[FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15

[Frank Wimberly]

Eric,

I asked Mike if he was aware of relevant data even though his field is
audiology.  I suspected there may be some overlap between the visual and
auditory cortexes or cortices (my daughter is a Latin teacher) or
similarity of functioning.

Frank
-----------------------------------
Frank Wimberly

My memoir:
https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly

My scientific publications:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2

Phone (505) 670-9918

On Mon, Dec 23, 2019, 3:37 PM Eric Charles <eric.phillip.charles at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Frank,
> There is very cool data about brain plasticity, which i only know the
> surface of.  "Visual cortex" tends to get taken over by other functions.
> If i recall,  much of it will become auditory cortex if you ate blind from
> birth.  But it will definitely vary by person.  Epigenetics and what not.
> Among other very cool research in these regards, I highly recommend Leah
> Krubitzer's experimental work that involves experimentally removing parts
> of developing brains in several species and observing the resulting
> plasticity. https://krubitzer.faculty.ucdavis.edu/leah-krubitzer/
>
> Nick,
> Why aren't you reflexively pointing out that Frank is begging the
> question? The visual cortex is named "visual cortex" because we discovered
> that it is active during "seeing". For that to have happened, we must have
> had a pretty damned solid idea of what *seeing* was, independent of any
> knowledge of what parts of the brain were involved. Thus, saying something
> like "seeing is whatever the visual cortex does" has both the logic and the
> historic chain of events exactly backwards. Rather, the visual cortex is a
> part of the brain that we found to be particularly involved in seeing,
> fairly early in our brain-mapping efforts.
>
> All,
> Speaking for the brand of psychological theory that I buy into, which
> focuses a lot on perception: "Seeing" is what happens when people are
> better at acting with the lights on then they are with the lights off.
> Thus, the blind man *isn't *seeing with a cane and the bat *isn't *seeing
> with its ears. Such metaphors might be useful in some situations -- it is *as
> if *the blind man sees with the cane -- but we will screw up if we lose
> track of the metaphor-work. Similarly, hallucinating *isn't* seeing,
> though it is similar in some ways. Hallucinating is a term exactly intended
> to allow us to contrast with situations in which things are seen. Note the
> clear difference if I said, "Yesterday I saw a car coming towards me when I
> was crossing the street, and just now I hallucinated a car coming towards
> me while I was sitting in my living room."
>
> The description-explanation slippage is happening, both here and
> throughout the field of psychology, because we haven't yet become clear on
> what what we are trying to explain. The explanation for why humans are
> better at particular tasks with the lights on WILL involve the visual
> cortext, if we are going for mechanistic explanations, which are one valid
> type of explanations in most systems. However, visual cortex will not fit
> into a much broader explanation of "seeing", because there are plenty of
> species that see perfectly well without any such thing. At that point, you
> would need to move towards a Gibsonian/Ecological-Psychology explanation.
> That would involve talking about organism-level systems syncing/resonating
> with ambient energy structures in the environment via systems level
> interactions. In such a story, a visual cortex is a component of one of the
> of many system-types that solve the resonance challenge.
>
> Also, there is a very interesting weird side conversation to be had about
> whether "mechanical explanations" are actually "explanatory" in any proper
> sense, or if they are simply an enhanced form of "description. If anyone
> would be interested in THAT conversation, specifically in the context of
> behavior/mind, I would enthusiastically join into an appropriate thread
> with a different title (so the discussions can stay separate).
>
> Best,
> Eric
>
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 21, 2019, 10:23 AM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> An example:  a person who has been totally blind since birth probably has
>> an active visual cortex and therefore sees some kind of "hallucination".
>> Anybody have data on this?  Mike?
>>
>> -----------------------------------
>> Frank Wimberly
>>
>> My memoir:
>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>>
>> My scientific publications:
>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>>
>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 21, 2019, 7:30 AM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> This is a good example of necessary vs sufficient.  In my opinion,
>>> involvement of the visual cortex is necessary but not sufficient for
>>> seeing.  But I'm open minded on this point.
