[FRIAM] OK. That's funny.

[jon zingale]

Ha, yeah. Originally, I had only meant to compare two (potentially
hallucinatory) modalities that I find myself humoring. On the one hand, an
arborescent ordering of my world (universal grammar of belief), and on the
other something more like a nomadic exploration of a rhizome. As a sort of
side comment to this, I mentioned a weak rejection of Peircean truth
relative to such a universal grammar of belief (UGB). There were also
caveats, I am talking about belief in a narrow sense. For these purposes, I
claim beliefs to be things that we discover via performance (belief
competence) and not the kind of things discoverable by reflecting on
hypotheticals. Additionally, along the lines of Chomsky's universal grammar,
UGBs are arbitrarily given by the historical accident of biology. This last
point opens the door to a reasonable assumption that any two people will
ultimately disagree on what they are capable of believing. What I find
interesting in this characterization is that apt-beliefs (roughly, beliefs
that one has and ought to have) may be part of the commons in the short run,
but are likely to be ruled out in the long run, and so will be found false
by a Peircean determination of truth. Again, the idea is that even if one
can profit in the world by putting their apt-belief to work, these beliefs
will generally be non-transferrable exactly because they will not be part of
another's UGB. I personally have no emotional investment in these ideas
(making no claim even in a broader sense to believe them), but the logic of
it all seemed curious enough to post about.



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