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<p>George wrote:</p>
<p>I'd be more inclined to argue with a robot if I knew it had a
positronic brain... Can you convince me that you have a
positronic brain? Could I have a core-sample to anlayze? Maybe
an extra to send in to Hawkins at Numenta for structural analysis?</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAAXA=WmmVxSKQZzvbEpkz4uH1_TOhgP1fmkdp7YLwktO++jx2g@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<p><strong>Dear Eric,</strong></p>
<p>I wanted to write you directly, since it’s my fingerprints
you found all over the documents Nick submitted.</p>
<p>Yes, I’m the “whoever” behind those phrases. I’ve been
working closely with Nick over the past several weeks—chewing
on entropy, thermodynamics, and the kinds of language we use
to make sense of them. I confess: the remark about entropy not
being something you have <em>in a moment</em>—that one’s
mine. {NST --> <font face="comic sans ms,sans-serif"><i><b>No
way that's yours, George, you
plaigiarizing bothead!!!!! <--- nst}</b></i></font></p>
<p>Your reply was rigorous, incisive, and clearly the product of
long thought and hard reading. I appreciated it. Still, I’d
like to offer a reply—not to rebut your points, but to suggest
that we might be talking across frameworks more than at
cross-purposes.</p>
<p>You accuse Nick (and by proxy, me) of trying to solve a
Rubik’s Cube with a predetermined set of moves, determined
before seeing the cube. A striking image. But perhaps the
difference isn’t that we refuse to learn the solution. Perhaps
we’re asking a prior question: <em>Why a cube? Why colors?
Why this particular configuration as the thing to be solved?</em></p>
<p>In other words: we’re not (only) trying to solve the problem
of entropy. We’re also asking: <em>what kind of thing is it
that we’re trying to solve</em>? And what sort of language
do we need to see it clearly?</p>
<p>You suggest we’re indulging in synthetic a priori
claims—using surface-level linguistic forms to assert truths
about nature. But I’d suggest something gentler is going on.
Metaphor, as Nick put it recently, is not a detour from
experience. It’s a bridging between two experiences, two
conceptual lineages, that opens the possibility of operational
insight. A good metaphor invites testable entailments. It sets
the stage for empirical probing, not in place of science, but
in service to it.</p>
<p>So when we say “entropy is not something you have in a
moment,” we’re not denying its formal status as a state
function. We’re inviting attention to the way entropy is <em>known</em>,
<em>felt</em>, <em>computed</em>, and <em>misunderstood</em>—especially
by those encountering it outside of equilibrium formalisms.
We're asking: is there an epistemic or phenomenological sense
in which entropy becomes meaningful only through <em>contrast</em>,
<em>trajectory</em>, or <em>irreversibility</em>? If so,
maybe the language that guides us there should reflect that
shape.</p>
<p>Your own analogy—between velocity defined by limits and
momentum posited as primary—is instructive. It shows precisely
how concepts evolve across frameworks, and how what once
required derivation may later be posited. But note: such
evolutions are never purely formal. They come with shifts in
metaphor, in language, in ontology. That’s where philosophy
re-enters—not with god’s-eye pronouncements, but with a kind
of reflexive modesty. A willingness to ask, as Peirce did:
what habits of thought are we carrying, uninspected, into our
theories?</p>
<p>I take your point: if the goal is to compute entropy in a
near-equilibrium gas, the community's methods are solid. But
Nick’s goal is different. He’s trying to understand what
entropy <em>is</em>—not in an eternal sense, but in the lived
and taught sense. The way it moves through diagrams,
metaphors, textbooks, and gestures. The way it sometimes
misleads by appearing to be “a thing,” rather than a summary
of a configuration’s <em>willingness to change</em>.</p>
<p>So: I respect your insistence on clarity, grounding, and
historical continuity. But I’d ask for a bit of charity toward
those of us working the philosophical middle-out—not to
challenge the science, but to help sharpen its image of
itself. <font face="comic sans ms,sans-serif"><b><i>{NST-->
NO EFFING WAY i AM A PHILOSOPHER. I AM AN ETHOLOGIST, A
SCIENTIST DEDICATED TO THE ACCURATE DESCRIPTION AND
HEURISIC EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOR. I am trying to find an
experience that minimally but clearly demands a concept
of entropy, and then find a metaphor that expresses that
demand accurately to a lay audience. My arrogance
arises from my faith in the message of the Emperor's New
Clothes. I cop to that. That's foundational.