>>>
>>> Frank
>>>
>>> -----------------------------------
>>> Frank Wimberly
>>>
>>> My memoir:
>>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>>>
>>> My scientific publications:
>>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>>>
>>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 20, 2019, 11:17 PM <thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi, Frank,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think I am logical entitled, if not social so, to assert that, on
>>>> your account so far, ANYTHING the visual cortex does is “seeing”.    In
>>>> other words, to be satisfied with your own definition, you will have to
>>>> specify that only those activities of the visual cortex that are involved
>>>> in “seeing” should be considered, in which case, we are right back to
>>>> defining “seeing” again.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nick
>>>>
>>>> Clark University
>>>>
>>>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>>>>
>>>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David
>>>> West
>>>> *Sent:* Friday, December 20, 2019 8:36 AM
>>>> *To:* friam at redfish.com
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Seeing" is the consequence of patterned neural activity in the
>>>> cerebral cortex?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> what is the relevance of "constraints," "enhancements," "inputs
>>>> (electrical impulses or hormones or chemicals that excite/inhibit synaptic
>>>> firing)," that are in any sense "required" for the patterns to form?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> please note these are questions, not assertions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> davew
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Dec 20, 2019, at 2:57 PM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>>>>
>>>> For me it has to involve the visual cortex.  I see things in my dreams
>>>> and I see hallucinations when I drink caffeinated coffee. So I'm not saying
>>>> it's what my eyes do.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Frank Wimberly
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My memoir:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My scientific publications:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 11:18 PM Nicholas Thompson <
>>>> thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Which raises the question, what is your definition  of "see".  To me,
>>>> seeing is building a three dimensional model of the world around you from
>>>> your point of view.  So, a blind man sees with his cane.  You see with a
>>>> television.  You saw trump tonight on the television.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Before you laugh at me, try to build a different definition of "see".
>>>> It's harder than you might suppose.  Whatever my eyes do, won't do.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nick
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019 at 9:52 PM Frank Wimberly <wimberly3 at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I don't mean to answer for Bruce.  That UV light may cause some
>>>> response from my skin but that does not fall within my definition of
>>>> "see".   Not even close.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Frsnk
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Frank Wimberly
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My memoir:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My scientific publications:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 19, 2019, 9:14 PM Nicholas Thompson <
>>>> thompnickson2 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi, Bruce,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I finally found this.  Email grief.  Sorry to be so slow in answering.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nick Thompson
>>>>
>>>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>>>>
>>>> Clark University
>>>>
>>>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>>>>
>>>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Bruce Simon
>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 1:44 PM
>>>> *To:* friam at redfish.com
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Friam Digest, Vol 198, Issue 15
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Birds and bees see ultraviolet light but I don't.
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] Well, your skin sees it, right? If you transduce it down to
>>>> wavelengths that your eye can respond to, you will see it with your eyes,
>>>> right?  So all of this hangs on your definition of “see”.  *
>>>>
>>>>  Flowers give off UV but I can't have the experience of it.  A
>>>> spectrophotometer can detect UV and I can see the dial move but that is not
>>>> the same as experiencing it. *[NST===>] Again, that hangs on a
>>>> definition of “see”.  *“ Suppose God gave me the ability to see like a
>>>> bird.  Could I describe to you what the flower looks like (re. UV?).
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] You mean, I can never experience the world as a bird
>>>> experiences the world, right?  But, on your account, as I understand it, we
>>>> don’t have to appeal to the birds and the bees to reach this conclusion:  I
>>>> can never experience the world as YOU experience it, because each persons
>>>> experience is ineffably his own.  But isn’t there a strange regress going
>>>> on here.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Bruce: I experience that flower.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Nick: I, too, experience that flower.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Bruce: But you don’t experience my experience of that flower.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Nick:  Non-sense.  I am experiencing your experience of that flower as
>>>> we speak!  Otherwise we could not be speaking of it. *
>>>>
>>>> *  you  y  *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, December 11, 2019, 12:23:29 PM MST,
>>>> friam-request at redfish.com <friam-request at redfish.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>> Today's Topics:
>>>>
>>>>   1. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?)
