[FRIAM] A question for tomorrow
Russ Abbott
russ.abbott at gmail.com
Sat Apr 27 17:01:57 EDT 2019
Nick: "It’s not that I think that self-conscious (etc.) doesn’t exist; it’s
that I think of it as a material relation."
What do you mean by a material relation?
Nick: "anywhere, anytime, etc., that material relation can be generated,
there consciousness exists."
Is there something to that statement other than its tautological
interpretation: whenever something can be brought into existence, it exists?
-- Russ Abbott
Professor, Computer Science
California State University, Los Angeles
On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 11:02 PM Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
wrote:
> Russ,
>
>
>
> Thanks for stating the issues so precisely.
>
>
>
> You perhaps my side of the argument a tad too strongly. It’s not that I
> think that self-conscious (etc.) doesn’t exist; it’s that I think of it as
> a material relation. So anywhere, anytime, etc., that material relation
> can be generated, there consciousness exists. It’s sort of like what
> Christ said: “wherever any number shall come together in my name, there
> shall I be.” Sorry, I am probably being silly there, but I just love that
> quote.)
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Russ
> Abbott
> *Sent:* Friday, April 26, 2019 10:44 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow
>
>
>
> Good to talk to you again also, Nick.
>
>
>
> You characterized me as saying, *"yours is an in principle argument
> against any claim that machines and humans are ever doing the same thing,
> right?" *
>
> I wouldn't go that far. One might argue that as physical beings, we are
> machines of a sort, so there's not such a clear line between machines and
> humans. One of our current scientific challenges is to figure out how to
> characterize it and how to push entities across it.
>
>
>
> But moving to shallower water, consider this example. Presumably, no one
> would say that a standard washing machine knows how to clean clothes. A
> washing machine is built to control the flow of water in and out of its
> tank, to rotate its agitator for given periods of time, etc. We then
> informally say that the washing machine is cleaning the clothes. But it's
> not. It just performing mechanical actions that result in what we think of
> as clean clothes.
>
>
>
> Suppose we made the washing machine smarter. Suppose it had sensors that
> could sense the chemicals that we consider "dirt," and selected actions
> from its repertoire of actions that reduced the level of those chemicals
> below some minimal threshold. Would one say that it then knows how to clean
> clothes? I would say that it doesn't--except in an informal way of talking.
> The washing machine is built of physical components, sensors, etc. along
> with algorithms that (again) produce what *we *think of as clean clothes.
> But the washing machine doesn't think of them as clean clothes. It doesn't
> think of anything. It just does what it does.
>
>
>
> Is there anything one might add to our washing machine so that we would
> want to say that it knows how to clean clothes. I can't think of any
> incremental steps. For me to attribute the washing machine with knowing how
> to clean clothes I would insist that it have consciousness and subjective
> experience. I know that's a big jump; it's the line between machines and
> humans that I would draw. I'm now recalling, Nick, that you don't believe
> in consciousness and subjective experience. Right? So we are probably at an
> impasse since we no longer have a common vocabulary. But even if the
> position I'm assuming you hold on consciousness and subjective experience
> were not a problem, I'd still be stuck. I have no idea how to build
> consciousness and subjective experience into a washing machine. This is
> probably where we got stuck the last time we talked about this. I guess we
> drifted back out to the deeper water anyway. Oh, well. Perhaps it was worth
> reviewing the issue. Perhaps not.
>
>
>
> -- Russ
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 8:55 PM Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net>
> wrote:
>
> Larding below.
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Frank
> Wimberly
> *Sent:* Friday, April 26, 2019 8:19 PM
> *To:* Russ.Abbott at gmail.com; The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee
> Group <friam at redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] A question for tomorrow
>
>
>
> On the way to Friam I said to Nick. Turing Machines don't know anything.
> They may store representations of knowledge. *[NST==>Frank: This is how I
> understand you. The relation between a Turing Machine and knowledge is
> like the relation between Mathematics and the events or processes it
> models. All the knowledge is in the interpretation translate “life” into
> something that the Math or Machine can compute and in the interpretation
> that translate the results of the computation back into life. Let’s see.
> What am I accusing you of here. OH. I have it. I am accusing you of a
> mathematicians understanding of computation. Is that understanding of that
> relation canonical? <==nst] * I further said that a photograph also
> represents knowledge. For example, the number of floors of a given
> building. Most people would be puzzled by the question, "What does a photo
> know?"*[NST==>I think the metaphor is unfair. Nobody has ever accused a
> photograph of being able to play chess, or to engage in other tasks which
> are broadly seen (at least by defrocked English majors) as cognitive.
> <==nst] *
>
>
>
> There were multiple parallel conversations after we arrived. I don't
> recall additional discussions about what Turing Machines know.
>
> *[NST==>Except at the very end, after 3 hours of discussing other things.
> By that time I was exhausted, and I don’t remember what we said. We spent
> a lot of time exploring our attractions to unorthodox scientific opinion in
> such matters as MSG and headaches, auras, pigeon navigation, an even, by
> implication, the tin-hat stuff. It’s a question I would love to poll the
> FRIAM list on: How many of you engage in unproven health practices of
> various sorts, even though “science” tells you they are worthless? Why,
> exactly? How is that consistent with your criticisms of climate science
> deniers? <==nst] *
>
> *Gotta go, *
>
> *Thanks everybody, *
>
>
>
> *N*
>
> -----------------------------------
> Frank Wimberly
>
> My memoir:
> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>
> My scientific publications:
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019, 8:06 PM Russ Abbott <russ.abbott at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Nick, I can't believe you are asking such a question -- unless by "know"
> you mean something very different from the common understanding. No
> computer *knows* anything, although it may have lots of stored
> information. (*Information *is meant in the Shannon sense.)
>
>
>
> For example, Oxford defines
> <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/knowledge> knowledge as "Facts,
> information, and skills acquired through experience or education; the
> theoretical or practical understanding of a subject." This is distinct
> from, for example, having access to an encyclopedia--or
> even having memorized the contents of one. Turing machines, and computers
> in general, do not have an *understanding *of anything--even though they
> may have lots of Shannon-style information (which *we *understand as)
> related to some subject.
>
>
>
> (Like Glen, though, I am interested in the results, if any, of this
> morning's meeting.)
>
>
>
> -- Russ Abbott
> Professor, Computer Science
> California State University, Los Angeles
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 2:38 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> What was the result of this morning's conversation?
>
> On 4/25/19 10:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > What does a Turing Machine know?
>
>
> --
> ☣ uǝlƃ
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
> ============================================================
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/attachments/20190427/3d20d3ea/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the Friam
mailing list