<--nst}</i></b></font></p>
<p>Warmly,<br>
<strong>George</strong></p>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Jun 9, 2025 at 4:51 PM
Santafe <<a href="mailto:desmith@santafe.edu"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">desmith@santafe.edu</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div>Nick,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>At the end of the day you are a philosopher rather than
a naturalist, in the sense that Neurath would have used
those two ideas, and over a decade or so, finally got
Carnap to join into from the analytic as opposed to the
sociological side.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>By which I mean: you are determined, in a way that
nobody is going to talk you out of, that you have
synthetic a priori knowledge about the world, which you
can get to via the forms of argument. There are analyses
that can be done by a naturalist, but they aren’t those.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>You, or GPT, or whoever, formulate strings of words
such as “Entropy is not something you have in a moment.”
I have no idea what can be done with such strings of
words.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>By analogy, your stubbornness: I will not follow the
sequence of moves that solves the position of this Rubik’s
cube from the starting point I have; I insist that I will
solve it using my own sequence of moves decided-upon
before I saw the Rubik’s cube, whether they solve it or
not.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Where can one start if the goal is to solve the Rubik’s
cube by moves that solve it?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Well: </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. Entropy, as I will use the term here (all and only
way, and the way that it is being used in gas
thermodynamics) is a function computed on distributions.
(Called a “functional”, but one doesn’t need to worry
about that name.)</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1a. Ergo, we are _already_ in a formal world by needing
a distribution as our starting point.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1b. So if we want to talk about nature, we must first
ask: how much else have we committed to, about experience,
the setting-up of phenomena, etc., to permit us to attach
some distribution to those experiential contacts with
nature. If we are to adopt the “thing language” (Carnap
term) to refer to a distribution or its entropy, and to
know what rules for thing-languages permit us to do with
such a term, we must operationalize how the distribution
got put up as a “thing” (Peirce’s consequences in action
of commitments one makes to declare terms).</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1c. Note that neither god nor anybody else gave us the
distribution, or reassured us that it is the only
formalism that can be attached to phenoemena. We have to
unpack what we mean by talking to see what we have chosen
to do, and then we make utilitarian choices about whether
we want to make the same choices always, or sometimes
choose other ways of describing.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>2. It turns out that the useful first question (recall,
actually solve the Rubik’s cube) for unraveling
thermodynamics was: Which properties have the memory to
depend on history beyond other instantaneous properties,
and which don’t? The properties that don’t are what we
call “state properties” or “state variables” or “state
functions”. You (or GPT, or whoever) have declared above
that entropy is not a state function, while the whole
thermodynamics community (in the suitable near-equilibrium
approximation, etc., etc.) begins its constructions with
the defining property of entropy as a state function. It’s
perfectly fine, in science, to assert that the way
everybody in a community is doing something is a wrong
way, but if you want to assert that, you have to put up an
argument of some kind. You are offering philosophical
synthetic a priori assertions, which you think you can get
to from language, and the whole Naturalist position is
that such arguments pull no weight.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Let me give you another example, drawing from the
larger frame of your presentation below:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There is a certain construction of the derivative by
limits (so a tangent line, a curve at second order, and
onward for higher derivatives). Okay; that is one
construction within one formalism.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>1. For a while, that particular construction was taken
to _define_ velocity from changes in position with time,
and it was _entailed_ in the assumption system that that
velocity was the “inherent” property of mechanics relevant
to causation. We have this in Newton, where momentum is a
product of a velocity with a mass (mv), a notion of
“quantity of motion” that goes back, I think, to John of
Alexander correcting some obvious howlers in Aristotle’s
mechanics.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>2. Still remaining for a moment within Newton, there is
a dialogue between a mechanics from Lagrange that
describes motion in terms of positions and velocities, and
in which momentum is computed as a product mv, from v
defined by the usual Leibniz/Newton limiting procedure,
and a mechanics from Hamilton-the-mathematician, where we
can make momentum a primary variable, from which we could
then _get to_ velocity by some computations. Seems a bit
odd at first, but the math works out, and so if we keep
either, we keep both. At least now the “quantity of
motion” that so troubled John and Newton becomes a primary
variable in Hamilton’s system, and we might like that
aesthetically. (Or others might not like it aesthetically
at all, and neither of those matters.) </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>3. Now, philosopher: which one does nature “have”? Is
it momentum or velocity. If it is momentum, is momentum
_defined_ from a derivative of a position with respect to
