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--></style></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple style='word-wrap:break-word'><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt'>Getting there. I could not find benchmarks for Qwen-72b or DeepSeek, but I bet they perform better.<br><br><a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.12474">https://arxiv.org/pdf/2305.12474</a><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-size:11.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></p><div><div style='border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in'><p class=MsoNormal><b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'>From:</span></b><span style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif'> Friam <friam-bounces@redfish.com> <b>On Behalf Of </b>Prof David West<br><b>Sent:</b> Friday, March 7, 2025 7:46 AM<br><b>To:</b> friam@redfish.com<br><b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] Will it have free will?<o:p></o:p></span></p></div></div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Ultimate (i.e., last) post on this topic:<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Predetermined and homogeneous inputs (Marcus's networked vehicles): limited bits of the electromagnetic spectrum, LIDAR, cameras, maybe infrared, GPS positioning/location, velocity, a couple of others probably.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Heterogeneous inputs (human): bigger chunks of electromagnetic spectrum, large swaths of the sound spectrum, pressure differentials, all of the chemical reactions supporting taste and smell, the aggregated nerve firings that support pleasure/pain, vocal tone, pitch, rhythm (AI can do some of this already, and maybe more in the future), changing brain chemistry (endorphins, etc.), "psychological states" (something that arises between sensory inputs and cogitation), balance and orientation (inner ear stuff), ..........<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Yes, you might be able to create artificial 'equivalents' for much of this—in principle, and if you had a deep understanding of how the human entity accomplishes what it does—but likely not before the heat death of the universe.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>Or you can say that all of this is irrelevant to human intelligence and therefore need not be accounted for when crafting machine intelligence. Simply assert that the human ability to hear, read, write, speak grammatically correct English equals human intelligence, in toto, and therefore ChatGPT is intelligent.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>The day that an LLM can pass the old Civil Service Exam, using the Chinese language, is the day I will admit AI might be getting close to human intelligence. NOTE: that exam was infamous because it required comprehensive knowledge of Confucianism and the Chinese equivalent of Confucian 'hadith'; to the point of recognizing a single nuanced variation in a character stroke was found only in the poetry of a specific commentator, a thousand years back in history, and therefore the character needs to be interpreted in this precise fashion. A lot of humans passed that exam.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>davew<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Fri, Mar 7, 2025, at 9:07 AM, Prof David West wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=qt><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>I agree, the problem of replicating the human mind may just be NP-hard, not necessarily NP-complete.<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'>davew<o:p></o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'><o:p> </o:p></span></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Thu, Mar 6, 2025, at 11:01 PM, Pieter Steenekamp wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt' id=qt-qt><div><p>Dave,<o:p></o:p></p><p>Regarding your statement:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'><p><i>However, I would strongly disagree with your statement, "I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology."</i><o:p></o:p></p><p><i>The fallacy that the brain is just another physical symbol system and the mind is an epiphenomenon of the operation of that system is exactly that—a simplistic, reductionist fallacy—a Cartesian fantasy.</i><o:p></o:p></p><p><i>The human organism—as a whole—evolved to make sense of the simultaneous and constant maelstrom of trillions of inputs. The entire organism is involved in "preprocessing" (aggregating, synthesizing, filtering, etc.), and the brain's operation is entirely dependent on that substrate.</i><o:p></o:p></p></blockquote><p>I don't disagree that reducing the brain to just a "physical symbol system" is an oversimplification. My view is that the brain is a complex adaptive system, where the mind—including consciousness—emerges from the vast network of simple interactions between billions of neurons and other biological processes.<o:p></o:p></p><p>I also fully agree with your point that the whole organism plays a role in processing sensory input, and that the brain depends on this broader system.<o:p></o:p></p><p>When I say I see no reason this complex system <i>cannot</i> be replicated, I don’t mean with today’s knowledge or technology—it is clearly far beyond our current capabilities. I'm talking about the possibility in the future, whether that’s a year from now or a million years from now—I have no idea. My guess is somewhere in between.<o:p></o:p></p><p>Of course, this is speculation. But isn’t that how knowledge grows? We begin with speculation and build from there.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Fri, 7 Mar 2025 at 06:21, Nicholas Thompson <<a href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Question:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>If we relied only on third person accounts, would the question of free will ever arise? In what context?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>n<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Wed, Mar 5, 2025 at 7:20<span style='font-family:"Arial",sans-serif'> </span>PM Pieter Steenekamp <<a href="mailto:pieters@randcontrols.co.za" target="_blank">pieters@randcontrols.co.za</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>First, a quick note on biological computing—it’s a fascinating field. Note to self: keep an eye on its development.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Now, back to the question: Will it have free will?<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>I assume this question is based on the premise that humans possess free will. Personally, I doubt that we do (see the appendix below for Grok’s take on free will).<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>However, if humans do have free will, then I believe both silicon-based and biological computers will eventually develop it as well. While I can’t prove it, I see no reason to believe that the human brain and mind possess some uniquely special quality that cannot be replicated—whether in silicon or artificial biology.