<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title></title><style type="text/css">p.MsoNormal,p.MsoNoSpacing{margin:0}</style></head><body><div style="font-family:Arial;">Pieter,<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">I mostly agree with you about free will. if it exists at all, it is at a relatively trivial level, like choosing Twizzlers over Red Vines when I buy licorice.<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, <i>"I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."</i><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">The fallacy that the brain is <b>just</b> another physical symbol system and the mind is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a simplistic, reductionist, Fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">The human organism—<b>as a whole</b>—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous and constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is involved in "preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.) those inputs and the operation of the brain is totally dependent on that substrate. <br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">Within the brain itself there is specialization, with a subset of the substrate processed by right or left lobes. <b>NOTE: the whole brain is always involved in any cognitive activity.</b> <br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">The left-brain's contribution to cognition is relatively small. Unfortunately, it is both easy to describe and looks a lot like how scientists, college professors, and programmers believe they "think."<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">I will concede that anything the left-brain can do a computer can do. But that is almost infinitely remote from what a human mind-organism can do.<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">BTW the human left-brain shares an interesting trait with LLMs. It lies and hallucinates, and frequently.<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;">davew<br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div><div>On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, at 8:18 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:<br></div><blockquote type="cite" id="qt" style=""><div dir="ltr"><div>First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note to self: keep an eye on its development.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?<br></div><div><br></div><div>I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free will).<br></div><div><br></div><div>However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology.<br></div><div><div><br></div><div>Appendix, Grok's take on free will:<br></div><div><br></div><div>Prompt: Please take a deep dive into  free will.<br></div><div><br></div><div>Grok's reply: (<a href="https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg">https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg</a>)<br></div></div><div><span class="font" style="font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><span class="size" style="font-size:12pt;"><br>Key Points</span></span></div><div><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="disc"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Research
     suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can make choices
     independently of prior causes.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Some
     believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while others
     argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Neuroscience
     shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but interpretations
     vary, fueling controversy.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The
     concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making it a
     deeply debated topic.<br></li></ul><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Definition and Philosophical Debate<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices
not fully determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are
divided into two main camps:<br></p><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="disc"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Compatibilists
     argue that free will can coexist with determinism, meaning our choices are
     free if they align with our desires, even if those desires are caused by
     prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you love sweets is
     free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Incompatibilists
     believe free will requires choices not determined by prior causes. They
     split into:<br></li><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="circle"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Libertarians,
      who think free will exists and determinism is false, suggesting some
      indeterminacy allows free choices.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Hard
      determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an illusion,
      as all actions are the result of prior causes.<br></li></ul></ul><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says
if determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination
Argument, which claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our
actions, not external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like
Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do
otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments
persist regardless of determinism.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Scientific Insights<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s,
shows brain activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious
decision-making, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware.
However, this is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while
others argue we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for
significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s
paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental
procedures can influence results (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Neuroscience
News</a>).<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Implications and Conclusion<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold
people responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no
consensus exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for
society, even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a
compatibilist view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the
discussion continues.<br></p><div class="qt-MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><hr size="2" width="100%" noshade="" style="color:black;" align="center"><br></div><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical,
Scientific, and Societal Dimensions<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices
independently of deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical
inquiry, scientific research, and societal structures. This exploration delves
into its definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader
implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper
understanding.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Historical and Philosophical Context<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek
philosophy and has evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will
is often defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by
prior events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing
otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading
to divergent philosophical positions.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Key Philosophical Positions<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and
incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories:<br></p><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="disc"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Compatibilism:
     This view posits that free will is compatible with determinism.
     Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to one’s own
     desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior causes. For
     instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is considered
     free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.<br></li><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="circle"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Hierarchical
      View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will involves a
      harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order
      desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free will,
      regardless of determinism (<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a>).<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Reasons-Responsive
      View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue that free will is
      present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such as deciding
      to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a deterministic
      framework.<br></li></ul><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Incompatibilism:
     This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with determinism,
     splitting into two camps:<br></li><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="circle"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Libertarianism:
      Advocates believe free will exists and requires indeterminism, suggesting
      that some choices are not fully determined, possibly due to quantum
      mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to decision-making,
      allowing genuine freedom.<br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Hard
      Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free will is
      an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior causes,
      leaving no room for alternative choices.<br></li></ul></ul><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The debate hinges on definitions of freedom.