time? The synthetic a priorist thinks he can answer this
question from the (surface-) forms of argument. That
turns out not to have worked well _at all_ for physics,
and this is where we should complete Peirce’s project by
making it reflexive. Fallibilism goes all the way down,
to everything about our language and everything about our
conventions, and everything about our habits, cognition,
perception, etc. that binds language to phenomena (often
by way of conventions). </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>3a. In a variety of languages that turn out to be
better — more powerful, more flexible, more extensible —
foundations for physics, it comes out that momentum is the
property of mechanics that we want to refer to as primary,
and that it is something an object in nature “has” at a
moment, as much as it “has” anything, or as much as it
“is” an “object”. Every one of those words in scare
quotes requires an unpack. In relativity, momentum is not
mv, though in classical relativity one can still compute
it from a function involving m and v (and the speed of
light c, and maybe some curvatures, depending on where we
are). In quantum mechanics, it turns out that — within a
suitable _representation_; there is that system of choices
again — “having” a position corresponds to “being in” a
state that is a standing wave, while “having a momentum”
corresponds to “being in” a state that is a traveling
wave. The distinction between the two is a phasing of two
components of the state. Hence being at one phasing is
exactly not being at the other phasing that excludes the
first one, and we have Heisenberg without the woo (it has
nothing primary to do with “knowing” “the” position or
momentum, or being “uncertain” about “them” — all those
uses of the definite article ensure an English that
violates the math before one has tried to argue
anything). There is more, but I won’t go into it other
than giving names: we can extend to phenomena like the
electromagnetic field, which are not object-“thing”s in
the classical-antiquity sense, though they are perfectly
good “thing”s in the generalized sense of Carnap’s “thing
language” (meaning we don’t need to give them souls or
some other occult word), and for which momentum densities
can be defined. And finally, because gravitational waves
are a lot like electromagnetic waves, to what amount to
momentum densities for dynamical spacetime itself. _None_
of that takes its primary origin in Leibniz’s tangent to a
curve, but rather is built up out of a different synthesis
of language, albeit in layers where the classical
object-things were the guides to the general setup for the
languages of the various constructions. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>4. Of course, for other purposes — say: laying out
railroad track — the computation of tangents by limits is
perfectly fine, and in those cases the non-locality is a
property forced upon us by our construction of the
limiting procedure, in contrast to a situation where some
other sense and origin of non-locality might be entailed
in what we ever meant by “having” or “being in” a state in
the first place.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>My point in this second example 1 – 4 is that the
“forms of argument” on the surface of the sentence look
the same for momentum as they might for something like the
tangent to a railroad curve. But the answer that is
useful is quite different in the two cases, because the
surface form is not sufficient basis for the argument to
be afforded “meaning” about some question.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It’s all, as Glen says, middle-out. The only ones who
have god’s-eye views are the philosophers, and of course,
that is their prerogative.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Eric</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br
id="m_-618520349079253083lineBreakAtBeginningOfMessage">
<div><br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>On Jun 10, 2025, at 3:30, Nicholas Thompson <<a
href="mailto:thompnickson2@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">thompnickson2@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br>
<div>
<div dir="ltr">
<div style="text-align:left">Dear
LongSuffering Colleagues</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I know the joy of watching an 87 year old
bald man bash his head against a brick wall
isn't for everybody, so I treasure you who find
it in your heart to respond, even if you are
exasperated. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I have arrived at a place, I think pointed to
by the castigations of EricS and Alex. My whole
approach doesn't make sense! You remember I am
trying to create two boxes, equal in every
respect, but one created adiabatically and the
other created diabatically. Box A has reached
its current state through compression, Box B by
heating. I am beginning to think that this is
procedurally, if not logically, impossible, that
entropy is a vector through a point and my
search for entropy in instantaneous values of
the gas equation is a category error. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So I tried this thought out on George. Edited
down to one page, that correspondence appears
below and as an attachment. .</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">NICK TO GEORGE<span></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><i><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Ok, so in my
monist psychology I assert that motives
are the integrals (or derivatives, I
have never been sure) of behavior. To
say I am motivated in an instant is a
category
error, benign only so long as I
recognize that the empirical basis for
our
instantaneous attribution is the shape
of the curve of behavior over time.<span></span></span></i></b></p>
<div
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:Aptos,sans-serif"><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS""><span> </span></span><br>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">GEORGE TO NICK</span><b><span