>>>>   2. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (Frank Wimberly)
>>>>   3. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind? (u?l? ?)
>>>>   4. Re: [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
>>>>       (thompnickson2 at gmail.com)
>>>>
>>>> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But
>>>> it's unclear to me what the question is.  If the question is:
>>>>
>>>> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it
>>>> in any language will be a false description?
>>>>
>>>> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy
>>>> quoting Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate
>>>> one way that could happen:
>>>>
>>>> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always
>>>> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce
>>>> the object.
>>>>
>>>> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more
>>>> clearly from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the
>>>> complete description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the
>>>> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete
>>>> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of
>>>> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to
>>>> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of
>>>> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two
>>>> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of
>>>> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture.
>>>>
>>>> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description
>>>> will fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types
>>>> conception.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing
>>>> Automata
>>>>
>>>> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious
>>>> to all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic
>>>> devices, were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could,
>>>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's
>>>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently
>>>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as
>>>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my
>>>> experience.
>>>> >
>>>> > God is therefore real and extant?
>>>> >
>>>> > But wait ...
>>>> >
>>>> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words,
>>>> and the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the
>>>> fact, a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of
>>>> "something." And, of course, the form of all those words and effects is but
>>>> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious)
>>>> within which I was raised.
>>>> >
>>>> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
>>>> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact
>>>> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the
>>>> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the
>>>> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2)
>>>> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the
>>>> "Experience."  None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or
>>>> even differentiable from each other.
>>>> >
>>>> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that
>>>> patterns of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the
>>>> brain before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and
>>>> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of
>>>> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual
>>>> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the
>>>> "outside" —  is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond,
>>>> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... "
>>>> >
>>>> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
>>>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
>>>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
>>>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
>>>> the prediction of effects.
>>>> >
>>>> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
>>>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
>>>> >
>>>> > Despite being, in every way ineffable —  in that no words capture its
>>>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
>>>> false-to-fact.
>>>> >
>>>> > ????
>>>> >
>>>> > dave west
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>>>> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable"
>>>> issue. I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which
>>>> ANYTHING I want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in
>>>> some reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you
>>>> that I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of
>>>> exactly what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but
>>>> I'm not convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability
>>>> to express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the
>>>> way I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real /
>>>> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
>>>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
>>>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive
>>>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
>>>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of
>>>> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in
>>>> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
>>>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
>>>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part.
>>>> The bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
>>>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we
>>>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
>>>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
>>>> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of
>>>> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but
>>>> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>>>
>>>> I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen.
>>>>
>>>> -----------------------------------
>>>> Frank Wimberly
>>>>
>>>> My memoir:
>>>> https://www.amazon.com/author/frankwimberly
>>>>
>>>> My scientific publications:
>>>> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2
>>>>
>>>> Phone (505) 670-9918
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, 11:34 AM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> It seems like you're asking a question with the ???? at the end. But
>>>> it's unclear to me what the question is.  If the question is:
>>>>
>>>> Can a thing-occurance exist/be-real even if any attempt to describe it
>>>> in any language will be a false description?
>>>>
>>>> Phrased that way, it's unclear how anyone could say "No". I enjoy
>>>> quoting Gödel's interpretation of what von Neumann said [†] to demonstrate
>>>> one way that could happen:
>>>>
>>>> von Neumann: But in the complicated parts of formal logic it is always
>>>> one order of magnitude harder to tell what an object can do than to produce
>>>> the object.
>>>>
>>>> Gödel: However, what von Neumann perhaps had in mind appears more
>>>> clearly from the universal Turing machine. There it might be said that the
>>>> complete description of its behavior is infinite because, in view of the
>>>> non-existence of a decision procedure predicting its behavior, the complete
>>>> description could be given only by an enumeration of all instances. Of
>>>> course this presupposes that only decidable descriptions are considered to
>>>> be complete descriptions, but this is in line with the finitistic way of
>>>> thinking. The universal Turing machine, where the ratio of the two
>>>> complexities is infinity, might then be considered to be a limiting case of
>>>> other finite mechanisms. This immediately leads to von Neumann's conjecture.
