<div dir="ltr">Consciousness? Sure. Free will? Not so much.<br>Science still doesn’t really understand consciousness, but I do think humans are conscious. Free will, though? I don’t believe in it—it seems more like a trick our minds play on us.</div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, 6 Mar 2025 at 04:34, Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div class="msg4859251450491911540"><div lang="EN-US" style="overflow-wrap: break-word;"><div class="m_4859251450491911540WordSection1"><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">Will it have consciousness?<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"><u></u> <u></u></span></p><div style="border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> Friam <<a href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam-bounces@redfish.com</a>> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Frank Wimberly<br><b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, March 5, 2025 6:23 PM<br><b>To:</b> The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <<a href="mailto:friam@redfish.com" target="_blank">friam@redfish.com</a>><br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?<u></u><u></u></span></p></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">The real issue is consciousness. <u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal">---<br>Frank C. Wimberly<br>140 Calle Ojo Feliz, <br>Santa Fe, NM 87505<br><br>505 670-9918<br>Santa Fe, NM<u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">On Wed, Mar 5, 2025, 7:20<span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif"> </span>PM Pieter Steenekamp <<a href="mailto:pieters@randcontrols.co.za" target="_blank">pieters@randcontrols.co.za</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style="border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><p class="MsoNormal">First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note to self: keep an eye on its development.<br><br>Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?<br><br>I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free will).<br><br>However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology.<u></u><u></u></p><div><p class="MsoNormal"><br>Appendix, Grok's take on free will:<br><br>Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.<br><br>Grok's reply: (<a href="https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg" target="_blank">https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg</a>)<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><br>Key Points<u></u><u></u></p></div><div><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can make choices independently of prior causes. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but interpretations vary, fueling controversy. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making it a deeply debated topic.<u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Definition and Philosophical Debate<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into two main camps: <u></u><u></u></p><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism, meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined by prior causes. They split into: <u></u><u></u></li></ul><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="circle"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false, suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.<u></u><u></u></li></ul></ul><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist regardless of determinism. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Scientific Insights<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental procedures can influence results (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Neuroscience News</span></a>). <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Implications and Conclusion<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion continues. <u></u><u></u></p><div style="margin-bottom:8pt"><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center;line-height:115%"><hr size="1" width="100%" noshade style="color:black" align="center"></div></div><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and Societal Dimensions<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper understanding. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Historical and Philosophical Context<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading to divergent philosophical positions. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Key Philosophical Positions<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories: <u></u><u></u></p><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing. <u></u><u></u></li></ul><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="circle"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free will, regardless of determinism (<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</span></a>). <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a deterministic framework.<u></u><u></u></li></ul></ul><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with determinism, splitting into two camps: <u></u><u></u></li></ul><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="circle"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to decision-making, allowing genuine freedom. <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.<u></u><u></u></li></ul></ul><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states differ. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Major Arguments<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature: <u></u><u></u></p><table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" style="border-collapse:collapse"><tbody><tr><td style="border:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><b>Position</b><u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><b>Main Arguments</b><u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><b>Key Details and Examples</b><u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><b>References/URLs</b><u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Consequence Argument<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section 4a).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐ (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Origination Argument<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">: Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents this (Section 4b).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. self-origin).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Kane (1998)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">For Free Will (Compatibilism)<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision.<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Frankfurt’s Argument<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section 5b).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative (Section 5b).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by determinism (Section 5c).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being pushed); supports compatibilism.<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">P. Strawson (1963)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr><tr><td style="border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-left:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-top:none;padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Pessimism<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true (Section 3c).<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based on chance.<u></u><u></u></p></td><td style="border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);border-right:1pt solid rgb(51,54,57);padding:0.75pt"><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)<u></u><u></u></p></td></tr></tbody></table><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions are externally caused. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this, arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Scientific Investigations<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</span></a>). This has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard determinism. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not conclusively disprove free will (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Neuroscience News</span></a>). Additionally, some argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them, preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (<a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</span></a>). Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment, with no room for independent choice (<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">New Scientist</span></a>). <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Societal and Practical Implications<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible for their actions, or should we see them as products of their circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for social order (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">The Atlantic</span></a>). Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment, and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical frameworks. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Quantum Mechanics and Beyond<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the complexity. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Conclusion<u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency in a potentially deterministic universe. <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%">Key Citations<u></u><u></u></p><ul style="margin-top:0in" type="disc"><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</span></a> <u></u><u></u></li><li class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"><a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank"><span style="color:rgb(70,120,134)">Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist</span></a><u></u><u></u></li></ul><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:8pt;line-height:115%"> <u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p><div><div><p class="MsoNormal">On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com" target="_blank">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<u></u><u></u></p></div><blockquote style="border-top:none;border-right:none;border-bottom:none;border-left:1pt solid rgb(204,204,204);padding:0in 0in 0in 6pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in"><div><div><div><p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://corticallabs.com/research.html" target="_blank">https://corticallabs.com/research.html</a><u></u><u></u></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal">.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - 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