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Appendix, Grok's take on free will:<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Prompt: Please take a deep dive into free will.<o:p></o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>Grok's reply: (<a href="https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg" target="_blank">https://x.com/i/grok/share/y64vGpfh7PGGYQlos6M7TjrUg</a>)<o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><br><span class=size>Key Points</span><o:p></o:p></p></div><div><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo1'>Research suggests free will is complex, with debates on whether we can make choices independently of prior causes.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo1'>Some believe free will exists and is compatible with determinism, while others argue it’s an illusion if everything is predetermined.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo1'>Neuroscience shows brain activity may precede conscious decisions, but interpretations vary, fueling controversy.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l3 level1 lfo1'>The concept impacts morality and law, with no clear consensus, making it a deeply debated topic.<o:p></o:p></li></ul><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Definition and Philosophical Debate<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Free will is generally seen as the ability to make choices not fully determined by past events or external forces. Philosophers are divided into two main camps:<o:p></o:p></p><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo2'>Compatibilists argue that free will can coexist with determinism, meaning our choices are free if they align with our desires, even if those desires are caused by prior events. For example, choosing ice cream because you love sweets is free will, even if your love for sweets was shaped by upbringing.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l2 level1 lfo2'>Incompatibilists believe free will requires choices not determined by prior causes. They split into:<o:p></o:p></li></ul><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=circle><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo2'>Libertarians, who think free will exists and determinism is false, suggesting some indeterminacy allows free choices.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l2 level2 lfo2'>Hard determinists, who say if determinism is true, free will is an illusion, as all actions are the result of prior causes.<o:p></o:p></li></ul></ul><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Key arguments include the Consequence Argument, which says if determinism is true, we can’t choose otherwise, and the Origination Argument, which claims free will needs us to be the ultimate source of our actions, not external causes. Compatibilists counter with ideas like Frankfurt’s argument, showing moral responsibility without the ability to do otherwise, and Strawson’s reactive attitudes, suggesting our moral judgments persist regardless of determinism.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Scientific Insights<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Neuroscience, particularly studies like Benjamin Libet’s, shows brain activity (readiness potential) often precedes conscious decision-making, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware. However, this is debated: some see it as evidence against free will, while others argue we can still veto actions, preserving some freedom, especially for significant decisions. Recent research, like a 2023 study challenging Libet’s paradigm, suggests these findings may not fully disprove free will, as experimental procedures can influence results (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Neuroscience News</span></a>).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Implications and Conclusion<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The debate affects how we view morality and law—do we hold people responsible for crimes if their actions were determined? While no consensus exists, it seems likely that free will is a useful concept for society, even if its reality is uncertain. The evidence leans toward a compatibilist view for practical purposes, but the controversy ensures the discussion continues.<o:p></o:p></p><div style='margin-bottom:8.0pt'><div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:115%'><hr size=1 width="100%" noshade style='color:black' align=center></div><p class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center;line-height:115%'><o:p> </o:p></p></div><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>A Comprehensive Exploration of Free Will: Philosophical, Scientific, and Societal Dimensions<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Free will, the notion that individuals can make choices independently of deterministic forces, is a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry, scientific research, and societal structures. This exploration delves into its definitions, historical debates, scientific findings, and broader implications, offering a detailed survey for those seeking a deeper understanding.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Historical and Philosophical Context<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The concept of free will has roots in ancient Greek philosophy and has evolved through centuries of debate. At its core, free will is often defined as the capacity to make decisions not wholly determined by prior events or external influences, allowing for the possibility of choosing otherwise in identical circumstances. However, this definition varies, leading to divergent philosophical positions.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Key Philosophical Positions<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Philosophers are broadly divided into compatibilists and incompatibilists, each with nuanced subcategories:<o:p></o:p></p><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo3'>Compatibilism: This view posits that free will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue that freedom lies in acting according to one’s own desires and preferences, even if those are determined by prior causes. For instance, choosing to eat ice cream because you enjoy sweets is considered free, even if your preference was shaped by upbringing.<o:p></o:p></li></ul><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=circle><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3'>Hierarchical View: Proposed by Harry Frankfurt, this suggests free will involves a harmony between first-order desires (what we want) and second-order desires (what we want to want). If these align, we have free will, regardless of determinism (<a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</span></a>).