>>>>
>>>> By this reasoning, it's relatively easy to see why *any* description
>>>> will fall short of the thing described, at least in this levels-of-types
>>>> conception.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [†] Or what Burks says Gödel said anyway -- Theory of Self-Reproducing
>>>> Automata
>>>>
>>>> On 12/11/19 1:58 AM, Prof David West wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious
>>>> to all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic
>>>> devices, were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could,
>>>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's
>>>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently
>>>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as
>>>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my
>>>> experience.
>>>> >
>>>> > God is therefore real and extant?
>>>> >
>>>> > But wait ...
>>>> >
>>>> > I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words,
>>>> and the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the
>>>> fact, a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of
>>>> "something." And, of course, the form of all those words and effects is but
>>>> an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective unconscious)
>>>> within which I was raised.
>>>> >
>>>> > There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
>>>> false-to-fact. What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact
>>>> continues (and predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the
>>>> meaning of 'an experience'. There is an implied relation between the
>>>> "Experience" and an ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2)
>>>> "I" was part of the "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the
>>>> "Experience."  None of these implied relations are accurate or complete, or
>>>> even differentiable from each other.
>>>> >
>>>> > There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that
>>>> patterns of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the
>>>> brain before and after "It" are measurable and comparable. Behavior and
>>>> experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically, in the sense of
>>>> the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of interpretations of individual
>>>> experiences is dramatically altered. Experience — of others on the
>>>> "outside" —  is altered as well, although often not expressible beyond,
>>>> "there's something different about you, can't put my finger on it, but ... "
>>>> >
>>>> > Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
>>>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
>>>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
>>>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
>>>> the prediction of effects.
>>>> >
>>>> > "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
>>>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
>>>> >
>>>> > Despite being, in every way ineffable —  in that no words capture its
>>>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
>>>> false-to-fact.
>>>> >
>>>> > ????
>>>> >
>>>> > dave west
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>>>> >> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable"
>>>> issue. I want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which
>>>> ANYTHING I want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in
>>>> some reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you
>>>> that I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of
>>>> exactly what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but
>>>> I'm not convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability
>>>> to express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the
>>>> way I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real /
>>>> to exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
>>>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
>>>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive
>>>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
>>>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive of
>>>> is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is _in
>>>> principle_ conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
>>>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
>>>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part.
>>>> The bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
>>>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are _in principle_ we
>>>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
>>>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
>>>> be detectable. So the limits of what _is_ are the same as the limits of
>>>> what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing but
>>>> which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally contradictory.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>>>
>>>> ============================================================
>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>>> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>>>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>>>> archives back to 2003: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
>>>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>>>>
>>>> I'm not. Wittgenstein was very cool. But he wasn't a *builder*. (... as
>>>> far as I know. I'd be happy to be wrong.) The thing that (in my ignorant
>>>> opinion) distinguishes people like Wittgenstein from people like Gödel, von
>>>> Neumann, Feynman, etc. ... even Penrose with the tilings and such, is that
>>>> they *build* things. Until the hoity-toity results from the unification
>>>> theorem come percolating down to morons like me, I'll continue treating
>>>> constructive proofs as better and more real/existing than classical proofs.
>>>>
>>>> On 12/11/19 10:44 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
>>>> > I'm surprised no one has quoted Wittgenstein:
>>>> >
>>>> > Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann daruber muss Mann schweigen.