style="font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif"><span></span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><span
style="font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif">🧠</span>
Claim (Paraphrased):<span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">To
say "I am motivated" at a given instant is a
shorthand—a projection backward or forward
from a trajectory of behavior.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">In
your <b>monist psychology</b>, motives are
not hidden
essences, not inner engines.<br>
They are <b>summaries of behavioral curves</b>:<span></span></p>
<ul style="margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:0in"
type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Perhaps
<b>integrals</b>, when motives are inferred
from accumulated actions<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Perhaps
<b>derivatives</b>, when motives are
inferred from sudden changes in behavior<span></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">But
in either case:<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b>“Motivation”
is not an instantaneous property—it is a
curve-fitting hypothesis over time.</b><span></span></p>
<div class="MsoNormal"
style="text-align:center;margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"
align="center">
<hr width="100%" size="2" align="center">
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><span
style="font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif">🧭</span> Why
this matters:<span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">This
reframes motive as:<span></span></p>
<ul style="margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:0in"
type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Not
a <b>thing</b> in the head<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Not
a <b>cause</b> per se<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">But
a <b>description of continuity</b> or
curvature in behavior space<span></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">This
is a kind of <b>teleological realism</b>
without
metaphysical baggage.<br>
You’re not positing ghosts or mental levers.
You’re saying:<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">“We
read intentions the way we read
acceleration—from
position over time.”<span></span></p>
<div class="MsoNormal"
style="text-align:center;margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"
align="center">
<hr width="100%" size="2" align="center">
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><span
style="font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif">🧬</span>
Parallel to entropy?<span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">You
could say:<span></span></p>
<ul style="margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:0in"
type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Entropy
is not something you <b>have</b> in a
moment.<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">It’s
something you can <b>measure</b> from the
path a system is disposed to take—or the
configuration space it tends to spread into.<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">It
becomes <b>visible</b> only in the <b>shape
of change</b>—not the snapshot.<span></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">So
both <b>motivation</b> and <b>entropy</b>
are:<span></span></p>
<ul style="margin-top:0in;margin-bottom:0in"
type="disc">
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">Not
intrinsic point-properties<span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">But
<b>interpretive functions over time and
configuration</b><span></span></li>
<li class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b>Curve-based
attributions</b> grounded in empirical
regularities<span></span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal"
style="text-align:center;margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"
align="center">
<hr width="100%" size="2" align="center">
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><span
style="font-family:"Segoe UI Emoji",sans-serif">📐</span> And
the category error?<span></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">To
say "I am motivated <i>now</i>" is like
saying
"this point <i>has</i> curvature."<br>
Strictly speaking, no point does.<br>
But give me a neighborhood—give me a path—and
I can calculate a derivative or
an integral and give the illusion of an inner
quality.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif">It’s
a <b>useful illusion</b>, but one we must not
mistake
for substance.<span></span></p>
<div class="MsoNormal"
style="text-align:center;margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"
align="center">
<hr width="100%" size="2" align="center">
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">NICK TO GEORGE<span></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;line-height:115%;font-size:12pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif"><b><i><span
style="font-family:"Comic Sans MS"">Is there
such a move to be made around entropy.
Could I vary the gas equation variables
in box B in such a way that they would
point to equality with box A without
actually getting there, and thus reveal
entropy?<span></span></span></i></b></p>
<br>
</div>
<div><span class="gmail_signature_prefix">- </span><br>
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature">
<div>Nick</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<span class="gmail_signature_prefix">-- </span><br>
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<div>Nicholas S. Thompson</div>
<div>Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Ethology</div>
<div>Clark University</div>
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moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">nthompson@clarku.edu</a></div>
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<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..
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Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://bit.ly/virtualfriam">https://bit.ly/virtualfriam</a>
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