<div dir="auto">I have only been lightly scanning this thread, because I have no energy to pursue the bibliography, but this article, <a href="https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2026/07/260712011757.htm">https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2026/07/260712011757.htm</a> raised the spectre of every perceptual and cognitive stage at every scale immediately feeding back into its sources. It's bias all the way down, every stage applying it's thumb to wiggle its sources around according to some scheme.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">The article isn't so totally committed as this, but it made sense to me that a prediction/control process would use back pressure links at every opportunity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">-- rec --</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Jul 11, 2026, 4:34\u202fPM Eric Charles <<a href="mailto:eric.phillip.charles@gmail.com">eric.phillip.charles@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>I skimmed the predictive processing chapter. My main thought was wondering if it still seemed interesting if translated into less jargon-ey English. </div><div><br></div><div>My second thought was: Doesn't Gibson help with this? <span style="background-color:transparent">Isn't the "loop" problem a "problem" at least in part because you are trying to find the loops inside the organism instead of in the larger organism-environment system? </span></div><div><br></div><div><i>If</i> there is specification in the ambient energy, <i>then </i>the loop can extend outside the organism, and exist at whatever scale the relevant patterns exist at. Yes, you need sufficient neuronal support for the organism to do their part of the loop... at least with us very-neuronal organisms... but that type of "complexity" is different than the complexity one might imagine if they thought <u style="font-style:italic">all</u> the work had to happen inside the head. For example, recognizing that one is accelerating towards the ground --- because the rate of optic expansion is accelerating --- could be much easier than trying to "predict" whether one is accelerating towards the ground by comparing a series of snapshot images and trying to neuronally create an internal model of everything happening around you. You can offload most of that by not trying to "model" things that are directly perceivable. And that can extend as far as we can extend "perceivable."</div><div><br></div><div>Re the first thought.... Here is a quote: </div><blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 40px;border:none;padding:0px"><div><span style="background-color:transparent">The second type of predictive </span>circuit<span style="background-color:transparent"> might support the sequencing and
arbitration of </span>behaviors<span style="background-color:transparent">. Simple solutions to these </span>problems<span style="background-color:transparent"> might appeal to
generative models for sequential dynamics (Parr et al., 2023). For example,
locomotion behavior in C. elegans might be supported by sequential </span>generative<span style="background-color:transparent"> models that encode expected transitions among locomotion </span>behaviors<span style="background-color:transparent"> (e.g., forward and backward movements, left and right turns), with
decision points corresponding to bifurcations in the dynamical sequences
(Kato et al., 2015). In turn, the transitions prioritized at bifurcation points
might depend partially on external sensation and partially on internal (e.g.,
interoceptive) sensations reporting impending drives and needs, which
leads us to the next point. </span></div></blockquote><div><br></div>So far as I can tell, that means something like:<div><blockquote style="margin:0 0 0 40px;border:none;padding:0px">A second thing well-developed neuron clumps do is ensure movements happen in order, so as to form coherent "behaviors." We can understand how this happens in several ways, some of which Ph.D.-level scientists call "simple." Roundworms, for example, swim in predictable ways, sometimes changing direction. Those turns sometimes depend on external factors, at least in part. </blockquote><div><br></div><div>Seriously... this might be my weird form of getting old and yelling at kids to get off my lawn... but... Ugh... A lot of that might as well be pretentious continental philosophers stringing jargon together. "The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning. To this epoch belongs the difference between signified and signifier, or at least the strange separation of their 'parallelism,' and the exteriority, however extenuated, of the one to the other." Orwell could take at least half the sentences as examples of bad writing, and not be wrong. Even in my attempt at a translation, the word "ensure" is highly suspect. </div><div><br></div><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><span style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">Best,<br>Eric<br></span><br><div></div></div><div dir="ltr"><a href="mailto:echarles@american.edu" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer"></a></div></div></div></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, Jul 7, 2026 at 10:35\u202fAM glen <<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">gepropella@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Of course. You have a knack for pushing my buttons. 8^D<br>
<br>
What irritates me about all this active inference and predictive processing advocacy [\u26e7] is well-represented in the title of that chapter "From Sensorimotor Skills to Higher Cognition". [grrrr] The reason I took the time to download it and start skimming it was my hope for a thorough *composition* from the very small-fast feedback loops to the large-slow ones. There are a lot of citations. So maybe the clues are in there. But I'm lazy.<br>
<br>
What I *want* ... what I really really want is evidence of predictive processing in a minimal model organism like C. Elegans or Drosophilia. Such exist [1-5]! But now we need something like connectome (or simpler?) circuits in more complex organisms that show how small-fast predictive processing composes into large-slow predictive processing. Does the model work at *all* scales? Only some scales? Is it like a percolating stew of predictions, some of which are suppressed by the larger circuits?<br>
<br>
Speaking of which, I discovered this book just last night:<br>
<br>
<a href="https://bookshop.org/p/books/from-human-reasoning-to-belief-an-empirical-account-joshua-mugg/de6c8394b4e24d99?ean=9781032736952" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bookshop.org/p/books/from-human-reasoning-to-belief-an-empirical-account-joshua-mugg/de6c8394b4e24d99?ean=9781032736952</a><br>
<br>