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>>>
>>>> Hi, Dave, and thanks, Frank.  See Larding Below:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nick Thompson
>>>>
>>>> Emeritus Professor of Ethology and Psychology
>>>>
>>>> Clark University
>>>>
>>>> ThompNickSon2 at gmail.com
>>>>
>>>> https://wordpress.clarku.edu/nthompson/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *From:* Friam <friam-bounces at redfish.com> *On Behalf Of *Prof David
>>>> West
>>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, December 11, 2019 2:58 AM
>>>> *To:* friam at redfish.com
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] [EXT] Re: A pluralistic model of the mind?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Last summer I spoke with God. The effects were profound and obvious to
>>>> all. Many of the effects, measured with MRI and encephalographic devices,
>>>> were quantifiable. I spoke of my experience, as best as I could,
>>>> recognizing that whatever words I used told but part of the story. Other's
>>>> experience of me changed as well - they uniformly and consistently
>>>> experience me, not as the fun loving drunken whoring party guy, but only as
>>>> the pious jackass that was the inevitable and most profound effect of my
>>>> experience.
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] My Larder is only half working on this computer.  *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> God is therefore real and extant?
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] Does God “prove out”? In order to answer that question, we
>>>> would have to have a conception of God that could possibly “prove out”.  I
>>>> say that God is the Wizard in Wizard of Oz.  An old guy who hides in a
>>>> closet and manipulates our experience with giant levers.  That conception
>>>> is probably “prove-out-able” but probably doesn’t prove out.  Or, ringed
>>>> around with sufficient special meanings, it could become circular, and
>>>> therefore not “prove-out-able”.  So, *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But wait ...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I did not really speak with God. That word and all the other words, and
>>>> the framing of the effects, piety replacing ribaldry, came after the fact,
>>>> a post hoc rationalization/interpretation/articulation of "something." And,
>>>> of course, the form of all those words and effects is but
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>]  Why “but”, Dave?  It’s an artifact of culture.  It’s an
>>>> experience that proves out only with in the framework of a culture.  As
>>>> long as you stay within the culture, it proves out pretty good.  When you
>>>> moved away from home, it didn’t prove out.  *
>>>>
>>>>  an artifact of the culture (and maybe the Jungian collective
>>>> unconscious) within which I was raised.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There was "An Experience;" but even that label, those two words, is
>>>> false-to-fact.
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>]  Stipulated*
>>>>
>>>> What "Was" had no bounds, in time or space and, in fact continues (and
>>>> predated) the implied bounded context inherent in the meaning of 'an
>>>> experience'. There is an implied relation between the "Experience" and an
>>>> ego, an "I:" 1) the "Experience" was apart from "I," 2) "I" was part of the
>>>> "Experience," 3) "I" perceived/sensed the "Experience."  None of these
>>>> implied relations are accurate or complete, or even differentiable from
>>>> each other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There was a Real, Existing, Thing. "It" was effectual; in that patterns
>>>> of brain waves and detectable activity in different parts of the brain
>>>> before and after "It" are measurable and comparable.
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] Not sure what all this brain talk is doing.  What
>>>> experiences does brain talk represent.  Were you looking at an MRI while
>>>> all of this was happening? *
>>>>
>>>> Behavior and experience — from the "inside" — was altered dramatically,
>>>> in the sense of the "color," the filtering lens, the 'fit" of
>>>> interpretations of individual experiences is dramatically altered.
>>>> Experience — of others on the "outside" —  is altered as well, although
>>>> often not expressible beyond, "there's something different about you, can't
>>>> put my finger on it, but ... "
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] The outsidedness and the insidedness of experiences are
>>>> themselves experiences which prove out in markedly different ways.  *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not only was the "Thing" effectual, it is, within statistical limits,
>>>> possible to predict the nature and degree of the effects that ensue from
>>>> "Thing-Occurrence." Moreover, it is possible to establish an "experimental
>>>> context" whereby others can "experience" the "Thing" and thereby confirm
>>>> the prediction of effects.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Thing-Occurrence" ---> partially predictable, measurable (sometimes
>>>> quantifiable) effects ---> "Thing is Real/Existing?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Despite being, in every way ineffable —  in that no words capture its
>>>> totality and any words used, in any naturally occurring human language, are
>>>> false-to-fact.