Incompatibilists often define free will as the ability to have done otherwise
in exactly the same circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same
circumstances” includes internal states, allowing for different choices if
those states differ.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Major Arguments<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key
arguments from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:<br></p><table class="qt-gmail-MsoNormalTable" border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse;border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-right-width:medium;border-right-style:none;border-right-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:medium;border-bottom-style:none;border-bottom-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-image-outset:0;border-image-repeat:stretch;border-image-slice:100%;border-image-source:none;border-image-width:1;"><tbody><tr><td style="border-top-width:1pt;border-top-style:solid;border-top-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-image-outset:0;border-image-repeat:stretch;border-image-slice:100%;border-image-source:none;border-image-width:1;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><b>Position</b><br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:1pt;border-top-style:solid;border-top-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><b>Main Arguments</b><br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:1pt;border-top-style:solid;border-top-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><b>Key Details and Examples</b><br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:1pt;border-top-style:solid;border-top-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><b>References/URLs</b><br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">-<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Consequence Argument<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the
  future (Section 4a).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal
  operators ☐ (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if
  determinism is true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)<br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><br></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">-<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Origination Argument<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">: Free will requires being the originator of actions;
  determinism prevents this (Section 4b).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs
  origination), 2 (determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if
  externally caused); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g.,
  brainwashing vs. self-origin).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Kane (1998)<br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">For Free Will (Compatibilism)<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">-<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using
  hierarchical or reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is
  1st/2nd-order desire mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive
  view (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g.,
  Allison's dog walk decision.<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)<br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><br></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">-<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Frankfurt’s Argument<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do
  otherwise (Section 5b).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures
  decision if she didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no
  alternative (Section 5b).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)<br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><br></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">-<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes,
  unaffected by determinism (Section 5c).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist
  despite determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into
  someone vs. being pushed); supports compatibilism.<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">P. Strawson (1963)<br></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-left-width:1pt;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Pessimism<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- Free will impossible whether determinism or
  indeterminism is true (Section 3c).<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g.,
  reasons occur randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk
  decision based on chance.<br></p></td><td style="border-top-width:medium;border-top-style:none;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-width:medium;border-left-style:none;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-width:1pt;border-bottom-style:solid;border-bottom-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);border-right-width:1pt;border-right-style:solid;border-right-color:rgb(51, 54, 57);padding-top:0.75pt;padding-right:0.75pt;padding-bottom:0.75pt;padding-left:0.75pt;"><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)<br></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to
argue that if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future,
leaving no room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The
Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of actions,
which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions
are externally caused.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment,
where an agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the
outcome, but doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative
possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this,
arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist
regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Scientific Investigations<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added
a new dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using
electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness potential)
precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting decisions might be
determined before we’re aware (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Neuroscience
of Free Will Wikipedia</a>). This has been interpreted as evidence against free
will, supporting hard determinism.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023
study by Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness
potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental
procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not
conclusively disprove free will (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Neuroscience
News</a>). Additionally, some argue that even if brain activity initiates
actions, we can veto them, preserving a form of free will, especially for
significant decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored
meaningful choices, such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000
donation, finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real
consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (<a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</a>). Conversely, neuroscientist
Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing
actions as the sum of biology and environment, with no room for independent
choice (<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">New Scientist</a>).<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Societal and Practical Implications<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and
personal identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals
responsible for their actions, or should we see them as products of their
circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free
will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for
social order (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">The Atlantic</a>). Conversely, believing in free will supports
systems of reward, punishment, and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in
legal and ethical frameworks.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Quantum Mechanics and Beyond<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are
probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will,
allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics
arguing that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This
remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the
complexity.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Conclusion<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">The question of free will remains unresolved, with
philosophical arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting
incompatibilism, and compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s
offering a middle ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not
conclusively disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for
freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely
that free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for
maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate will
continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency in a
potentially deterministic universe.<br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;">Key Citations<br></p><ul style="margin-top:0cm;margin-bottom:0cm;" type="disc"><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Free Will Internet
     Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific
     American</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">A
     Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Science supports the existence of free will The Johns
     Hopkins News-Letter</a><br></li><li class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank" style="color:rgb(70, 120, 134);">Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky
     New Scientist</a><br></li></ul><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"> <br></p><p class="qt-MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0cm;margin-right:0cm;margin-bottom:8pt;margin-left:0cm;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos, sans-serif;"> <br></p></div></div><div><br></div><div class="qt-gmail_quote qt-gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="qt-gmail_attr">On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="qt-gmail_quote" style="margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204, 204, 204);padding-left:1ex;"><div class="qt-msg-5499258730175681639"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap:break-word;"><div class="qt-m_-5499258730175681639WordSection1"><p class="qt-MsoNormal"><a href="https://corticallabs.com/research.html" target="_blank">https://corticallabs.com/research.html</a><u></u><u></u><br></p></div></div><div>.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..<br></div><div> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br></div><div> Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom <a href="https://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br></div><div> to (un)subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br></div><div> FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br></div><div> archives:  5/2017 thru present <a href="https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br></div><div>   1/2003 thru 6/2021  <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><br></div></div></blockquote></div><div>.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..<br></div><div>FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br></div><div>Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom <a href="https://bit.ly/virtualfriam">https://bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br></div><div>to (un)subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br></div><div>FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br></div><div>archives:  5/2017 thru present <a href="https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br></div><div>  1/2003 thru 6/2021  <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><br></div><div><br></div></blockquote><div style="font-family:Arial;"><br></div></body></html>