But as always, it's silly to keep buying books I'll never read. I post it here in the hopes that you readers out there might read it and tell me what it says ... or maybe I'll buy the epub and feed it to Claude ... or maybe it's read it already? I haven't checked. You'll remember we've had such arguments before, when you claimed I *must* believe in the floor in order to get out of bed in the morning. And my counter was that it is my *doubt* about the existence of the floor that allows me to get out of bed. IDK if Mugg's "DJ mixing board" model fits one of our stances better. But I do like it better than the overly simplistic fast vs slow thinking model.<br>
<br>
<br>
[1] Dimakou A, Pezzulo G, Zangrossi A, Corbetta M. The predictive nature of spontaneous brain activity across scales and species. Neuron. Published online March 1, 2025. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2025.02.009<br>
[2] Kaplan H, Nichols A, Zimmer M. Sensorimotor integration in Caenorhabditis elegans: a reappraisal towards dynamic and distributed computations. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 2018;373. doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0371<br>
[3] Kim A, Fitzgerald J, Maimon G. Cellular evidence for efference copy in Drosophila visuomotor processing. Nature neuroscience. 2015;18:1247-1255. doi:10.1038/nn.4083<br>
[4] Lin A, Witvliet D, Hernandez-Nunez L, Linderman S, Samuel A, Venkatachalam V. Imaging whole-brain activity to understand behavior. Nature reviews Physics. 2022;4:292-305. doi:10.1038/s42254-022-00430-w<br>
[5] Wang S, Segev I, Borst A, Palmer S. Maximally efficient prediction in the early fly visual system may support evasive flight maneuvers. PLoS Computational Biology. 2019;17. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008965<br>
<br>
<br>
[\u26e7] It seems to me that most of the peri-Friston work borders on advocacy of the model(s) as opposed to challenging them. But I'm not a scholar. So my scope is very small.<br>
<br>
On 7/6/26 8:15 PM, Nicholas Thompson wrote:<br>
> Hi, Glen,<br>
> <br>
> I liked the predictive processing thing. It coheres with an idea I have been kicking around of late. People tend to think of cognitive processes as putting us in touch with the world as it is. Then we look at that represented world and make decisions about the future. Wouldn't it make more sense for cognitive processes to put us in touch with the world as it is going to be? To translate that back into monist talk, we live in a world of successive anticipations. As I get more frail, I become aware of all the hard work my cerebellum must be doing to anticipate the consequences of any action I might take that changes my center of gravity. A delayed prediction can lead to my taking actions that compound a balance prediction and send me to the floor. it's like I am doing judo to myself.<br>
> <br>
> Is that annoying enough to feed the beast?<br>
> <br>
> Nick<br>
> <br>
> On Mon, Jul 6, 2026 at 6:31\u202fPM glen <<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">gepropella@gmail.com</a> <mailto:<a href="mailto:gepropella@gmail.com" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">gepropella@gmail.com</a>>> wrote:<br>
> <br>
> It's so dead, here, I figure it can't hurt to post arbitrary nonsense I've run across lately:<br>
> <br>
> Meningeal lymphatic architecture and drainage dynamics surrounding the human middle meningeal artery<br>
> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.113693" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.113693</a> <<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.113693" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.113693</a>><br>
> <br>
> Constructing a lower-bound estimate of the global number of insect species on a hyperdiverse empirical foundation<br>
> <a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2524283123" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2524283123</a> <<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2524283123" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2524283123</a>><br>
> <br>
> Predictive Processing: From Sensorimotor Skills to Higher Cognition<br>
> <a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/15999.003.0011" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/15999.003.0011</a> <<a href="https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/15999.003.0011" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/15999.003.0011</a>><br>
> <br>
> As always, I'm reading them in fitful bursts, interleaved across each other and all the other open tabs and crap strewn about my desk. So .... grain of salt and all.<br>
> <br>
> -- <br>
> 8647 \u22a5 \u0250\u05df\u05df\u01dddo\u0279 \u01dd u\u01dd\u05df\u0183<br>
> \u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 oi \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c7\u03d1\u03c1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ac\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03b3\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ce\u03c3\u03c9.<br>
<br>
<br>
-- <br>
8647 \u22a5 \u0250\u05df\u05df\u01dddo\u0279 \u01dd u\u01dd\u05df\u0183<br>
\u1f45\u03c4\u03b5 oi \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03cd\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c7\u03d1\u03c1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ac\u03ba\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03b3\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c6\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f35\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c3\u03ce\u03c3\u03c9.<br>
<br>
<br>
.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..<br>
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom <a href="https://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>
to (un)subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>
FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br>
archives: 5/2017 thru present <a href="https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br>
1/2003 thru 6/2021 <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><br>
</blockquote></div>
.- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-..<br>
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv<br>
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom <a href="https://bit.ly/virtualfriam" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://bit.ly/virtualfriam</a><br>
to (un)subscribe <a href="http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com</a><br>
FRIAM-COMIC <a href="http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/</a><br>
archives: 5/2017 thru present <a href="https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/</a><br>
1/2003 thru 6/2021 <a href="http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/" rel="noreferrer noreferrer" target="_blank">http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/</a><br>
</blockquote></div>