[FRIAM] Motives - Was Abduction

glen gepropella at gmail.com
Sun Jan 6 18:47:05 EST 2019


Unfortunately, that is the sense in which I thought you were using the term. Have I been strawmanned? 8^)

The packaging of a scalar vs the packaging of a matrix are "levels of analysis", if there ever was such a thing. 8^) To use Eric(C)'s words the organization of a set of numbers into a matrix isn't in the scalars of which it's composed.

My example was that higher-organized things like feeling hungry mix directly with lower-organized things like eyeball jittering. The organization of the low level stuff (e.g. tissues) isn't hygenically separated from the organization of the chemicals into a cell. I.e. tissue isn't strictly made up of cells, and cells aren't strictly made up of complex molecules, etc. Tissue is a cross-level operator. Tissue is made of molecules as well as cells (as well as other mixed-level things like lumens).

Hence, it's a fiction (oversimplification) to say that tissue is an organization of cells. Your hierarchy is fictitious (though perhaps useful for an entry into some subject matter). 

On January 5, 2019 2:49:16 PM PST, Nick Thompson <nickthompson at earthlink.net> wrote:
> 
>
>But you are exactly right that that is the sense in which I wanted to
>use the term. 
>
> 
>
>
>
>From: Friam [mailto:friam-bounces at redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric
>Charles
>Sent: Saturday, January 05, 2019 3:05 PM
>To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
><friam at redfish.com>
>Subject: [FRIAM] Motives - Was Abduction
>
> 
>
>Glen said: " I would claim motives are a higher order behavior, but NOT
>(solely) at a higher level of organization.  I.e. motives consist of
>BOTH low level behaviors like eyeball saccades AND high level behaviors
>like how one feels about another person." And then a bit later Glen
>complained (rightly) that no one had followed up on his examples. I
>will attempt to fill that gap!
>
> 
>
>I suspect the first issue is here is what we call "higher level."
>Sometimes, when people reference "higher level behavior", they are
>envisioning something like a "ladder of life" with simpler beings lower
>down and more complex beings higher up. In that context, something like
>a saccade is low on the scale, because many "lower beings" do it, and
>throwing a baseball might be higher on the scale, because only a few
>non-human species are capable of such a thing. Based on how the above
>quote is phrased,  I believe that is what Glen very-understandably
>thinks Nick is be talking about.  However, Nick is invoking something
>else entirely, something like "levels of analysis" talk, in which
>meaningful "higher" things exist in the relations between lower-level
>things. 
>
> 
>
>The most common context in which people are exposed to this is in
>biology class, where we are told that at some level there are cells,
>and that many cells of similar type make tissue, tissue combines into
>organs, organs into organ systems, and systems into organisms. In some
>obvious sense, cells "make up" organs, but also one would not really
>come to understand organs by virtue of individually examining cells.
>There is something "higher-level" going on, something about the
>organization of the cells that we consider important, and worth talking
>about and studying in its own right, which is why organ-talk and
>organ-level science are things.  
>
> 
>
>When Nick says that " Motives ARE behavior.  Just at a higher level of
>organization.", he means "higher level" in that sense. We see that
>someone is motivated towards a certain goal when we witness them
>varying their behavior across circumstances in order to achieve that
>goal. If we want to measure how motivated someone is, we change the
>circumstances so that they are no longer directed at (what we assume to
>be) their goal, and then measure the strength of their effort to
>"return to course." That line of thought can be elaborated extensively,
>with other examples brought in from both scientific efforts and mundane
>life, and what you end up with is the conclusion that: Motives are an
>identifiable type of pattern that can exist between behavior and
>circumstances, specifically a pattern in which behavior changes such
>that the acts in question continue to be directed towards producing a
>particular outcome. 
-- 
glen



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