols.co.za</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note to self: keep an eye on its development.<br><br>Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?<br><br>I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free will).<br><br>However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology.<div><br>Appendix, Grok's take on free will:<br><br>Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.<br><br>Grok's reply: (<a href="https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg</a>)</div><div><span style="font-family:Aptos,sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><br>Key Points</span></div><div>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Research
suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can make choices
independently of prior causes. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Some
believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while others
argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Neuroscience
shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but interpretations
vary, fueling controversy. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The
concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making it a
deeply debated topic.</li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Definition and Philosophical Debate</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices
not fully determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are
divided into two main camps: </p>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Compatibilists
argue that free will can coexist with determinism, meaning our choices are
free if they align with our desires, even if those desires are caused by
prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you love sweets is
free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Incompatibilists
believe free will requires choices not determined by prior causes. They
split into: </li>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="circle">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Libertarians,
who think free will exists and determinism is false, suggesting some
indeterminacy allows free choices. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Hard
determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an illusion,
as all actions are the result of prior causes.</li>
</ul>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says
if determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination
Argument, which claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our
actions, not external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like
Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do
otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments
persist regardless of determinism. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Scientific Insights</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s,
shows brain activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious
decision-making, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware.
However, this is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while
others argue we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for
significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s
paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental
procedures can influence results (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Neuroscience
News</a>). </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Implications and Conclusion</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold
people responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no
consensus exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for
society, even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a
compatibilist view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the
discussion continues. </p>
<div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">
<hr size="2" width="100%" noshade style="color:black" align="center">
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical,
Scientific, and Societal Dimensions</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices
independently of deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical
inquiry, scientific research, and societal structures. This exploration delves
into its definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader
implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper
understanding. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Historical and Philosophical Context</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek
philosophy and has evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will
is often defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by
prior events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing
otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading
to divergent philosophical positions. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Key Philosophical Positions</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and
incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories: </p>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Compatibilism:
This view posits that free will is compatible with determinism.
Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to one’s own
desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior causes. For
instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is considered
free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing. </li>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="circle">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Hierarchical
View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will involves a
harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order
desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free will,
regardless of determinism (<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>). </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Reasons-Responsive
View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue that free will is
present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such as deciding
to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a deterministic
framework.</li>
</ul>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Incompatibilism:
This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with determinism,
splitting into two camps: </li>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="circle">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Libertarianism:
Advocates believe free will exists and requires indeterminism, suggesting
that some choices are not fully determined, possibly due to quantum
mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to decision-making,
allowing genuine freedom. </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Hard
Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free will is
an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior causes,
leaving no room for alternative choices.</li>
</ul>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The debate hinges on definitions of freedom.
Incompatibilists often define free will as the ability to have done otherwise
in exactly the same circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same
circumstances” includes internal states, allowing for different choices if
those states differ. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Major Arguments</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key
arguments from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature: </p>
<table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;border:none">
<tbody><tr>
<td style="border:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><b>Position</b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><b>Main Arguments</b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><b>Key Details and Examples</b></p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><b>References/URLs</b></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Consequence Argument</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the
future (Section 4a).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal
operators ☐ (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if
determinism is true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Origination Argument</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">: Free will requires being the originator of actions;
determinism prevents this (Section 4b).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs
origination), 2 (determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if
externally caused); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g.,
brainwashing vs. self-origin).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Kane (1998)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">For Free Will (Compatibilism)</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using
hierarchical or reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is
1st/2nd-order desire mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive
view (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g.,
Allison's dog walk decision.</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Frankfurt’s Argument</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do
otherwise (Section 5b).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures
decision if she didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no
alternative (Section 5b).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes,
unaffected by determinism (Section 5c).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist
despite determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into
someone vs. being pushed); supports compatibilism.</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">P. Strawson (1963)</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Pessimism</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- Free will impossible whether determinism or
indeterminism is true (Section 3c).</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g.,
reasons occur randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk
decision based on chance.</p>
</td>
<td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to
argue that if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future,
leaving no room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The
Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of actions,
which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions
are externally caused. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment,
where an agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the
outcome, but doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative
possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this,
arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist
regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Scientific Investigations</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added
a new dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using
electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness potential)
precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting decisions might be
determined before we’re aware (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Neuroscience
of Free Will Wikipedia</a>). This has been interpreted as evidence against free
will, supporting hard determinism. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023
study by Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness
potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental
procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not
conclusively disprove free will (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Neuroscience
News</a>). Additionally, some argue that even if brain activity initiates
actions, we can veto them, preserving a form of free will, especially for
significant decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored
meaningful choices, such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000
donation, finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real
consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (<a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</a>). Conversely, neuroscientist
Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing
actions as the sum of biology and environment, with no room for independent
choice (<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">New Scientist</a>). </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Societal and Practical Implications</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and
personal identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals
responsible for their actions, or should we see them as products of their
circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free
will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for
social order (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">The Atlantic</a>). Conversely, believing in free will supports
systems of reward, punishment, and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in
legal and ethical frameworks. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Quantum Mechanics and Beyond</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are
probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will,
allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics
arguing that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This
remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the
complexity. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Conclusion</p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">The question of free will remains unresolved, with
philosophical arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting
incompatibilism, and compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s
offering a middle ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not
conclusively disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for
freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely
that free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for
maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate will
continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency in a
potentially deterministic universe. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif">Key Citations</p>
<ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm" type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Free Will Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a> </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific
American</a> </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic</a> </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</a> </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">A
Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News</a>
</li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Science supports the existence of free will The Johns
Hopkins News-Letter</a> </li>
<li class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" style="color:rgb(70,120,134)" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky
New Scientist</a></li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"> </p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"> </p></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div><div lang="EN-US"><div><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://corticallabs.com/research.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://corticallabs.com/research.html</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></div>.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..<br>
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