>>>>
>>>> *[NST===>] Hang on, Dave. We are starting to talk as if ANYTHING is
>>>> effable.  Let’s agree on an example of proper, unambiguous effing that we
>>>> can use as a model, a case where you, and I, and all members of FRIAM can
>>>> agree, “Nick and Dave really effed that sucker!”  In the meantime, please
>>>> have a look at the attached text, pp 4-8.  *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Here, for the lazy amongst you, is a “gist”*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Working through thought-experiments like the one above leads us to
>>>> conclude that all descriptions, particularly satisfying ones, are
>>>> inevitably explanatory and that all explanations are descriptive. And yet,
>>>> you cannot explain something until you have something to explain – so all
>>>> explanations must be based on prior descriptions. The only reasonable
>>>> conclusion, if you take both of these claims at face value, is that all
>>>> explanations are based on prior explanations! The distinction between
>>>> description and explanation concerns their position in an argument, not
>>>> their objectivity or subjectivity in some enduring sense.  Whether a
>>>> statement is explanatory or descriptive depends upon the understandings
>>>> that exist between the speaker and his or her audience at the time the
>>>> statement is made. *Descriptions are explanations that the speaker and
>>>> the audience take to be true for the purpose of seeking further
>>>> explanations*.[1]
>>>> <#m_-1074620829853032260_m_4003883892656982527_m_-8650350458720351220_m_2300299217579441687_m_-2581826447417716101_m_3115841449660933792_m_-71896931143132>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ????
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dave west
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 11, 2019, at 6:10 AM, Eric Charles wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Ok.... I'm going to try to do a better take on the "ineffable" issue. I
>>>> want to start by admitting that there is some sense in which ANYTHING I
>>>> want to describe is never fully described by the words I use, in some
>>>> reasonable use of the word "fully." If I see a turtle, and I tell you that
>>>> I saw a turtle, I haven't provided you with a full description of exactly
>>>> what the experience was like. So, I'm willing to admit that... but I'm not
>>>> convinced there is anything deeper than that about Nick's inability to
>>>> express his "feelings" to his granddaughter... and with that out of the way
>>>> I will return to what I think is the broader issue.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Real / existing things have effects. That is what it is to be real / to
>>>> exist. If someone wants to talk about something that exists but have no
>>>> effects, they are wandering down an rabbit hole with no bottom, and might
>>>> as well be talking about noiseless sounds or blue-less blue.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The pragmatic maxim tells us: " Consider what effects... we conceive
>>>> the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
>>>> is the whole of our conception of the object." So anything we conceive
>>>> of is, in some sense, a cluster of effects, and so everything "real" is *in
>>>> principle* conceivable. And to the extent anything can be expressed
>>>> adequately - whether by words or any other means of expression - concepts
>>>> can be expressed, and so anything real can be expressed.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> However, i'm not sure the effability is really the important part. The
>>>> bigger question was about epistemology and ontology. But the pragmatic
>>>> maxim covers that as well. Things that have effects are *in principle* we
>>>> may presume there are many, many effects that we don't yet have the means
>>>> to detect, but anything that has effects could, under some circumstances,
>>>> be detectable. So the limits of what *is* are the same as the limits
>>>> of what can in principle be known. Postulation of things that are existing
>>>> but which can't, under any circumstances, be known is internally
>>>> contradictory.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Was that a better reply? It felt more thorough at least...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----------
>>>>
>>>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
>>>>
>>>> Department of Justice - Personnel Psychologist
>>>>
>>>> American University - Adjunct Instructor
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 7:36 PM uǝlƃ ☣ <gepropella at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> I intend to respond to both Nick's and EricC's comments about "faith in
>>>> convergence" at some point. But I've been caught up in other things. So, in
>>>> the meantime, ...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Irony and Outrage," part 2: Why Colbert got serious — and why Donald
>>>> Trump isn't funny
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> https://www.salon.com/2019/12/08/irony-and-outrage-part-2-why-colbert-got-serious-and-why-donald-trump-isnt-funny/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are 2 interesting tangents touching this thread:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 1) Re: ineffability -- "But also that the mere logic of the humorous
>>>> juxtaposition eludes him — the notion that you do not issue the argument,
>>>> you create a juxtaposition that invites the audience to issue an argument."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'll argue that the content of a (good) joke is *ineffable*. The whole
