[FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
Roger Critchlow
rec at elf.org
Thu Sep 21 17:03:49 EDT 2017
I believe you all have too much free time.
-- rec --
On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Marcus Daniels <marcus at snoutfarm.com>
wrote:
> Speaking for myself, I don’t hold A as an assumption. A is more like a
> function parameterized on relevant conditions that computes an expected
> value. Alternatively it could also be a predicate, but parameterized on
> some threshold of risk and/or reward. If snows a little, I just jump in
> the car and go. If it is wet and cold and snowed a lot, I go look at the
> pavement, and consider the risks of not getting to where I might be
> expected or try to think of ways to mitigate the risk (e.g. chains).
> Sometimes I miscalculate or misapprehend the risks and rewards, like the
> time the car was acting up, but I felt I needed to get to work to take a
> large supercomputer reservation. (I kept going and the car broke a tie
> rod and was ruined!)
>
>
>
> And I never just hop out of bed without looking because the dog could be
> there.
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Nick
> Thompson
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:46 PM
>
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> Ok. Self-reflection time.
>
> 1. Ah! Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings. To what
> extent does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of
> acting, one holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a
> matter of logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.
>
> 2. I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God,
> particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out
> Feynman as if HE were God. I do so because it is easier for me to figure
> out what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if
> feels less narcissistic. But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral
> because, of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I
> think] and others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.
>
> 3. I now know why I am being cranky. I am supposed to be
> winterizing the Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe. I
> hate travel, I hate winterizing, and I hate packing. From my actions, I
> surmise that I have been acting in the belief that I will be happier if I
> start a fight on FRIAM then if I put my head down and do the things I am
> supposed to be doing. Sober reflection suggests that I may be wrong in
> that belief. Will this reflection result in a change in my beliefs? Only
> my actions will tell.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com
> <friam-bounces at redfish.com>] *On Behalf Of *Marcus Daniels
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem
> with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than
> a few past experiences. No we definitely can live with doubt. For
> goodness sake we have Donald as president. It is a personality disorder
> when people can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com
> <friam-bounces at redfish.com>] *On Behalf Of *Nick Thompson
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> Dear Glen,
>
>
>
> I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:
>
>
>
> *"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
> I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of
> certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And
> there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know
> an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by
> being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it
> really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."*
>
>
>
> … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise
> as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.
>
>
>
> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt. We cannot
> doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of
> the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our
> eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it. Every perception is
> doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet
> for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are
> largely confirmed. Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we
> stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what
> is left.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com <friam-bounces at redfish.com>]
> On Behalf Of g??? ?
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:59 PM
> To: FriAM <friam at redfish.com>
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a
> BBC interview:
>
>
>
> "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
> I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of
> certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And
> there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know
> an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by
> being lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it
> really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."
>
>
>
> He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every
> type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is
> philosophy. The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be
> useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy
> should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else.
>
>
>
> You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's
> publications are puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I
> don't.) But every puzzle is a math problem. It's up to the puzzle solver
> to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are they doing it because it
> FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions or the
> exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video
> gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their
> fetish against the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical"
> people aim at philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a
> real shame that we shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy
> it.
>
>
>
> But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher
> can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun
> shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who
> does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun
> it is. Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the
> nay-sayers.
>
>
>
> On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
>
> > Glen -
>
> >
>
> > I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly)
> defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the
> process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").
>
> >
>
> > When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my
> role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more
> emphasis on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a
> larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a
> similar ambivalence about "Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math
> and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math
> than just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real
> Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I
> don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly
> much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has
> read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is
> equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles
> of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value
> having enough understanding of all of these
>
> > ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly
> informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each
> quantitatively.
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
>
>
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