[FRIAM] AI and argument
gⅼеɳ ☣
gepropella at gmail.com
Wed Oct 4 13:09:51 EDT 2017
I propose that any commonalities between experiences, are due to common physiology. And that means that were I and a mouse to get together and define some scientific experiments we *both* could perform independently (say, jumping on a see-saw or pushing a kibble lever), then the mouse would have a fundamentally different experience than I would have. If experience is somehow "truth", then there are 2 truths, mine and the mouse's. That's pluralism.
On 10/04/2017 09:55 AM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Well, unless you understand Peirce as a fallibilist, I have described him wrongly or you have misunderstood me. To Peirce, there is only one kind of stuff ... experience. He would not understand what on earth you meant by "out there", unless you were clear that you meant only that some experiences have a character of "out there ness" which you are obligated to define. Peirce starts with his pragmatic understanding of meaning as the conequences of an conception to experience, and by experience he means scientific experience ... almost "experiments". He deploys this pragmatic understanding of meaning on the word truth and ends up with the truth as that stable opinion toward which we all strive. */But nothing in that definition of truth implies necessarily that the truth is ever known. Hence Peirce’s fallibilism is at least as profound as your own. /*Imagining that there is a truth of the matter has the [pragmatic] effect of forcing us all into a convergent discourse and
> this effect is for Peirce the central meaning of the word truth. He has great contempt for styles and fashions of criticism precisely because there is no commitment to convergence in such discourses. Screw pluralism.
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> I think you ARE a Peircean.
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☣ gⅼеɳ
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