[FRIAM] The Atlantic article on "the illusion of reality"

[gⅼеɳ ☣]

On 09/18/2017 06:56 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/04/the-illusion-of-reality/479559/?utm_source=atlfb

We've discussed Hoffman's ideas before.  Lots of us played in that thread.  The FriAM archives are down, I think.  But here's the 1st post of the thread:

-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: [FRIAM] Why depth/thickness matters
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 12:05:05 -0800
From: glen ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com>
Reply-To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <friam at redfish.com>
To: friam at redfish.com


  Natural selection and veridical perceptions
  Justin T. Mark, Brian B. Marion, Donald D. Hoffman
  http://cogsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/PerceptualEvolution.pdf

> For the weak type, X ⊄ W in general, and g is a homomorphism. Perception need not faithfully mirror any subset of reality, but relationships among perceptions reflect relationships among aspects of reality. Thus, weak critical realists can bias their perceptions based on utility, so long as this homomorphism is maintained. 

To me, this evoked RRosen's "modeling relation", wherein he assumes the structure of inferential entailment must be similar to that of causal entailment (otherwise "there can be no science" -- Life Itself, pg. 58).

> For the interface (or desktop) strategy, in general X ⊄ W and g need not be a homomorphism. 

This more closely resembles what I (contingently) believe to be true.  Hoffman goes on to define and play some games, the results of which (he thinks) show that the interface strategy, under evolution, can demonstrate how fake news might dominate.  But my interest lies more in the idea that one's internal structure does matter with respect to whether or not one's likely to _believe_ false statements.  And I'm arguing that flattening that internal structure in a kind of holographic principle simply doesn't work with this sort of machine.

An interesting potential contradiction in my own thought lies in:

1) I reject Rosen's assumption of the modeling relation (i.e. inference ≉ cause), and
2) I still think intra-individual circularity is necessary for biomimicry.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