[FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?

[glen∈ℂ]

Excellent! So, your *scalar* is confidence in your estimates of any given distribution. I try to describe it in [†] below. But that's a tangent.

What I can't yet reconstruct, credibly, in my own words, is the faith in *convergence*. What if sequential calculations of an average do NOT converge?

Does this mean there are 2 stuffs, some that converge and some that don't? ... some distributions are stationary and some are not? Or would you assert that reality (and/or truth, given Peirce's distinction) is always and everywhere stationary and all (competent/accurate/precise) estimates will always converge?




[†] You can be a little confident (0.01%) or a lot confident (99.9%). I don't much care if you close the set and allow 0 and 1, confidence ∈ [0,1]. I think I have ways to close the set. But it doesn't matter. If we keep it open and agree that 100% confidence is illusory, then your scalar is confidence ∈ (0,1). Now that we have a scale of some kind, we can *construct* a typology of experiences. E.g. we can categorize things like deja vu or a bear in the woods as accumulations of confidence with different organizations. E.g. a composite experience with ((e1⨂e2⨂e3)⨂e4)⨂e5, where each of ei experiences has some confidence associated with it. Obviously, ⨂ is not multiplication or addition, but some other composer function. The whole composite experience would then have some aggregate confidence.

On December 6, 2019 8:22:29 PM PST, thompnickson2 at gmail.com wrote:
>Elegant, Glen, and you caused me truly to wonder:  Is the population
>mean, mu,  of statistics fame, of a different substance than the
>individual measurements, the bar x's that are stabs at it?  But I think
>the answer is no.  It is just one among the others, a citizen king
>amongst those bar-x's, the one on which the others will converge in a
>normally distributed world.  I guess that makes me a frequentist,
>right?  
>
>And it's not strictly true that Mu is beyond my reach.  I may have
>already reached it with the sample I now hold in my hand.  I just will
>never be sure that I have reached it.  
>
>Could you, Dave, and I perhaps all agree that all ==>certainty<== is
>illusory?  
>
>I don't think that's going to assuage you.  
>
>I am going to have to think more. 
>
>Ugh!  I hate when that happens.