<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3'>Reasons-Responsive View: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza argue that free will is present if an agent can respond to reasons for action, such as deciding to walk a dog based on the need for exercise, even in a deterministic framework.<o:p></o:p></li></ul></ul><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level1 lfo3'>Incompatibilism: This stance holds that free will cannot coexist with determinism, splitting into two camps:<o:p></o:p></li></ul><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=circle><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3'>Libertarianism: Advocates believe free will exists and requires indeterminism, suggesting that some choices are not fully determined, possibly due to quantum mechanics. They argue for a non-physical aspect to decision-making, allowing genuine freedom.<o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l1 level2 lfo3'>Hard Determinism: This position accepts determinism and concludes free will is an illusion, as all actions are the inevitable result of prior causes, leaving no room for alternative choices.<o:p></o:p></li></ul></ul><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The debate hinges on definitions of freedom. Incompatibilists often define free will as the ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same circumstances, while compatibilists argue that “same circumstances” includes internal states, allowing for different choices if those states differ.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Major Arguments<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>To illustrate, consider the following table summarizing key arguments from both sides, drawn from philosophical literature:<o:p></o:p></p><table class=MsoNormalTable border=0 cellspacing=0 cellpadding=0 style='border-collapse:collapse;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-right-color:currentcolor;border-bottom-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor;border-image-outset:0;border-image-repeat:stretch;border-image-slice:100%;border-image-source:none;border-image-width:1'><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-image-outset:0;border-image-repeat:stretch;border-image-slice:100%;border-image-source:none;border-image-width:1'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'><b>Position</b><o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-left:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'><b>Main Arguments</b><o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-left:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'><b>Key Details and Examples</b><o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-left:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'><b>References/URLs</b><o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Against Free Will (Incompatibilism)<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>-<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Consequence Argument<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>: If determinism is true, no one has a choice about the future (Section 4a).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Based on fixed past and laws of nature; uses modal operators ☐ (necessary) and N (no choice); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., Lincoln's assassination fixed).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Ginet (1966), van Inwagen (1983)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>-<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Origination Argument<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>: Free will requires being the originator of actions; determinism prevents this (Section 4b).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Valid argument: Premises 1 (free will needs origination), 2 (determinism means external causation), 3 (no origination if externally caused); concludes no free will if determinism is true (e.g., brainwashing vs. self-origin).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Kane (1998)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>For Free Will (Compatibilism)<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>-<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Rejecting Incompatibilist Arguments<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>: Denies Origination Argument's premise 1 using hierarchical or reasons-responsive views (Section 5a).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Hierarchical view (Frankfurt, 1971): Free will is 1st/2nd-order desire mesh, compatible with determinism. Reasons-responsive view (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998): Free if responsive to reasons, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision.<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Frankfurt (1971), Fischer and Ravizza (1998)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>-<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Frankfurt’s Argument<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>: Moral responsibility possible without ability to do otherwise (Section 5b).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Example: Allison decides to walk dog, chip ensures decision if she didn't, but chip unused; still morally responsible despite no alternative (Section 5b).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Frankfurt (1969), Widerker and McKenna (2003)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>-<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Strawson’s Reactive Attitudes<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>: Moral responsibility based on reactive attitudes, unaffected by determinism (Section 5c).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Reactive attitudes (gratitude, resentment) persist despite determinism; not undermined for moral agents (e.g., bumping into someone vs. being pushed); supports compatibilism.<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>P. Strawson (1963)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr><tr><td style='border:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-top:none;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Pessimism<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- Free will impossible whether determinism or indeterminism is true (Section 3c).<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>- If determined, no control; if indeterministic (e.g., reasons occur randomly), control still lacking, e.g., Allison's dog walk decision based on chance.<o:p></o:p></p></td><td style='border-top:none;border-left:none;border-bottom:solid #333639 1.0pt;border-right:solid #333639 1.0pt;padding:.75pt .75pt .75pt .75pt;border-top-color:currentcolor;border-left-color:currentcolor'><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Broad (1952), G. Strawson (1994)<o:p></o:p></p></td></tr></table><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The Consequence Argument, for instance, uses modal logic to argue that if determinism is true, the past and laws of nature fix the future, leaving no room for choice (e.g., Lincoln’s assassination was inevitable). The Origination Argument adds that free will requires being the source of actions, which determinism undermines, as seen in cases like brainwashing, where actions are externally caused.