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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 6/10/25 3:26 PM, Marcus Daniels
wrote:<br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">This conversation is well into bad faith
now. I’m done. </p>
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<p>Let me dig into my reserves of "good faith" for those who might
not have already exercised their free will by choosing to exit the
conversation (ok... THAT was bad faith also! )<br>
</p>
<p>FWIW, the *only* thing I have to offer in opposition to the
monistic/deterministic/no-free-will view is my own "experience"
which is *at best* proof (to me) by example... it is not hard for
me to grant that other "beings like me" have the same experience
of "free will" (and other <i>qualia</i>). </p>
<p>My mystical/abstraction-oriented/woo self tends to *grow* the
scope of "beings like me" and even without the benefit of various
organic alkaloids (et al) that others here might use to get into
that mood? I'm pretty open to granting AI/ML models something
*like* (my) consciousness, and by *extension* something *like*
(my) free will... while *simultaneously* (read Lewis Carrol's
Red Queen character) believing that determinism IS.</p>
<p>My snarky flipness was maybe a reflection of the inner tension I
feel in this discussion... that I can take either or both sides
pretty effectively and don't find the arguments of one extrema
very compelling to my other extrema (and vice-versa). The
epitome of ambi-valence?<br>
</p>
<p>Maybe there is useful meta-argument which helps resolve that?
Maybe everyone else is able to get a good grip on one extrema or
the other and recognize the opposite one acutely absurd? <br>
</p>
<p><br>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
Friam <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:friam-bounces@redfish.com"><friam-bounces@redfish.com></a> <b>On Behalf Of
</b>steve smith<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Tuesday, June 10, 2025 2:24 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:friam@redfish.com">friam@redfish.com</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [FRIAM] Free will—ghost in the
machine or just clever wiring?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p><o:p> </o:p></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">On 6/10/25 9:44 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Consider a robot with sensors roughly
comparable to humans.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The robot has access to all the energy it
wants. It has a large memory and generous computing
resources. It has executive processes with onboard
state-of-the-art LLMs to access vast information and can run
a wide variety of appropriate programs to plan its next
actions. It can use the LLMs to write new programs. It can
tune or fine-tune the LLMs constantly from new data. It
remembers its actions and their consequences. It has video
and audio recordings of every moment. It has time series
data of its sensors since it was activated. Because of its
general self-tuning ability, any guidance from its authors
(like for the LLM) can be overridden. It has
americium-241 onboard hardware random number generator that
drives its LLM sampling and any other stochastic algorithm.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Does this robot have free will? Why or
why not?<o:p></o:p></p>
</blockquote>
<p>Probably not unless it's brain is <i>positronic</i>. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p>For a <i>proof by anecdote</i>, read the corpus of Asimov's
work. ;/<o:p></o:p></p>
<p>Then go release an Orca into the wild and holler "Free Willy"
at the top of your lungs. If you survive being arrested and
convicted for your declaration of putative "public exposure",
then note that the entire global population are taking up the
practice of head-butting sailboats.... free will much? <o:p></o:p></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<p>The perils of Free Will(y)?<o:p></o:p></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
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