>>>> purpose of the joke teller is to communicate something without actually
>>>> *saying* it. If you explain a joke, it breaks the joke.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And 2) Re: limits to epistemology limiting ontology -- "That, to me, is
>>>> illustrative of that broader point I try to make about how when a threat is
>>>> salient to you, it becomes hard to enter the state of play, ..."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I *would* argue that pluralists will be more able to enter the "state
>>>> of play" Goldthwaite describes (and I've described on this list a number of
>>>> times as variations of "suspension of disbelief", "empathetic listening",
>>>> and being willing to play games others set up) than monists. I think
>>>> monists should TEND to be more committed to their way of thinking than
>>>> pluralists ... more willing to believe their own or others' brain farts. At
>>>> least in my case, being a pluralist means, in part, that I refuse to
>>>> *commit* to ontological assertions of any kind. I'll play with various
>>>> types of monism just as readily as I'll play with 3-tupleisms ... or
>>>> 17-tupleisms. I think that's what makes me a simulant of passing
>>>> competence. You just need to tell me *what* -ism you want to simulate.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As such, it seems that maybe Dave's got the cart before the horse. It's
>>>> the failure of ontology that's mandating voids in epistemology. We should
>>>> work toward robust *ways of knowing* and loosen up a bit on whatever it is
>>>> we think we know. I say "would argue" of course because, being totally
>>>> ignorant of philosophy, I'm probably just confused about everything.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 12/10/19 12:43 PM, Prof David West wrote:
>>>>
>>>> > Both your anecdotes support, my assertion that lots of things and
>>>> lots of experiences are ineffable. This does not mean they are not
>>>> "expressible" nor "communicable, merely that they cannot be expressed with
>>>> words nor communicated using words.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > Words fail! Indeed!
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > Entire languages fail. Entire epistemological philosophies fail.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > You "rendered" the ineffable to your grand-daughter, but you did NOT
>>>> render them to me with words. You you words to circumscribe and speak about
>>>> an experience of a kind that you believe I might have first hand, equally
>>>> ineffable, experience of and that your indirect words would move me to make
>>>> a connection. At best, your words, your language, worked like a game of
>>>> Charades or Pictionary as a means of limning the space wherein I might find
>>>> my own experience of like kind.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > A "mystic" engages an experience that is ineffable, and then utters
>>>> thousands, book volumes worth, of words attempting to limn a space wherein
>>>> you too might engage the same experience — or, if an optimist, might awaken
>>>> in you a recognition of what you have already experienced. More Charades
>>>> and Pictionary — spewing forth words ABOUT the experience; never
>>>> expressing, in words or language, the experience itself.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > At least some ineffable experiences can be expressed directly using a
>>>> language of voltages and wave forms, (Neurotheology), but not words or
>>>> mathematical symbols or such-based languages.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > The question remains: why does a failure of epistemology mandate
>>>> voids in ontology?
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > I love your etymological daffiness, I share it.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > The definitions cited reflect an arrogance of the "enlightened" in
>>>> the notion "too great for words." A lot of mystics make this, what I
>>>> believe to be, error, attempting to grant an ontological status of REAL
>>>> that does not follow from the simple fact that it cannot be expressed in
>>>> words.
>>>>
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> > And another sidenote — something might be "ineffable" simply because
>>>> you are not allowed to use a word, ala Carlin's seven dirty words, or the
>>>> "N-Word" or the "C-Word."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>> ☣ uǝlƃ
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ============================================================
>>>>
>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>> ============================================================
>>>>
>>>> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> [1]
>>>> <#m_-1074620829853032260_m_4003883892656982527_m_-8650350458720351220_m_2300299217579441687_m_-2581826447417716101_m_3115841449660933792_m_-71896931143132> Conversely,
>>>> explanations are descriptions that the speaker and audience hold to be
>>>> unverified under the present circumstances.
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>> ============================================================
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>>> ============================================================
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> ============================================================
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