[FRIAM] A pluralistic model of the mind?

uǝlƃ ☣ gepropella at gmail.com
Wed Dec 4 18:14:57 EST 2019


Well, I did reply, as did Dave. If you're ever wondering whether someone replied, you might check the archive at:
http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/

Dave's was rather interesting w.r.t. Turing machines.  Mine was more flippant. But to continue mine, your discussion of serial attention or behavior hearkens back to our prior discussions of quantum computing. Parallelism vs. serial(ism? ... sequentialism?) can be monified/unified by considering a 2 dimentional space of "space" vs time. In the ideal, even things at, say, space = 1 billion can operate that the same *time* as things at space = 1. Similarly, space at time = 1 billion can be at the same position as time = 1. But reality doesn't work that way. And quantum computing demonstrates this kinda-sorta painfully. But traditional distributed computing demonstrates it, too. Parallel computations across large spaces run into inter-process communication bottlenecks. I.e. sure, we can have 10 computers compute the same thing with different inputs and fuse the outputs. But we can't do the same thing with 1k computers without having "bus" or "backbone" bandwidth problems.

This sort of thing seems pragmatically clear when you talk about your issues handling "serial consciousness". And, at risk of conflating 2 unrelated weird things (quantum with consciousness) for no good reason, there's a *coherence* to the parallel processing that goes on in quantum computing that kinda-sorta feels like your reduction to a serial attention/behavior in parsing consciousness. A loss of that coherence results in separate things, whereas a retention of the coherence maintains your "monism". But, in the end, it's all about the orthogonality between space and time and the *scales* of space and time wherein such orthogonality breaks down.

I hope that's clear. I'm a bit occupied with debugging an uncooperative simulation at the moment.

On 12/4/19 1:40 PM, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
> Derelict poor sod that I am, I was hoping for some commentary on the note below sent a few days back, particularly the last paragraph where I speculate inexpertly about the relation between a Turing system model of a computer and our serial (?) model of the mind? 
> 
>  
> 
> I am hoping that you will, as usual, inflate these flabby ideas with some of your wisdom.

-- 
☣ uǝlƃ



More information about the Friam mailing list