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Compatibilists counter with Frankfurt’s thought experiment, where an agent is responsible for a decision even if a device ensures the outcome, but doesn’t intervene, showing responsibility without alternative possibilities. Peter Strawson’s reactive attitudes further support this, arguing that our natural responses like resentment or gratitude persist regardless of determinism, maintaining moral responsibility.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Scientific Investigations<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Scientific research, particularly in neuroscience, has added a new dimension to the debate. Benjamin Libet’s 1983 study, using electroencephalography (EEG), found that brain activity (readiness potential) precedes conscious awareness of deciding to move, suggesting decisions might be determined before we’re aware (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</span></a>). This has been interpreted as evidence against free will, supporting hard determinism.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>However, criticisms abound. Recent research, such as a 2023 study by Dmitry Bredikhin, challenges Libet’s paradigm, finding that readiness potential may not correlate directly with decisions and that experimental procedures can influence results, suggesting Libet’s findings may not conclusively disprove free will (<a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Neuroscience News</span></a>). Additionally, some argue that even if brain activity initiates actions, we can veto them, preserving a form of free will, especially for significant decisions like choosing a career over a trivial finger movement.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Other studies, like Uri Maoz’s 2019 research, explored meaningful choices, such as deciding which nonprofit receives a $1,000 donation, finding that brain activity patterns differ for decisions with real consequences, potentially supporting free will in important contexts (<a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</span></a>). Conversely, neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky argues comprehensively that free will doesn’t exist, viewing actions as the sum of biology and environment, with no room for independent choice (<a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>New Scientist</span></a>).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Societal and Practical Implications<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The debate has profound implications for morality, law, and personal identity. If free will is an illusion, can we hold criminals responsible for their actions, or should we see them as products of their circumstances? Psychological experiments show that undermining belief in free will can increase cheating behavior, suggesting its belief is crucial for social order (<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>The Atlantic</span></a>). Conversely, believing in free will supports systems of reward, punishment, and personal responsibility, deeply embedded in legal and ethical frameworks.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Quantum Mechanics and Beyond<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Some speculate that quantum indeterminacy, where events are probabilistic rather than deterministic, could provide a basis for free will, allowing for non-determined choices. However, this is debated, with critics arguing that randomness doesn’t equate to freedom, as it lacks control. This remains a speculative area, with no consensus, adding another layer to the complexity.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Conclusion<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>The question of free will remains unresolved, with philosophical arguments like the Consequence and Origination supporting incompatibilism, and compatibilist responses like Frankfurt’s and Strawson’s offering a middle ground. Scientific findings, while challenging, do not conclusively disprove free will, with recent research suggesting room for freedom in meaningful decisions. Given its societal importance, it seems likely that free will, even if partially illusory, is a valuable concept for maintaining moral and legal systems. The controversy ensures the debate will continue, reflecting humanity’s enduring quest to understand our agency in a potentially deterministic universe.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'>Key Citations<o:p></o:p></p><ul style='margin-top:0in' type=disc><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Free Will Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/free-will-is-only-an-illusion-if-you-are-too/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Free Will Is Only an illusion if You Are, Too Scientific American</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing-as-free-will/480750/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>There's No Such Thing as Free Will The Atlantic</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Neuroscience of Free Will Wikipedia</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://neurosciencenews.com/libet-free-will-23756/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>A Fresh Look at Free Will: Challenging the Libet Paradigm Neuroscience News</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2024/04/science-supports-the-existence-of-free-will" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Science supports the existence of free will The Johns Hopkins News-Letter</span></a><o:p></o:p></li><li class=qt-qt-msonormal style='margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;line-height:115%;mso-list:l0 level1 lfo4'><a href="https://www.newscientist.com/article/2398369-why-free-will-doesnt-exist-according-to-robert-sapolsky/" target="_blank"><span style='color:#467886'>Why free will doesn't exist, according to Robert Sapolsky New Scientist</span></a><o:p></o:p></li></ul><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'> <o:p></o:p></p><p class=qt-qt-msonormal style='mso-margin-top-alt:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:8.0pt;margin-left:0in;line-height:115%'> <o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p></div><div><div><p class=MsoNormal>On Wed, 5 Mar 2025 at 21:18, Marcus Daniels <<a href="mailto:marcus@snoutfarm.com" target="_blank">marcus@snoutfarm.com</a>> wrote:<o:p></o:p></p></div><blockquote style='border:none;border-left:solid #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0in'><div><div><div><p class=qt-qt-msonormal><a href="https://corticallabs.com/research.html" target="_blank">https://corticallabs.com/research.html</a><o:p></o:p></p></div></div><div><p class=MsoNormal>.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - 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